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I.

lNTRODUC110N
•

The elderly are the fastest growing segment in the U.S. population.
In 1990, persons over sixty-five comprised 12.5% of the United States
population; by 2020, it is projected this group will be 17.7% and by
2050, 25% of the total population.• Unfortunately, interest in solving
the problems facing the elderly has not grown as fast as the elderly
population. Despite congressional and scholarly estimates that between
2
1 and 2 million cases of elder mistreatment occur every year, few
3
cases are reported to .state authorities and only a minute number result
in criminal prosecution or civil litigation. In our civil courts and criminal justice system, mistreated aged persons are truly voiceless and their
suffering invisible.
Elder mistreatment occurs in all segments of our population, irre4
spective of race, sex, ethnic or socioeconomic background. Victims
often feel powerless. Much mistreatment occurs within the family and
the elderly person is often simultaneously embarrassed by the abuse,fearful of future mistreatment, and paradoxically, protective of the abus-

L See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF

nm

UNITED STATES: 1990,_ at 16, 37 (llOth ed. 199.0) [hereinafter 1990 STATISTICAL AD·
STRACT] (table no. 18, Projections of the Total Population by Age, Sex, and Race: 1989 to

2010).
2~

See House Subcomm~ on Health Long-Tenn _Care, Elder Abuse: A Decade of Shame and
Inaction: A Report by the Chairman of the Subcomm. on Health and Long-Term Care of the
Select Comm. on-Aging, House of Representatives, lOlst Cong.,_2d Sess. XI (1990) (hereinnller
1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT] (estimating more than 1.5 million persons may be victims
of such abuse each year, and the number is rising); see also Karl A. Pillemcr & David
Finkelhor, The Prevalence of Elder Abuse: A Random Sample Survey, 28 GERONTOLOGIST S 1
(1988) (estimating 700,000-1,100,000 cases of elder mistreatment, excluding financial exploita·
tion, more than a decade ago).
3. See 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at XIII (summarizing data report·
ed by States and Adult Protective Services workers and estimating only one in eight cases or
elderly abuse is ever reported).
4. See Steuer & Austin, Family Abuse of the Elderly, 28 J. AM. GERIATRIC Soc'y 372
(1980).
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5

Because it most often occurs in private residences against persons
who have limited contact \Vith outsiders, it is antong the most hidden
6
of contemporary America's _
problems. Mistreatment of the elderly is
often equated with physical abuse, but more often it takes the fotnl of
less drmnatic but equally damaging behaviors psychological or emotional abuse, financial exploitation, .and neglect of care-taking obligaer.

tions.'
S. See, e.g., Jordan I. Kosberg & Daphne Nahmiash.. Ch:araclerlstlcs. of J7ctfm.s· and Perpetrators and Milieus of Abuse and Neg/eel, in ABUSE, NEGLECt, M'D ExPLOrrATJON OF OLDER
PERSONS: S'IRATEGIES FOR AsSESSt-fENT AND INTERVENTION 31, 33, 42 (Lorin A. Baum}Jover &

S. Colleen Beall eds~ l996) [hereinafter Kosberg & Nahmiash].
6. See id. at 32.
7. Examples of shocking mistreatrnent could be recounted without end. A fc\v· of the situ•
ations described by the 1990 Elder Abuse House Report arc reproduced here \·erb3lim to Ulusbate the danger faced by some elderly persons.
An 82-year.-old woman suffered a brutal beating at the hands of her 40-y~-otd
daughter and had to be hospitalized for 8 v.·eeks. She had been kicked and had her
hair pulled out and puncture wounds had been inflicted by sharp Qbjects all o\·er her
body. The daughter, who was reportedly unable to \\·ork because of back problems.
was totally dependent upon her mother for financial support. The mother \'t-as found
to be passive, withdrawn, pale and weak and so intimidated by the daughter that she
was unable to consider taking any action to move or seek retribution.
An elderly woman was brought to the hospital by paramedics. confused and minimal·
ly responsive. She was severely dehydrated and her hair was completely matted.
She had maggots all over her left leg, which had been \\Tapped in cloth, and bloody
drainage coming out of her btees. She vtcigbed about 60 pounds. All unco_vered
parts of the woman's body revealed deep pwplc bruises. She also ha.d a left
blacked :eye and a deep gash over her right eyebrow. The· \\·oman, upon questioning
by police., said she lived with her daughter and children. She \VouJdn't confun1 that
her daughter had beaten her or denied her care because, "I don't \\'ant to get anyQnc
in trouble."

From Texas ·came the report of a client, age 69, \Vho \Vas. found by a neighbor one
night, lying on the ground naked with ants cra\vling on her. The v.·oman \\'US paralyzed on one side from a stroke and had heart problems.
An 88-year-old \Vashington State woman had her prescribed medications ,,·ithhcld by
her guardian. Cared for by a home health aide, the ·woman has ~portcdty had teeth
extracted without any anesthetic and is continually having her tracheotomy nnd g•tubc
replaced by unqualified help. She was re.cenUy dropped during a move from room
to room and now has a broken nose. No X-rays or pain medication \\"Crc administered. She has been routinely left in her chair for 12 hours nt a time nnd has· very
fragile skin which is wlnerabte to decubiti.

A home health aide in New Hampshire was startled to fmd her client, an elderly
woman,_in urine and feces·soiled clothing. The· v.·oman had sUffered severe \ttcight
loss, too. The woman's husband, her caregiver, had failed to contact his \\ifc•s
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This Article explores the critical legal issues underlying this prevalent, disturbing, yet unremediated phenomenon. At present our legal
system tries to protect the elderly in two major ways: through criminal
laws which outlaw mistreatment and prescribe punishments for it, and
through legal mandates that require professionals to report reasonably
8
suspected instances of abuse, thus triggering state protective services.
My thesis is that these fonns of protection are ineffective. Our present
system of reliance on the criminal law to deter and punish abusers is
inadequate, and penal statutes which mandate professionals to report
cases of mistreatment have failed.- New approaches are -needed. Civil
remedies, especially malpractice actions against professionals who fail
to report cases despite statutory obligations, may prove more effective
in identifying and ultimately preventing instances of mistreatment.
The first five parts of the Article present an overview of the history
of elder abuse and neglect, its contemporary "discovery," and its prevalence. In Part VI, the main state statutory responses are reviewed, in
conjunction with a series of appendices which list, and provide easy
access to, the statutes. Legal actions against perpetrators are discussed
in Part VII. Part VIII outlines the obligations of various professionals- e.g., physicians, nurses, social service agencies, home health workers who come in contact with the elderly and their families to identify
mistreatment and to report it to state authorities. Available evidence
9
indicates that reports are rarely made, and since abuse is often cyclical
10
and repeated; failure to report often means further injury and loss for
victims. While 43 jurisdictions make the failure to -report reasonably
11
suspected elder mistreatment a criminal offense, these statutes are
12
seldom enforced by prosecutors.
I thus propose the use of malpractice theories, and other civil remedies as catalytic agents to improve

physician as he had promised the aide he would, although his wife v1as weak and
malnourished and had to be hospitaliZed. Upon questioning, the husband became
angry. He denied that his wife was neglected-he said he sometimes might seem to
be ignoring her but that was only to encourage her to do things by herseJ£ When
officials asked him about his wife's difficulty breathing, which was another symptom,
be said he treated that by applying Vicks ojntment to her chest In fact, she had
serious respiratory problems.
1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE RE!'ORT supra note 2, at 1-7. The Report S,ets out more than 3,5
such stories, noting these are "meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive." ld at 1.
8.. See infra Part VIII.
9.. See infra notes 205.. t 6 and accompanying texl
10. See infra notes 358, 366-67 and accompanying text
ll. See infra Appendices B and E (listing statutes & penalties for non-reporters).
12. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
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diagnosis and increase identification of cases. Compliance \Vith mandatory reporting laws is critical in stemming elder abuse. Child abuse
may be detected because children are often observed by teachers and
others, but many aged persons are isolated or immobile. Although
professionals may insure against monetaiy liability,. licensure sanctions,
.

.

\Vhich are discussed in Part VIII.E, may be an even stronger lever.

Combined with financial exposure, professional discipline may be strong
enough to force significant changes in the behavior of professionals.

n.

HISTORICAL Co

OF THE PROBLEM

In many aspects of human endeavor there is an understandable
tendency to view the past as a ''golden age" and to mourn the '\vorld
13

we have lost" We are particularly prone to myth-making \Vith regard
to the aged; we imagine a past \Vhere extended families coexisted
peacefully and the aged received loving care. Ho,vever, much evidence
14
now contradicts that view. In preindustrial times, the aged \Vere often
15
treated quite harshly.
Anthropologists have documented that killing
16
the aged or abandoning them to die \Vas not unusual. \Vestem literature, from Greek myths to modem fiction, is replete \vith child-parent
17
conflict. In the sixteenth century, the brilliant gerontologist, \Villiam
Shakespeare, was able to encapsulate intergenerational tension \Vith
uncommon clarity, in the speech of Goneril, King Lear',s abusive
daughter:
Idle old man
•

That still would manage those authorities

That he hath given away.
Now by my life

Old fools are babes again, and must be used \Vith checks as
13. PErER LAsLErr, 1HE \VORLD \VE HAVE I.osr S-7. 2SO·S3 (196S).
14. See Corinne N. Nydegger, Family Ties of the Aged In Cross.Cultural Perspeclh-e, In
GROWING OLD IN AMERICA 71-8S (Beth B. Hess & Elizabeth \V. ~itukson eds._ 198S).
15. See Peter J. Steams, Old Age Fami6' Conjlicl: 77:e Perspeclh·e of the Pmt,. In ELDa
ABUSE: CONFLICT IN mE FAMILY 3•24 (Karl A. Pillemer &. Rosalie A. \Volfe c:ds._ 1986).
16. See Nancy Foner, Caring for the Elderly: A CrolS-C.u/Jural Ylew, In GROWING OLD JN
AMERICA 387-400 (Beth B. Hess & Elizabeth \V. 1\iarkson eds., 1985); see also Anthony
Glascock. & Susan Feinman, Social Asset or Social Burden: An Analysis of the Treatment of
the Aged in Non-lndzlstrial Societies, in D~fENSIONS: AGING, CULTURE AND HEALm (Christine

L. Fey ed., 1981).
17. See Shulamit Reinharz, Loving and Hating One's Elders: T1dn Themes in Legend tmd
Literature, in SteamsJ supra note IS, at 2548.
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flatteries, when they are seen
18
abused.
Goneril's disdain for her father reflects her perception that his power
has been relinquished and redistributed. His powerlessness creates the
vacuum which her cruelty fills. As we shall see, many contemporary
legal issues of the aged reflect their vulnerability and precarious social
19
and economic position.
III.

CONTEMPORARY DISCOVERY OF ELDER AB_USE

Elder mistreatment is the most recent variety of domestic violence
to command _public concern. In a pioneerin_g 1962 article, Doctor
Kempe and colleagues directed the medical community's attention to
the problem of physical child abuse, and coined the tenn ''battered
20
child syndrome.'' Within a few years, volumes of research on child
abus_e were ·published, and all fifty states enacted legislation mandating
the reporting of suspected child abuse to public agencies and providing
21
protective services for children.
Mandated reporters were typically
22
professionals such as doctors, nurses, and social workers.
By 1974,
Congress had passed the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
23
Act, which provided fe:deral financial incentives to create comprehensive state progrwns and procedures addressing child abus_e and neglect.
The act also established the National Center on Child Abuse and Ne.,
glect to serve as a central agency on incidence and research related to
• 24
that toptc.

18. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, K.lNG LEAR act I, sc. 3 ..
19. See generally BE'ITY FRIEDAN, THE FOUNTAIN OF AGE 35·38, 3941 (1993} (noting the

absence of positive images of older persons in contemporary American mass culture, the in·
creased attention to age as a "problem," and the burdens imposed by Social Security and Medl·
care on younger persons).
20. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17~24 (1962).
21. See Monrad G. Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. Rev.
679, 711 (1966).

22. See Brian G. Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to Child
Abuse, 12 AM. CRIM~ L. REv. 103, 109-10 (1974).
23. 42 U.S.C..A. §§ 5101-5107, 5119 (West 1995).
24. See id The most recent National Incidence Study, by the National Center, based on n
sample of 842 child protective agencies, estimates that I ,553,800 children were abused or ne"''
glected in 1993, quadruple the total in 1986. See ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DJANB D.
BROADHURST, U.S. DEP~T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L CIR. ON CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT; ExEctmVE SUMMARY OF THE THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUOY OP CHILD ABUSE

AND NEGLECT 3 (Sepl 1996).

1998]

SAVING GRANNY FROM THE WOLF

83

In the 1970s, spousal abuse and other fonns of violence against
women began to receive organized public and professional attention.25
A broad-based movement arose, including refonn of the law and the
development of social programs.26 Despite the fact that aged victims
and battered spouses/partners have much in common-indeed some
abused elderly fit both categories-little note was taken of the special
problems of older persons.
While anecdotal reports were published in the 1970s in Great Britain, calling attention to "granny bashing,"27 stUdies indicating that elder
abuse was a serious national problem in the United States did not begin
to appear until the late 1970s.28 In 1981, the Select Committee on Aging of the United States House of Representatives issued a landmark
report, Elder Abuse: An Examination of a Hidden Problem,29 which
attempted to define the nature of elder mistreatment and detennine its
extent The report estimated 4% of the elderly-roughly one million
persons-might be victims of mistreatment annually. It concluded that
while elder mistreatment was a "hidden problem," it was widespread
and largely unreported.30
Federal legislation and funding had improved systems for child
abuse prevention and treatment In 1974, protective services for adults
became a state-mandated program under Title XX of the Social Security Act31 Adult Protective Services (APS) is "a system of preventive,
supportive, and surrogate services for the elderly living in the commu-

25. The literature on spouse abuse is vast Among the earliest 1111d best known works nrc:
LENORE E. WALKER. 1HE BATIERED WOMAN (1979); Laurie Woods, Lfllgalfon on Behalf of
Battered Women, 5 WOMEN'S RlS. L. REP. 7 (1978); Terry L. Fromson, Note, The Case for
Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. cw-aE 135 (1977).
26. See, e.g., DEBORAH RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATIOM AND n1E LAW
237-44 (1989); Naomi Hilton Archer, Note, Battered Women and the Legal System: Past, Present and Future, 13 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 145 (1989). See generally Daniel J. Jacobs, Battered Women and Related Domestic Violence Issues: A Selecth:e Bibliography, 49 REc. Ass'N
B. CITY N.Y. 786-94 (1994) (listing over 100 articles on domestic violence).
27. See Letter from Burston to the Editor, in 1975 BRIT. 1\iED. J. 592; A.A. Baker, Granny
Battering, MODERN GERIA1RICS 20-24 (Aug. 5, 1975).
28. See, e.g., 1HE BATIERED ELDER SYNDROME: AN ExPLORATORY STUDY (Marilyn Block
& Jan Sinnott eds., 1979); E. Lau & I. Kosberg, Abuse of the Elderly by Informal Care Providers, AGING, Sept-Oct 1979, at 10.
29. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 97m CONG., 1ST SESS., ELDER ABUSE: AN Ex.\l.uNATION OF A HIDDEN PROBLEM (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter 1981 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE
REPoRT].
30. /d. at xiii-xiv.
31. Social Services Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, §§ 2001-2006, 88 Stat 233748 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1397a-c (West Supp. 1998)).

HeinOnline ·· 31 Conn. L. Rev. 83 1998-1999
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nity to enable them to maintain independent living and avoid abuse and
32
exploitation."
Federal Title XX block grant funding decreased dramatically during the 1980s and states were forced to fund and develop
their own responses to elder mistreatment, which soon proved inadequate.33 Nonetheless, state-funded Adult Protective Services agencies
remain the primary referral source for ,elderly mistreatment reports.
Although the 1981 Elder Abuse Report recommended that Congress
act to assist states in identifying and treating victims of elder abuse and
neglect, little federal action or funding followed. H.R. 7551, the Elder
Abuse Treatment & Prevention Act of 1980, was introduced in the 96th
Congress, and in subs,equent Congresses. The Act was modeled on the
federal child abuse statute; but never enacted. As a result, no consistent federal leadership policy or financing has emerged to protect non34
institutionalized elders living in the community.
The federal Older
35
Americans Act Amendments of 1987 required local Area Agencies on
Aging to assess the need for elder abuse prevention services and the
extent to which the need was being met While $5 million was authorized to be spent in 1988, 1989, and 1990, no money was actuaUy
36
appropriated in those years.
37
In 1978, Congress amended the Older Americans Act of 1965 to
mandate the establishment of -a Long Tenn Care Ombudsman program
38
in every state.
The 1987 Amendments increased the responsibilities
of state ombudsman programs, which attempt to protect residents of
39
nursing homes and similar institutions from abuse and neglect.
The
ombudsman is authorized to receive and investigate complaints of maltreatment and inadequacies in nursing homes. The situation of aged or
disabled residents in institutional care is often dire. Captive markets,
the lure of profits, and inadequate regulatory resources combine to

32. John Regan, Intervention Through Adult Protective Services Programs, 18 THE GBR()N•
TOLOGIST 250, 251 (1978).
33. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS~ GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND
DATA ON PROGRAMS WrniiN THE JURISDICITON OF THE COMMI1.1"EE ON WAYS AND MEANS,

103d Cong~, Ist Sess. 876 (1993).
34. A very scaled-down and poorly funded National Center on Elder Abuse was included in
the Older Americans Act of 1992. Today its future is in doubt because no appropriation wns
included in the 1997 budget See Rosalie Wolf, Elder Abuse & Neglect, 2 A.B.A. SEC. PROD.
& REAL PROP~ (8th Ann. Spring CLE Meeting) May 1997, at D-62.
35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3058i (West 1994).

36. .1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 71.
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq. (1994).
38. See id § 3027(a)(12).
39. See id.
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Problems include: lo\V pay and poor
40
working conditions for staff, inadequate facilities and unsanitary con42
ditions_,41 and the inappropriate use of physical and chemical restraints
to name but a few. A considerable caselaw has emerged reflecting the
43
rights of residents in such facilities, and the literature is \Vell-developed.44 As a result, this article will focus on issues of malb~tment of
45
the elderly in the community, where litigation has been rare.
Until 1977, no state had a statute specifically aimed at protecting
46
the aged; by 1985, undoubtedly expecting federal funding, 44 states
47
had passed such statutes. Presently, all fifty states have them. The
statutes drew on the experience with child and adult protective services
legislation and typically include two components: 1) coordinated provision of services for the elderly determined to be at risk of abuse and 2)
actual or potential power of state or local agencies to intervene to protect endangered individuals. Prior to 1980, only 16 states required professionals or others to report suspected elder abuse. In the decade between 1980 and 1990, 26 additional states and the District of Columbia
48
enacted such provisions.
place many at substantial risk.

IV.

"GREYING" OF "IHB UNI'l"ED STATES POPULATION

One of the dominant demographic trends in the United States this
centuty is the aging of our population. Persons over sixty-five are the

40. See GEORGE P. SMilH, LEGAL AND HEALlHCARE Ennes FOR nl£ ELDERLY 99 (1996).
41. See USA TODAY, May 30, 1990, at 10-A (account of a 93-volumc report of the federal
Health Care Financing Administration describing outrageous violations of even minilrull standards
of sanitation in food preparation and handling, basic requirements for lavoratory needs, etc.).
42. See SMI1H, supra note 40, at 96 ("On any given day, nearly 500,000 older Americans
are physically restrained to their beds and chairs.").
43. See, e.g., Martin v. Voinovicb, 840 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (holding privnte
right of action created by 1987 Amendments, and enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
public facilities); Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. 489 N.E.2d 1374 (Ill. 1986) (lmplying dam·
age action for nursing home residents under Illinois statute).
44. See, e.g~, Tunothy S. Jost, Enforcement of Quality Nursing Home Care In lhe Legal
System, 13 LAw, ?\iEDICINE & HEAL1H CARE 160 (198S); ~1nry Kalhlcen Robbins, Comment.
Nursing Home Reform: Objective Regulation or Subjectire Decisions?, 11 ThO!-fAS COOLEY L.
REv. 185 (1994); Bruce C. VJadeck, The Pas( Present, and Future of A'urslng Home Quality,
275 JAMA 425 (1996).
45. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
46. See Miller & Dodder, The Abused: Abuser Dyad, Elder Abuse in lhe Slate of Florida,
in ELDER ABUSE: PRACllC£ & POUCY 167 (R. Filinson & S. Ingman cds., 1989).
47. See id.
48. See 1990 ELDa ABUSE HOUSE REPoRT, supra note 2, at 66.
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49

fastest growing segment of our population. Both the number of aged
in this country and their percentage relative to the overall population
have steadily increased. In 1900 there were approximately three million people aged sixty-five and over, constituting 4% of the population.50 By 1950, the number of elderly had increased to 12 million, or
51
8% of the population.
In 1980, the elderly were 25 million strong
2
and had increased to 11% of the population.5 Of this 25 million, 2.9
53
million were older than eighty.
By 1994, the sixty-fives and older
had grown to 33.2 million, or 12.5% of the total population, and the
number is expected to increase to more than 40.1 million by 2010,
54
almost 13.3% of the nation's total population. The percentage of elderly in the United States population is further projected to reach
55
21.8% by 2030.
Embedded within this general trend are two notable subfactors.
First, the proportion of those over eighty-five years old is growing
faster than the number of elderly in general. Although representing
only 1% of the population in 1980 (2.2 million), this over-age eighty56
five segment will double to 2% by 2000 (4.6 million) and increase to
57
more than 5% by 2050.
Second, the elderly population is predominantly female. At every year past sixty-five, women outnumber men,
8
and the ratio of women to men increases as the cohort ages. 5
As the number of elderly grows and as a greater proportion of
them live longer, the number of individuals in the general population
that will require medical and health services will increase as well. In
addition, given the large and increasing number of cases of elder abuse

49. See 1990 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1.
50. See Christine A. Metcalf, Comment, A Response to the Problem of Elder Abuse: Florida's Revised Adult Protective Services Act, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 745, 746-47 (1986).
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See SENATE SUBCOMMITIEE ON AGING, CONSERVATORSHIP OF TilE ELDERLY: RECOM•
MENDATIONS FOR ITS INTERFACE WITH PROGRAMS AND SERVICES FOR OLDER CALIFORNIANS 1

(Senate Office of Research, prepared by Marquart Policy Analysis Assoc. 1988) [hereinafter
CONSERVATORSHIP REcOMMENDATIONS].

54. See Susan Levine, Aging Baby Boomers Pose Challenge: Preparations Needed for Com·
ing Strain on Services, Census Report Says, WASH. POST, May 21, 1996, at A09.
55. See SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, AGING AMERICA: TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS
(Annotated) lOlst Cong. 84-85 (Comm. Print 1990) (revised by Elizabeth Vierck).
56. See 1990 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 37 tbl. 41 (Population 65 Years Old
and Over, By Age Group and Sex, 1960 to 1988, and Projections, 1990 and 2000).
57. See 1990 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 37 tbl. 41 (Population 65 Years Old
and Over, By Age Group and Sex, 1960 to 1988, and Projections, 1990 and 2000).
58. See LAWRENCE FROLIK & ALISON P. BARNES, ELDER LAW 15-16 (1992).
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and neglect, we can predict an increasing demand for services to deal
with this problem.
V.

PREVALENCE OF ELDER ABUSE AND NEGLECT

You shall rise before the aged and sho1v deference to tlze old

-Leviticus 19:3.2
While the exact prevalence of elder mistreatment cannot be determined \vith precision, there is consensus that a very large number of
older persons are affected. After congressional hearings \vere conduct·
ed, a 1981 report issued by the House Select Committee on Aging
estimated 4% of the American elderly population, approximately 1
60
million persons, may be victims of moderate to severe abuse.
The
study also concluded that elder abuse, although at least as prevalent as
61
child abuse, is far less likely to be reported.
The committee found
that physical abuse, including neglect, is the most common type of
62
mistreatment, follo\ved by financial and psychological abuse.
Ten
years later, a follow up congressional report, ''Elder Abuse: A Decade
of Shame and Inaction," detennined that the situation had \VOrsened;
elder maltreatment was reported to be increasing and 5% of the elderly~
or more than 1.5 million elderly persons, \Vere estimated abused yearly.63 Ninety percent of states reported to the Committee that the inci64
dence of elder mistreatment was increasing.
Academic researchers have made similar prevalence estimates. In
1988, using a methodology that \Vas validated previously in 1:\vo national family violence surveys, a research team surveyed over .2,000 .noninstitutionalized elders living in the metropolitan Boston area and found
that 3.2% had experienced physical abuse, verbal aggression, and/or neglect.65 Extrapolated, this finding \Vould mean 700,000 to 1,100,000
cases of mistreatment across the nation. Spousal abuse (58%) \vas
more prevalent than abuse by adult children (24%}, and the proportion
of victims. was roughly equally divided bet\veen males and females.
See infra Part V.
See 1981 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPoRT, supra note 29, at xiv-xv.
See id. at xiv.
See id. at xv.
See 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPoRT, supra note 2. at XI.
64. See ill :at XIV.
65. See Plllemer & Finkelhor, supra note 2, at S1-52.
59.
60.
61.
62..
63.•
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Financial exploitation was not even queried in this survey. Other
66
American studies have produced similar estimates.
International surveys have confirmed these general prevalence statistics. A Canadian study, using a nationally representative sample of
elders able to respond on the telephone, found 4% had recently experienced one or more fonns of mistreatment. The rates for men and
women were about equal, but financial abuse was more common than
67
physical or other maltreatment. A British study found 6% of individuals aged 65 to 74 reported recent verbal abuse by a close family
member or relative; 2% reported physical mistreatment, and 1% finan68
cial exploitation.
A survey, using written questionnaires and clinical
evaluations to detertnine the rate of abuse and neglect in a small, semiindustrialized town in Finland, produced a 3% elder mistreatment prev69
alence rate for men and 9% for women, or 5.4% for both sexes.
Since all these surveys are based on self-reporting, the percentages most
likely are an underestimation of the problem rather than an exaggeration.70
While I focus on this segment of the elderly in this Article, it is
important to note that most older persons are not abused or neglected.
Many live independently, or are cared for in a loving and professional
manner by their families or others. Often that care is provided at great
personal and societal expense. We should not categorize the aged in a
negative, monolithic vision. At the same time, the law should provide
remedies where wrongs are perpetrated.
As noted earlier, only a small fraction of the estimated 1-1/2 to 2
million cases of mistreatment in U.S. communities comes to the attention of authorities. The 1990 House of Representatives Elder Abuse
Report concluded that elder abuse is far less likely to be reported than
child abuse, estimating only one of eight cases of elder abuse, as compared with one of three cases of child abuse, is reported to the authori-

66. See, e.g., Susan Steinmetz, Elder Abuse, AGING, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 610.
67. See Podnieks, National Survey of Abuse of the Elderly in Canada, 4 J. ELDER ABUSB &
NEGLECT (1/2), 5 (1992).
68. See Ogg & Bennett, Elder Abuse in Britain, 305 BRIT. MED. J. 998-99 (1992).
69. See Kivela et aJ., Abuse in Old Age: Epidemiological Data from Finland, 4 J. ELD. AB.
AND NEGL. No.3, 1 (1992).

70. There is room for debate about these estimates; definitions used in studies and statutes
vary, and the research methodologies utilized also vary widely. It is generally acknowledged,
however, that very large numbers of the elderly are seriously mistreated, that even larger numbers of elders are at-risk in the United States today, and that our response to this problem has
been ineffective.
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It noted that \vhile almost all states bad enacted statutes-or adult
protective services laws that mandated reporting of elder abuse, state
implementation and enforcement had been lacking, chiefly because of
72
lack of financial support. There is a dramatic disparity benveen funds
allocated to adult protective services and child abuse services_
; nationwide, in 1989, $43.03 per child was spent for protective services, as
73
compared to $3.80 per elderly resident for protective services.
The
lack of federal funding, combined \vith limited state expenditures, has
74
meant fewer seiVices available to deal \Vith the problem.
On average,
only 3.95% of the total state protective services budgets \Vere ear75
marked for the elderly in 1989, a drop of 40% over a decade.
The National Center on Elder Abuse has collected data on abuse
reports to state authorities over a number of years. The total of cases
reported has increased steadily, most probably because of increasing
awareness of the problem. In_1986, an estimated 117,000 cases \Vere
16
reported, while by 1994, 241,000 cases had been reported .
\Vbile this
is an impressive increase, the numbers are small in comparison \Vith the
projected number of community cases. Of the estimated 241,000 reports in 1994, about 61% \vere substantiated; half of these \Vere self~
neglect. Figures for 1993 \Vere similar. In domestic .s.ettings, neglect
was the most common fottn of maltreatment reported. Physical abuse
accounted ·for about 16% of cases in both years, \vhile financial exploitation made up 12% of substantiated reports. In both 1993 and 1994,
more than 65% of victims \vere \vhite, 20% African-American and 10%
. . 71
.Hispantc.

ties.

-

VI.

'

STA*IU'fORY REsPONSE BY' THE STA1FS

State la\vs concerning elder mistreatment are extremely diverse.

7L See 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPoRT, supra .note 2, at XIV. Other estimates on
underreporting are even more shocking. See also Society's Secret Shame: Elder Abuse tmd
Family Violence, Hearing Before Senate Special Committee on Aging, 104th Cong. nt 2 (1995)
(estimating only one in fourteen cases of elder abuse is ever reported).
72. See 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPoRT. supra note 2, at XJU, 40-43.
73. See id • at XII.
74. One state, Louisiana, even discontinued adult protective services for a period of fwe
years because of budget exigencies. See ld. at 38.
75. See id. at 40.
76~ See NATIONAL CENmR ON ELDER ABUSE, StP..tl-ttARJES OF mE STA11ST1CAL DATA 0~
EIDER ABUSE IN DoMESTIC SEl"nNGS: AN ExPLORATORY S1UDY OF STAlE STAnsnCS FOR
93 & FY 94, at V (1996).

77.. See id. at v-vi.

FY
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They contain myriad specific sections regarding protected classes, ·mandatory reporting of suspected abuse and neglect, definitions of reportable behavior, guidelines for investigations of reports and a host of
other subjects. No single definition encompasses all varieties of elder
mistreatment. Prohibited conduct may be acts of commission or omission; it may be intentional, i.e., a conscious and voluntary attempt to
inflict suffering, or inadvertent, i.e., reflecting inadequate knowledge,
effort, or even infinnity, on the part of the perpetrator. Even the
placement of the statutes is inconsistent. Many states use generic Adult
Protective SeiVices laws to address elder mistreatment, while others
73
have specific elder abuse statutes.
Other relevant provisions can be
79
found in penal provisions or domestic violence laws.
Despite such diversity, some common threads stand out. Mistreat;.
8
ment is typically characterized as abuse or neglect. ° Common elements are non-accidental physical injury, sexual molestation, emotional
or mental abuse, financial exploitation, and .neglect. Whether behavior
is labeled as abusive or as neglectful may depend on the frequency of
81
the mistreatment, its duration, intensity, and severity. Abuse may encompass several types of' behavior: a) physical abuse, the infliction of

78. See infra Appendices A..D.
79. See, e.g.J 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12~21 (West 1996) (penal statute); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. til 19~A §§ 4001-4014 (West 1998) (domestic violence).
80. The current federal definition as set forth by Section 144 of the Older Americans Act,
42 U.S.C. § 3022-3030(g) (1997), includes_three major types of elder maltreatment!--FphysJcal
abuse, neglect, and exploitation, and clearly recognizes self-neg1ect as a form of neglect. Un·
der the federal statute, "abuse" is defined as the "willful infliction of injury, unreasonable confinement,_ intimidation, or cruel punishment with resu1ting physical hann, pain; or mental an·
guish; or deprivation by . • . a caregiver, of goods or services • • • necessary to avoid physical
harm, mental anguish, or mental illness." 42 U.S.C.A. § 3002(13)(A-B) (West 1997). "Nc·
glect'' is the "failure to provide for oneself goods or services necessary to avoid physical hnrm,
mental anguish, or mental illness" or the ''failure of a caretaker to provide such goods or ser·
vices." 42 U.S.C.A. § 3002(37)(A-B) (West 1997)jt The tenn "exploitation" means "the illegal
or improper act or process of an individual, including a caregiver, using the resources
an
older individual for monetary or personal benefit, profit, or gain." 42 U.S.C.A. § 3'002(26)
(West 1998). A ''caregiver'' is an individual ''Who has the responsibility for the core of an
older individual, either voluntarily, by contract, by receipt of payment for care, or as a result
of the operation of the Jaw." 42 U.S.C.A. § 3002(20) (West 1997).
Section 144 notes that "elder abuse" refers to "abuse of an older individual', but docs not
specify any particular age. However, because other provisions under Title III of the Older
Americans Act are applicable to people who are sixty years of age and older, it may be as·
sumed that the congressional intent is to cover the elderly in the same age group with the new
elder abuse prevention program. The language clearly implies that the federal elder abuse
definitions cover both domestic and institutional abuse.
81. See Audrey Garfield, Elder Abuse & the States.' Adult Protective Services: Time for
Change in California,_42 HAsTINGS LJ. 861, 872-74 (1991).
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non-accidental physical pain or injury, (e.g., slapping, bruising, restrain82
ing, molesting, and similar behavior); b) psychological abuse, the \Vill83
ful infliction of severe mental anguish, (e.g., humiliation, threats, etc.);
and c) financial abuse, the unauthorized or exploitative use of funds,
84
property or resources of an elder p-erson. Neglect is generally defined
as the willful or passive failure of a caregiver to fulfill his or her caretaking obligations or duties, (e.g., the deprivation of basic services such
as food, housing, care for physical or mental health, such as medication}.85 "Self Neglect" is selt:directed conduct by an older person that
86
threatens his or her safety or health. Adult protective services are the
''preventive and remedial activities perfonned on behalf of elders and
87
dependent adults who are unable to protect their O\vn interests.,
The penalty to be imposed upon p_ersons responsible for the mistreatment varies. In many states the perpetrator is guilty of a misde~
88
meanor.
Some, however, classify many forxns of maltreatment as a

82. See, e.g~, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 473(6)(a) (fticKinney Supp. 1997) \'Physical abuse'
means the non-accidental use of force that results in bodily injwy, pain or impainnent. including but not limited to, being slapped, burned, cut, bruised or improperly physically restrained:');
IDAHO CODE § 39-5302(i) (1997) ("'Abuse' means the nonnccidental infliction of physical pain.
injwy or mental injury.").
83. See, e.g., N~D. CENT. CODE § S0-25.2-01(1) (1995) \~Abuse' means any \\illful act or
omission of a caregiver ••• which results in • .• • mental anguish, ••••"); NEV. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 41.1395(4)(a)(1) (l\iicbie Supp. l997) \'Abuse' means \'rillful and unjustified infliction
of pain, injwy, or mental anguish ••• •}.
84. See,. e.g.. Miss. CODE. ANN. § 43-47-S(i) {\'lest 1993) ("Exploitation shall mean the illegal or improper use of a vulnerable adult or his resources for another's profit or advantagc.").85. See, e.g., AlOC CODE ANN. § S•28-101(3)(A) ~iichic 199.7) ("'Neglect' means
[n]egligently failing to provide necessary treatJnent, rehabilitation, care. food, clothing. shelter,
supervision, or medical setvices to an endangered or impaired ndulL"); see also CAL. \VELF.. &
INST. CODE § 15610.07 (\Vest Supp. 1998) \'Abuse of an elder or a depend.ent adult• means
physical abuse, neglect • • • or the deprivation by a care custodian of goods or services that
are necessary to avoid physical hann or mental sutTering.").
86. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-2(1 0) (lt1ichie Supp. 1997) (Neglect is ". • • the ftillurc of
the person to provide • • • basic needs for himself or herself \\·hen the failun: is the result of
the person's mental or physical inability.").
87. Regan, supra note 32~ at 251; see also CAL. \VEI.F. & INST. COD£ § 15610.10 (\Vest
Supp. 1998).
88. See, e.~, UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-5·111(3) (Michie Supp. 1998):
Under circumstances other than those. likely to produce death or serious physical
injury any person, including a caretaker, \vbo causes a disnbled or elder adult to
suffer physical 'injury, abuse, or neglect, or having the care_or custody of a disabled
or elder adult, causes or permits that adult's person or health to be injured, nbused,
or neglected, or causes or pennits a disabled or elder adult to be placed in a situa·
tion where his person or health is endangered, is guilty of the offense of abuse of a
disabled or elder adult as follo\\'S: (a) if done intentionally or kno\vingly, the offense
is a -class A misdemeanor; (b) if done recklessly, the offense is- t1 class B misdc.
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felony.
Many states, however, make no mention of penalty.
Normally the statutes create liability for the caretaker of an elderly person
or any other person who willfully commits an abusive act or omission.
Caretaker is typically defined as an individual or entity responsible for
the care of a vulnerable adult as a result of family relationship, volun91
tary assumption, or contract.
•
To facilitate comparative analysis, the appendices at the end of this
article catalogue key provisions of state law. Several focus on statutes
mandating reporting of suspected elder abuse, and the process for receiving and investigating such reports, statutes which are of particular
relevance to subsequent sections of this article. Laws protecting elders
and mandating reporting are listed alphabetically by state in Appendices
A and B.
Appendix C identifies the protected individuals and categories of
harm. Column 1 shows_that some states protect all "vulnerable," "disabled'' or "incapacitated'' adults (using different verbal fonnulations)
92
whatever their age, while others cover only those over a designated
meanor; and (c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class_C misdemeanor.
See also W. VA. CoDE § 61-2·29(4)(b) (Michie- 1997) ("Any care giver \Vho -neglects an inca·
pacitated adult, or who knowingly penuits another person to neglect said adult, is guilty of a
misdemeanor . • . .").
89. See, e.g.~ NEV. REv~ STAT. ANN. § 200.5099(1) (Michie Supp. 1997):
[A]ny person who abuses an older person, causing the older person- to suffer unjusti·
fiable physical pain or mental suffering is guilty of a category B felony and shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum tenn of not less than
two years and a maximum tenn of not more than six years, unless a more severe
penalty is prescribed by law . . . .
See also ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-28-103((a-b(l)) (Michie 1997):
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to abuse, neglect, or exploit any person
subject to protection . . . of this chapter. Any p_erson or caregiver who purposely
abuses an endangered or impaired adult in violation of the provisions of this chapter,
if the abuse causes serious physical injury or substantial risk of death, shall be guilty
of a Class B felony and shaJI be punished as provided by law.
90. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. §§ 47.24.010-4724.900 (Michie 199_6); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6·
2501 to -2513 (Michie 1996).
91. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. §' 47.24.900(3)(A) (Michie 1996) ('"[C]aregiver' menns a per·
son who is providing care to a vulnerable adult as a result of a family relationship, or \Vho
has assumed responsibility for the care of a vulnera:bte adult voluntarily, by contract, or by
court order}'); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-47..S(c) (West Supp. 1998) ('"Caretaker' sbaU mean an
individual • • . which has assumed the responsibility for the care of a vulnerable adult.").
92. See, e.g.~ ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 464Sl(A)(IO) (West 1997) ("Vulnerable adult
means an individual who is eighteen years of age or older who is unable to .protect himself
.from abuse, neglect or exploitation by others because of a phy$ical or mental impainnent.'');
DEL~ CoO.E ANN. tit 31 § 3902(1) (Michie I 9.97) ("Infirm adult s.hall mean any person l8
years of age or over who, because of physical or mental disability, is substantially impaired In
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94

age, usually sixty, or sixty-five \vho experience mistreatment. Each
state operates under its own set of definitions. Components of maltreatment vary widely. As Column 2 demonstrates, all states include
physical harm as abuse) although some jurisdictions require a \Villful
95

infliction of injury or deprivation of needed services. Neglect is like-96
wise included by all statutes (Column 3).
Self-neglect is included by
more than one-half of the states (Column 9). Financial exploitation
and fiduciary abuse (C-o lumn 5), the illegal or improper use of a vulnerable or incapacitated elder's resources or prop:erty for the exploiter's
97
or another's profit or personal advantage, is almost al\vays covered.
Variations in state definitions occur in other areas. Some statutes
include "emotional abuse,') or ''mental anguish" (Column 4) as prohibit98
ed conduct, although these tertns present obvious difficulties in classification and severity. Sexual abuse (Column 6) is a separate category
99
in some states, while in others it is considered a part of the general
the abilit¥ to provide adequately for the person's ov.n care and custody."); NEB. REv. STAT. §
28~371 (\Vest 1995) {"Vulnerable adult shall mean any person eighteen years or age or older
who has a substantial mental or functional impainnent or for \vhom a guardian has been appointed under the Nebraska Probate Code.")..
93. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-4S0(1) (\Vest Supp. 1998) \The term 'elderly
person' means any resident of Connecticut who is sixty years of age- or older.}.
94. See, e.g., CAL. \VELF. & INSI. CODE § 1561.0.27 (\Vest Supp. 1998} \'Elder~ means
any person residing in this state, 65 years of age or older.").
95. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 82S.l02(l)(a) (\1/est Supp. 1998) (Abuse or an elderly person consists of the "intentional infliction of physical or psychological injury."); CiA. CODE ANN.
§ 30-S-3(1) (Harrison Supp. 1997) \'Abuse means the ••• \Villful deprivation of essential ser·
vices to a disabled adult or elder person/'); ~1lss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-S(a) (199.3) ("\~illful
infliction" of physical pain or injury).
96. See, e.g., CAL. WEI-F. & INST.. CODE § 15610.57 (\Vest Supp. 1998) \'Neglect' mCIDlS
that negligent failure of any person having the care or custody of an elder • • • to exercise
that degree of care which a reasonable person in a like position v.-outd exercise."); IDAHO
CoDE § 39-5302(8) (Michie 1998) ("'Neglect' means failure of a caretaker to provide foo~
clothing, shelter or medical care reasonably necessary to sustain the life and henlth or a vulnerable adult .....").
97..; See, e.g., ILL. COl-iP. STAT. ANN•. cb. 720, para.. S/16-13 (1998) f'(a) A person commits_
the offense of _financial exploitation of an elderly person when he stnnds_in a position of trust
and confidence with the elderly or disabled person and he kno\vingly and by deception or
intimidation obtains control over the elderly or disabled person's property Vtith the intent to
pennanently deprive the elderly or disabled person of the use. benefi~ or possession or his
property.."); :MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. 19a § 14 (\Vest 1994) \An net or omission by nnother
person, which causes a substantial moneta!)' or property loss to an elderly person • • • .").
98. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. :§ l61-F:43(III)(a) {B'utterYiOJth 1994) \'Emotional
abuse" means the misuse of power, authority, or both, vcrb:ll harassment, or unreasonable confinement which results or could result in the mental anguish or emotional distress of an incapacitated adult"-) GA. CODE. ANN. § 30-S-3(1) {Harrison 1997) ("'Abuse• means the ,,;urut infliction of ••• mental anguish ••••").
99. See~ e.g., FLA. STAT.. ANN. § 415.102{1) (\Vest 1998) ("'Abuse' means the nonatcidental
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definition of abuse. The lack of consistent definitions among states is
a major problem; it hinders efforts to obtain prevalence and incidence
data, and it makes useful comparisons between research findings difficult.
Appendix D presents the criminal penalties prescribed for perpetrators,. Again, these vary widely, with different states defining the same
conduct as either felony or a misdemeanor (Columns 1 & 2). Many
states require referral of cases to criminal authorities (Column 3).
Appendix E is a compilation of laws relating to the reporting prov.isions. Forty-two states and the District of Columbia mandate a wide
variety of professionals to report known or susp,ected cases of elde.r
abuse. The remaining states (Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey, New
York,_North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wisconsin) make
100
reporting voluntary.
The categories of professionals required to report instances of mistreatment include health care and social servlce
professionals, and law enforcement personnel. My own inexact count
encompassed at least twenty different types of professionals as "manda•
tory reporters" in the various states. As this app-endix makes clear,
some groups are almost always required to report, e.g., physician,
101
nurse, mental health professional, social worker, etc.
Other states
infliction of physical or psychological injury or sexual abuse upon a djsabled adult or an. elder·
ly person by a relative; can;giver, or household member . . • or sexual abuse of a disabled
adult or an elderly person by any person. 'Abuse' also means the active encouragement of any
person by a relative, caregiver, or household member to commit an act that inflicts or could
reasonably be expected to result in physical or psychological ·injury to a disable adult or an
elderly person.").
100. See COLO REv. STAT. ANN. § 26-3..t-102(b) (Bradford 1998) ("The following persons
are urged to make or initiate an initial oral report within twenty-four hours followed by a
written report within forty-eight hours.'') (emphasis added); ILL. COMP, STAT- ANN. ch. 320,
para. 20/4 (West 1993) ("(a) Any p.erson wishing to report a case of alleged or suspected
abuse or neglect may make such a report . . . •") (emphasis added}; NJ. STAT. ANN. §
52:270-409 (West Supp. 1998) ("(a) A person who has reasonable cause- to believe that o vul·
nerable adult is the subject of abuse, neglect, or exploitation may report . ~ . /') (emphasis
added); see also N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 473~b (McKinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § SO·
25.2-03 (Michie 1997); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10215 (West 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws
§ 22-46-6 (Michie 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 46.90 (West 1997).
101. See~ e:g., ALA. CODE § 38·9-8(a) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1996) ("All physicians and
other practitioners of the healing ans having reasonable cause to believe that any adult protect·
ed under the provisions of this chapter has been subjected to physical abuse, neglect or explol·
tation shall report or cause a report to be made . . . .''); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-454
(West 1998) ("A physician, hospital intern or -resident, -surgeon~ .... psychologist, or social
worker, who has a reasonable basis to believe that abuse or neglect of the adult has occurred .
. . shall ·immediately report or cause reports to be made .. .. ."); ARK. CODE ANN. § S-28·
203(a)(l) (Michie. 1997) ("Whenever any physician ••• registered nurse, hospital personnel~ ••
. social worker, . . . mental health professional, . . . has reasonable cause to suspect that an
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105

also include clergy, attorneys, dentists, chiropractors, ambulance
106
drivers, and a host of others. Many states also mandate that "any
person" with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the defined
07
abuse has occurred report the incident}
Column 12 notes the mental
state required for criminal conviction under the mandatory reporting
108
statutes, if one is specified, and the penalties for failure to report ,a
109
violation, typically classified as a misdemeanor.
Appendix F swveys the type and timing of the required reports.
The content of the report usually includes names and addresses of the
allegedly abused citizen, the reporter, and the alleged abuser, as \Vell as
infonnation relating to the nature of the extent of the hann, the basis
110
of the reporter's knowledge, etc.
The time frame for making such a
report is delineated either explicitly (Columns 3 & 4) or through gener-

•

endangered adult has been subjected to .. • • abus,c • • • he shall immediately report or cause a
report to be made in accordance with the provisions of this section.").
102. Reports of suspected abuse must be made by "[c]very clergyman, practitioner of Christian Science or religious healer, unless he has acquired the- knowledge of abuse, neglect or
exploitation ftOm the offender during a confession." NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.220(2)(d)
(Michie 1997); see also ALAsKA STAT. § 47.24.010(a)(IO) (l\1ic.hie 1996); Co~. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17b-4Sl (West 1997); NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.5093(2)(dHt) {Michie 1997); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 5010.61 (Anderson 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 124.060 (Michie Supp. 1996); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 43-35-25 (Law. Co--op 1997).
103. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 200..5093(i) ~iichie 1997) (Reporting required by
"[e]vecy attorney, unless be has acquired the knowledge of abuse, neglect. exploitation or isola·
tion • • . from a client who has been or may be accused of such abuse, neglect, exploitation
or isolation."').
104., See, e.g., GA., CODE ANN. § 30·S-4(a)(l) (Hanisonl997).
lOS.. See, e.g., MoNT. CODE ANN. § 52·3-811(3)(a-c) (1997).
106. See id.
107.. See, e.g., Miss~ CODE ANN. § 43-47-7(1.) (\Vest Supp.. 1998) \[A]ny person having reasonable cause to believe that a wlnerablc adult has been or is being abused, neglected. or
exploited shall report such information ••••").
108. See, e;.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2512(a)(l) ~iichie 1996) ("Any person required to report under § 6~2503(a)(l) who willfully fails to do so shall be guilty of a ,misdemeanor and.
upon conviction, subject to a fine not exceeding $300..").
109. See IDAHO CODE § 39-5303(2) (1\iichie- l998) ("Failure to report as provided under this
section is a misdemeanor subject to punishment as provided in section 18·113, Idaho Code.}..
110. See, e.g., LA.. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2{0)(2) (\Vest 1986 & Supp. 1996) \All reports shall contain the name and address of the adult, the name and address of the person
responsible for the care of the adult, if available, and any other pertinent in(onnation."). See
also MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. l9A § IS(c) (\Vest 1994 & Supp. 1998) ("Reports ••• shall
contain the name,- address and approximate age of the elderly person \'iho is the subject of the
report, information regarding the nature and extent of the abuse, the name of the person"s caretaker, if known, any medical treatment being received or immediately required, if kno\\11, any
other infonnation the reporter believes to- be relevant to the investigation, and the name and
address of the reporter and where said reporter may be contacted, if the reporter \'tishes to
provide said infonnation.").
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111

al description.
Appendix G summarizes the agency or agencies designated to receive reports of elder abuse or neglect and the response. Many states
assign this task to more than one agency, especially where there are
several applicable abuse laws. These include state social services, APS,
112
and law enforcement agencies.
Column 3 sets out the legally required response, including the time allowed by statute for investigation.
Column 6 also details the use of central registries, a centralized listing
for abuse reports and infonnation to which only certain individuals may
113
gain access.
These registries facilitate computerization of data, allowing rapid access to, and retrieval of, relevant information. This is
particularly useful in states where more than one agency is involved in
the investigation and response to mistreatment.
Appendix H surveys statutory protections for the reporter. Almost
all states guarantee anonymity or confidentiality to reporters of
114
abuse
an important consideration given the chilling effect that fears
of retaliation or violation of privacy may have on the willingness to
report. A few states provide for disclosure of the reporter's identity
during the subsequent investigation and/or court proceedings if consent
115
116
or a court order is obtained.
Immunity, either absolute or for re-

111. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § S-28-206(a) (Michie 1997) ("A report of abuse, sexual
abuse, or negligence of an abused or neglected adult may, pursuant to this chapter, be made by
telephone and shall be followed by a written report within forty-eight (48) hours, if so requested by the receiving agency."). See also GA. CODE. ANN. § 31-8·82(a) (Hanison 1997) ("Such
person shall also make a written report to the Department of Human Resources within 24 hours
after making the initial report").
112. See, e.g., GA. CoDE ANN. 30..S-4(a)(2) (Michie 1997) (requiring that reports of elder
abuse be directed toward an "adult protection agency, .•. [or] an appropriate Jaw enforcement
·
authority or district attorney'').
113. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 415.103(1) (West 1997) (requiring that a "central abuse registry" be established to receive all reports of elder abuse).
114. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §47.24.0SO(a) (Michie 1996) ("Investigation reports and reports
of the abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect or self-neglect of a vulnerable adult filed under
this chapter are confidential and are not subject to public inspection and copying . • . ."); CAL4
WELF. & INST. CODE § 15634(a)-(b) (West 1991 & Supp. 1996) (uThe reports .•. sbnll be
confidential and may be disclosed only as provided in subdivision {b). Any breach of the
confidentiality required by this chapter is a misdemeanor • • . .'') (Subdivision {b) pennits dis·
closure to authorized persons and agencies responsible for investigation of the alleged abuse.).
115. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 320 20/4 {West 1997) ("(c) The identity of a person making a report of . . . abuse or neglect under this Act may be disclosed . . . only with such
person's written consent or by court order."); MICH. COMP. ANN. § 14.800 (723) (West 1996);
\VASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 1434.050 {West Supp. 1998) (uUnless there is a judicial proceeding
or the person consents, the identity of the person making the report is confidential.").
116. See ALA. CODE § 38·9-9 (1992) ("Any person, firm or corporation making ..• a report
pursuant to this chapter . . . shall in so doing be immune from any liability, civil or criminal,
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117

is typically provided to protect reporters
from legal liability for adherence to statutory commands. Many states
presume reports are made in good faith unless proved othenvise by
118
clear and convincing evidence.
VII.

LEGAL ACilONS AGAINST PERPETRATORS

A. Criminal Law

Conceptually, almost every fo11n of elder mistreatment corresponds
to a common law or statutory crime. Physical abuse, for example,
could be assault, battery, or perhaps even attempted murder; financial
exploitation may be theft, larceny, or eA1ortion. By criminalizing elder
mistreatment; society proclaims that such violence is not acceptable,
despite its prevalence. "[T]he criminal code reflects . • • some notion
119
of the moral sense of the community . . . .',
Once the illegality of
such behavior is recognized, the criminal la\v can be enforced aggressively to protect the victim and to hold the offender accountable in a
public \vay. Criminal (and other) courts can also protect victims by
"no contact" orders, requiring the abuser to vacate the residence, ordering restitution for theft or medical expenses, and by a \vide variety of
121
120
other measures.
Emergency orders are often available.
~

that might otherwise be incurred or imposed."); see also Jones v. Living Ctrs. Holding Co..

695 So. 2d 1194 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (section confers absolute immunity for mandatory rc·
porters).
117. See IDAHO CoDE § 39-5303(5)(4) (1998) ("Any person ,,.·ho makes any report pursuant
to this chapter, or who testifies in any administrative or judicial proccding arising from such
report, • . .. shall be immune from any civil or criminal liability on aceount of such report.
testimony .•• except that such immunity shall not extend to perjwy, reports made in bad faith
or with malicious purpose • . • !').
118. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.1036 (\Vest 1998) ("Any person v.·ho participates in making
a report under § 415.1034 or participates in a judicial proceeding resulting therefrom is pre·
sumed to be acting in good faith and. unless lack of good faith is shown by clear and convincing evidence~ is immune from any liability, civil or criminal. that othen\·isc might be incurred or imposed • • • .).
119. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRThm AND PUNlSW.fENT IN ~tERICAN HISTORY 125 (1993).
120. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 107.700-107.720 (1998) (includes authority for courts to
issue temporazy restraining orders, injunctions of different types; includes requirement for \\111'·
rantless arrest upon probable cause of a person believed to have violated such an order); UTAH
CODE ANN § 30-64.8 (1996) (Electronic ~fonitoring of Domestic Violence Offenders); 750 IlL.
CoMP. STAT. 60/103 (West 1993). For a comprehensive overview of cnses nnd statutes on
abuse of women, see Catherine F. Klein & Leslyc E. Orloff, Providing Legal ProtecJ/on for
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes & Case Lmv, 21 HOFSTRA L REv. 801 (1993).
121. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 19A § 20(b) (\Vest 1994) ("If an emergency
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Abuse, neglect, and financial exploitation of older persons have
122
Statutes often make seribeen made specific crimes in many states.
123
ous physical abuse or neglect a separate offense.
States which do
not specifically criminalize abuse and neglect often have provisions
requiring reports to be reported to the police for criminal investiga124
Most states allow the advanced age of a victim to be considtion.
ered as an aggravating factor in sentencing because of the vulnerability
to crime of older persons as well as the enhanced effect that crime has
125
on them.
Others designate various crimes, including assault, battery,

exists and the department, its designated agency, a -member of the immediate family or n -care·
taker has reasonable cause to believe that an elderly person is suffering from abuse and lacks
the capacity to consent to the provision of protective services, said department, designated a.gen·
GY, member of the immediate family or caretaker may petition the court for nn emergency
order of protective services!'); TEx. CODE ANN. § 48.061 (b) (\Vest 1998) ("If the department
determines that an elderly o.r disabled person is suffering from aouse, exploitation, or neglect
presenting a threat to life or physical safety, that the person lacks capacity to consent to receive protective services, and that no consent can be obtained, the department may petitlon the
probate or statutory or constitutional county court that. has probate jurisdiction in the county in
which the elderly or disabled person resides for an emergency order authorizing protective services.").
122. See, .e.g., TENN. CoDE ANN. § 71-6-117 (1995) ("It is unlawful for any person to \Viii·
fully abuse, neglect or exploit any adult within the meaning of the provisions of this part.
Any person who willfully abuses, neglects or exploits a person in violation of the provisions of
this part commits a Class A misdemeanor"); Wvo. STAT. ANN § 35-20-l 09 (Michie 1997) ("A
person who abuses, neglects, exploits or abandons a disabled adult is guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars [$1000..00]."). See also
infra Appendix A.
123. :See, e~g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265 § 13K(e) (West 1997) ("Whoever. being n
caretaker . . . permits serious bodily injury to such elder or person with a_disabUity, or wantonly or recklessly permits another to commit an assault and battery upon such elder • • . shall
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than ten years or . . • in the
house of correction for not more than two and one-half years ...•"). See also DEL. CODE
ANN. tiL 31, § 3913 (1997) (intentional abuse causing bodily hann, pennanent disfigurement is
a Class D felony); KY. REv. STAT~ ANN. § 209.990 (Banks-Baldwin l997) (knowing and willful abuse causing _serious physical or mental injury is Class C felony).
124. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 19A § 18(a) (West 1994) ("If an assessment re•
suits in a determination that the elderly person has suffered serious abuse, the department or
designated agency shall report such detennination to the district attorney of the county where
the abuse occurred within forty-ejgbt hours. The district attorney may investigate and decide
whether to initiate criminal p_roceedings.'') See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § l7b-460 (\Vest
1997); IDAHO CODE § 39-5310 (1997).
125. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(13) (West 1997) (enhancing culpability u[i)f
the victim of the offense is sixty-five or more years of age or is a handicapped person''); DEL.
CODE. ANN.- til 11 § 84l(c)(2) (1996) (enhancing liability if the-"victim is 60 years of age or
older''); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. S/5-S-3.2(b){4)(ii) (West 1997) (augmenting punishment If
the victim is "a person 60 yeats of age or older at the time of the offense,); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 193.167 (1·2) (Michie 1997) ("Certain crimes committed against persons 65
years of age or older ·~· . . shall be punished by imprisonment • • • for a tenn equal to and in
.
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robbery, etc. as more serious offenses when committed against an elder126
ly person.
Moreover, if the victim of a crime is particularly vulnerable, a judge may take that into account in imposing a sentence even
without specific statutory authorization. As long as the sentence is kept
within normal sentencing guidelines, there is little to prohibit a judge
127
from imposing a greater sentence.
These criminal provisions reflect the special vulnerability of the
elderly to crime. The physical, financial, and behavioral impacts of
crime on the elderly, by caretakers or strangers, are much greater than
128
According to the National Conference on
upon younger victims.
Crime Against the Aging, the elderly are eight times more vulnerable
to crime than are younger people, primarily because of their physical
129
limitations and poverty.
It has long been recognized that the elderly
130
are among the groups especially vulnerable to crime.
Perceived
wealth and physical \veakness combine to make the elderly likely targets and their living arrangements often leave them dependent and
131
isolated.
Thieves know that elderly persons \Viii receive checks or
addition to the tenn of imprisonment prescribed by statute for the crime.").
126. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.08(2) (\Vest 1998):
\Vhenever a person is charged with committing an assault or nggrnvnted nssnuJt or a
battery or aggravated battery upon a person 65 years of age or older, regardless of
whether he or she knows or has reason to know the age of the victim, the offense
for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as folJO\\"S:
(a) In the case of aggravated battery, from a felony of the second degree to a
felony of the first degree.
(b) In the case of aggravated assault, from a felony of the third degree to a
felony of the second degree.
(c) In the case of battery, from a misdemeanor of the fust degree to n felony
of the third degree.
127. See, e.g., People v. Jorgensen, 538 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ill. App. Ct 1989) (holding that it
was proper for the trial court to enhance the sentence of a defendant \\·ho \\115 convicted of
home invasion and anned robbery because the victim was over the nge of sixty even \Vhen
there was no specific stabJtol}' mandate to consider age because "a sentencing court has ,.,·ide
latitude to conduct a broad inquiry into facts \\·bich may tend to mitigate or aggravate the
offense •••."); State v. Flowers, 394 S.E.2d 296 (N.C. Ct App. 1990) (fmding the advanced
age of the victim a proper basis for enhancing the defendant's conviction for murder, burglary,
kidnapping, larceny, anned robbel}', and breaking and entering because of the greater vulnerability of the elderly victim).
128. See ROBERT J. SMriH, CRl"tE AGAINST mE ELDERLY: 11-fPUCAnOSS FOR POUCYl.tAKERS
AND PRACitllONERS 18-21 (1979).

129. See JoanN. Scott, Senior Citizens Present a Special Case, JUDGES J._ Summer
19.
130. See

19~ at

HANG VON HENne, 1HE CRI~UNAL AND H1S Vtcn~!: SlUDIES IN ntE
SOCIOBIOLOGY OF CRIME 408-11 (1948).
131. See Jordon I. Kosberg, Jlictimization of the Elderly: Cmuallon and Pre,·entlon, 10
VICTIMOLOGY 376, 377 (1985).
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132

Despite the shocking prevalence statistics of elder abuse and neglect
133
discussed earlier, elder abuse victims rarely report.
Some may feel
134
abusive treatment is ordinary or that recourse through the law is
135
unavailable or unavailing.
Others may be so thoroughly isolated or
under the control of the caregiver that they have no opportunity to seek
136
help.
Victims are often particularly reluctant to proceed against family members because of embarrassment, shame, lack of third party emotional support, and failure of the criminal justice system to accommo137
date victims' needs.
The failure of mandated professionals to report
138
suspected cases likewise means prosecutors are rarely involved. El·
der abuse follows patterns similar to other fortns of family violence,
139
especially spousal abuse.
To be successful, the criminal justice system must take the victim's situation and vulnerability into account
Ultimate responsibility for arrest, charging, and .d·isposition of a criminal

132. See id
133. See, e.g., 1990 ELDER ABusE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 42 (estimating only one
in every eight cases of .elder abuse is ever reported; Pillemer & Finkelhor, supra note 2 (estl·
mating only one in fotJrteen cases of elder mistreabnent is reported to authorities).
134. See, e.g., Linner W. Griffin, Elder Maltreatment Among Rural African-Americans, 6 J.
OF ELDER AB. & NEGL. 1-29 (1994).
135. See A. Paul Blunt, Financial Exploitation of the Incapacitated: Investigation and Relne·
dies, S J. ELDER AB. & NEGL. 19, 28-31 (1993).
136. See K.A. Pillemer, Social Isolation & Elder Abuse, 8 REsPONSE No. 4, 2-4 (1984).
137. See Suzanne K. Steinmetz, Dependency, Stress and Jllolence Between Middle Aged
Caregivers and Their Elderly Parents, in ABUSE AND MALTREATMENT OF niB ELDERLY 134-49
(Jordon I. Kosberg ed.). Prof. M~a Minow has astutely commented on the complexity of
these situations.
Two important features are neglected in this familiar debate over assigning blame for
family violence. The first is the real possibility that violence within a family in·
volves a system of human interactions that should all be changed, rather than a sin·
gle, sick, and malevolent \vrong-doer. The second is the family's embeddedness in
larger social patterns of neighbors who look the other way, police and social workers who do not respond to reports of violence, and public attitudes that tolerate or
deny family violence. By neglecting these two features, debates over assigning
blame for violence within the family contribute to the sense that the problem is
abnonn~, private, and contained within that family. At the same time, these features
may help explain why some people who engage in family violence believe it to be
nonnal, publicly accepted, and not confined to their own family.
Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language and Family Jllo/ence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1682-83 (1990).
138. See infra notes 205-16 and accompanying texl
139. See, e.g., LENORE E. \VALKER, THE BA1.1"ERED WOMAN 52 (1979) (describing reasons
battered women are unable to respond effectively); Mark Hansen, New Strategy in Ballerlng
Cases, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 14 (analyzing increasingly violent cycle in domestic abuse cas·
es).

19981

101

SAYING GRANNY FROAI THE JYOLF

case should rest with police and prosecution. Elder mistreatment is a
matter of public concern, not a private or fan1ily matter.
Given the ''hidden" nature of the events, there is no precise data on
the number of unreported instances of geriatric mistreatment. There is,
however, anecdotal and general infonnation available. Although Massachusetts, _for example, has one of the most active progrmtls for identifying elder abuse, a study conducted in that state concluded that only one
14
case in fourteen comes to the attention of state authorities. ° Congressional reports have noted that \Vhile elder abuse is at least as prevalent
141
as child abuse, it is far less likely to be reported.
In 1990, the
House Subcommittee on Health and Long-Tenn Care sent questionnaires to all states in an effort to assess the extent of undeJieporting of
elder mistreatment. All states concurred that significant numbers of
142
elder abuse cases were never reported. - Some of the responses by
state agencies are truly shocking; California estimated one in ten cases
are reported; Wisconsin one in sixteen and Indiana responded that as
143
few as one in fifty cases were reported.

B. Civil Remedies
Elder maltreatment often has a devastating impact on its victims.
Because of their age, health, or limited resources, the elderly typically
have fewer options for resolving or avoiding the abusive situation.
Their physical frailty makes them more vulnerable to physical or other
144
abuse, and poor health often accentuates the problem.
Older persons
may have less ability to recover from financial exploitation because of
fixed incomes or short remaining life spans. The loss of a home lived
in for many years may be particularly traumatic because of its familiarity, memories, and the trauma of being moved.
Since elder mistreatment 'is often a '~family affai-r" involving gro\vn
children or spouses, doctrines of intrafmnilial and interspousal tort im-

140. See Pillemer & Finkelhor, supra note 2.
141. See 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPoRT, supra note 2, at Xl ("On the average .. • •
roughly I of 8 elder abuse cases is ever reported ••••"); 1981 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE RE·
PORT, supra note 29,- at xiv-xv {estimating one of six cases ls reported to nuthorities).142. See 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPoRT,_supra note 2, Table 8, n1 53.
143. See id., Table 9, at 54.
144. \Vhile it would be inaccurate to describe the vast population over sixty-five \'tith one
generalization, physical decline eventually becomes an aspect of the aging process. See generally DAVID A. TOMB, GRO\VING OLD 15-40 {1984). Chronic hcaJtb problems increase dramati·
cally in this age group. See ROBERT C. ATCHLEY, SOCIAL FORCES AND AGING 91 (1988).
.

'
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145

munity at one time blocked civil remedies.
Modern family and tort
146
law concepts have swept away most of these barriers and civil damages are available in suits by parents against emancipated children and
147
between spouses.
Provided that legal counsel is available and the
legal process is accessible, traditional civil law remedies can sometimes
be effectively utilized against many of the fonns of elder mistreatment.
Physical or sexual abuse is civil battery. Misuse of the elder's funds
may be remedied by litigation claiming conversion or fraud. There are
particularly useful civil to,ols where the abuser occupied a fiduciary
status such as trustee, guardian, ·conservator, or power of attorney. A
"fiduciary'' relationship exists where ''special confidence is reposed in
one who is bound in equity and good conscience to act in good faith
with due regard to the interest of the p-erson reposing the confidence."148 In addition, an attorney for the fiduciary has a duty to the
beneficiaries or wards.

In all matters connected with [the] trust a trustee is bound to
act in the highest good faith toward all beneficiaries, and may
not obtain any advantage over the latter by the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat, or adverse press_ure of any
kind. An attorney who acts as counsel for a trustee _
provides
advice and guidance to all beneficiaries. It follows that when
an attorney undertakes a relationship as an adviser to a trustee,
he in reality also assumes a relationship with the beneficiary
149
akin to that between trustee and beneficiary.

145. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON

nm

LAWS OF ENOLAND 445

(Cooley 3d ed. 1884) ("[H]usband and wife are ,one," so a married woman could not sue her
husband in tort for physical or other mistreabnenl).
146. See generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DoMESTIC RELATIONS IN niB UNIT·
ED STATES

370-81 (1987).

147. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Valdez, 427 P.2d 655, 659 (N.M. 1967) (recognizing suit by parent against child); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E2d 338, 342 (W. Va. 1978) (allowing
compensatory and punitive damages in assault suit brought by one- spouse ngainst the other).
148. People v. Riggens, 132 N.E.2d 519, S22 (Ill. 1956). See generally JONA1llAN
FEDERMAN & MEG REED, ABUSE AND THE DURABLE PO~ OF ATTORNEY: OPTIONS FOR RE·
FORM (Government Law Ctr. of Albany Law Sch. ed., 1994).
149. Morales v. Field, DeGoff, Huppert & MacGowan, 99 Cal . App. 3d 307, 316 (1979); see
also Weingarten v. Warren, 753 F. Supp~ 491, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ('•By alleging Warren
acted as attorney for the trustee and that he violated his fiduciary duty to the bencflclaries,
plaintiffs have stated a cause of action against Warren individually for breach of fiduciary duty."); Estate of Halas, 512 N.E.2d 1276, 1280 (Ill. App. 1987) (attorney for the trustee owed
both- a fiduciary duty directly to tbe beneficiaries, but also a "derivative fiduci~ duty • • • .");
Fickett v., Superior Court of Pima County, 558 P2d 98,8, 990 (Ariz. App. 1976) ("[P]ubllc
policy requires that the attorney exercise his position of trust and superior knowledge rcsponsi-
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Attorneys who participate in misconduct may have licensure sanctions
150
imposed on them.
The :fiduciacy may be forced to provide an accounting of the money and property that have been expended in order
to determine whether improprieties have o-ccurred. Num-erous states
151
have also provided statutory remedies for abuse by fiduciaries.
Sometimes intervention may eliminate future abuse in straightforward ways. Power of attorney may be annulled in most states by \vrit152
ten revocation of the power.
Names on bank accounts -can be
changed or a representative payee removed upon notice to the Social
153
Security Administration.
Even without formal legal appointment, a fiduciacy relationship may
be found when ,a person has voluntarily undertaken the care of an elderly person, particularly if the elder is disabled. Courts may then find
a ''guardian-like'' relationship and impose upon the caregiver a fiduciacy
duty to safeguard assets. A "constructive', trust may be imposed if
154
fraud or abuse has occurred within a confidential relationship.
\Vhere

bly" to the trustee.).
150. See, e.g., In re Matter of Smi~ 572 N.E.2d 1280 (Ind. 1991) (upholding suspension
ftom practice of two attorneys who drafted instruments used in fraudulent trnnsnctions). See
also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf RULE I.S(c).
151. See, e.g, ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-454(0) (\Vest 1997) \If any person is found to
be responsible for the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an incapacitated or vulneroblc adult in
a criminal or civil action, the court may order the perSon to make restitution as the court
deems appropriate."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.102 (12)(a)(2) (\Vest Supp•. 1998) (action available against person who "[k]nows or should kno\V [action will] ••• deprive the disabled adult
or elderly person of the use, benefit, or possession of the funds. assets, or property for the
benefit of someone other than the disabled adult or elderly person}:: OR. REv. STAT. §
124.110 (l)(a) (1995) {"An action may be brought • " • for fiducimy abuse in the fotlo\\ing
circumstances: {a) \Vhen a pers,on, including but not limited to a person \•;ho has the cate or
custody of an elderly or incapacitated person or who stands in a position of trust to an cldedy
or incapacitated person, takes · or appropriates money or p,roperty of the elderly or incapacitated
person for any wrongful use").
152. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.. § 30·5~10·1 (\Vest 1998).
153. See Representative payee status, 42 U.S.C. § 40S(j)(2)(A) (1997) \If the Commissioner
of Social Securicy or a court of competent jurisdiction dctcnnines that a representative payee
has misused any individual's benefit paid to such representative payee pursuant to this subseclll!
tion or section 1383(a)(2) of this title, the Commissioner of Social Security shnJI promptly
revoke certification for payment of benefits, to such representative, payee pursunnt ·to this subsection and certify payment
.. to an alternative representative payee or, if the interest of the individual under this subchapter· would be served thereby, to the· individual."); 20 CJ='.R. § 404.2055
("If a beneficiary receiving representative paym~nt sbo\\-s us that he or she is mentally and
physically able to manage or direct the management of benefit payments, \\·c \\·ill make, direct
payment").
154. See, e.g., Estate of Campbell, 704 A.2d 329, 330 (1\ie. 1997) (holding thnt a constructive trust may be imposed to do equity, prevent unjust enrichment v.·hen title to property is
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the aged person is dependent, and has allowed a third party to handle
assets, a "constructive trust" requires the fiduciary to use resources only
155
for the benefit of the older person.
If funds or property were expended for something other than the elder's best interest, traditional
156
common law remedies may be employed to recover the assets.
In appropriate circumstances, punitive damages may be assessed.
Particularly where the abuser has resources, or the funds have been
egregiously wasted, the requirements for ''criminal type" damages may
157
be met.
Extra-compensatory liability is justified because of outra158
geous misconduct that is accompanied by malicious intent.
C. New Statutory Remedies

Mistreated elderly often find legal remedies inadequate. Many
victims are unable to obtain an attorney, even when the abuse is obvious and shocking; there is little financial incentive for lawyers to become involved. Because of the slow pace of litigation, many of the
frail elderly do not survive long enough for a law suit to come to
judgment. In some states the death of the abused elder person cuts off

acquired by fraud, or when property is acquired in violation of a fiduciary duty}; Stnuffer v.
Stauffer, 351 A.2d 236, 241 (Pa 1976} (constructive trust, shaped by the conscience of equity,
unlike an express trust, is a remedy created to prevent unjust enrichment).
155. See REsTATEMENT {IHIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt b (1996) (stating that "despite the dif·
ferences in the legal circumstances and responsibilities of various fiduciaries, one chnracterJstic
is common to all: a person in a fiduciary relationship to another is under a duty to act for the
benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the relationship,'); see also Kurtz v. Sol·
omon, 656 N.E.2d 184, 190-91 (Ill. App. Ct 1995} (stating that factors in "detcnnining wheth·
er a fiduciary relationship exists between parties, the breach of which would warrant n con·
structive trust, include health, mental condition, education, and business experience . • . . The
fiduciary is prohibited from seeking a selfish benefit during the relationship.").
156. See, e.g., Wennerholm v. Wennerholm, 46 N.E.2d 939, 944 (Ill. 1943} (setting aside a
transfer of property between family members after requiring that such a gratuitous transfer be
not only free from fraud but also equitable to the grantor); Wiemer v. Havana Nat. Bank 385
N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ill. App. Ct 1978) (holding that actions of trustee bank violated the fiduciary
responsibilities owed to its customer to preserve the trust property).
157. See generally 1 JAMES D. GHJARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND
PRAcnCE tbl. 4.1 (1984 & Supps.} (noting most states recognize the supcrcompcnsntory nature
of punitive damages).
158. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DIE LAW OF REMEDIES, § 3.11(2), at 468 (1989); REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) cmt b (1979) (stating that "[p]unitive damages •.• can be
awarded •.. for conduct [that is] ... outrageous, either because the defendant's acts arc done
with an evil motive or because they are done with reckless indifference to the rights of oUt·
ers"}; Martsch v. Nelson, 705 P.2d 1050, 1054 (Idaho 1985} (stating that courts would award
punitive damages when conduct is "wanton, malicious or gross and outrageous or the facts
imply malice and oppressionj.
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recovery for pain, suffering, or disfigurement
Problems of proof are
another disincentive to la\vyers' taking abused elderly clients; often
victims suffer from diminished mental capacity, memory loss, or speech
160
difficulties.
In many instances of financial abuse, the misappropriated
property may be the elder's life savings, but still amounts to a relatively small sum in comparison to attorney fees and other costs of litigation. We thus need ne\v statutory remedies, and several states have
161
become "Iaboratories" in \Vhich experiments in ne\v remedies are
being conducted.
In 1992, California enacted a ne\V statute covering abused elders or
dependent adults. The Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protec162
tion Act begins with legislative findings: the infi11n elderly and dependent adults are a "disadvantaged class," and fe\v civil cases are
brought in connection with their abuse because of problems of proof,
163
The
court delays, and the lack of incentives to prosecute these suits.
legislative intent, clearly stated, is to enable abused, vulnerable persons
to engage attorneys to take their cases. \Vhen it is proven by "clear
and convincing" evidence that the defendant has been guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud or malice in the commission of abuse of the
elderly, new remedies are created. These include postmortem recovery
164
for pain and suffering, and mandatory attorney fees and costs.
The
Act allows fees for the services of a conservator litigating an elder's
clairn and continuation of a pending action by the elder's personal

159. See \V. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON lHE I.A\V OF TORTS § 126, nt
942-43 (5th ed. 1984) ("The pain and suffering recovery on behalf of the cstntc • • • is clearly
a windfall to the heirs and a respectable number of states explicitly exclude such damages in
the survival action."). See also, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1~3110 (1997) rEvery cause
of actio~ . . . shall survive the death of the person entitled thereto ••• [but] damages for
pain and suffering of such injured person shall not be allowed"); CAL av. PROC. Cooa §
37734 (1998) ("In an action or proceeding by a decedent's personal reprcscntntivc • • • • the
damages recoverable • • • do not include damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement}.
160. See, e.g., Society '.s Secret Shame: Elder Abuse and Family l'lolence, Hearing Before .lhe.
Senate Special Committee on Aging, 104th Cong. 27-30 (1995) (statement of uo J. Delienta,
Esq.) (describing fear and impairment of victims and delay in litigation process ns factors deter•
ring lawsuits).
161. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single cou.rogeous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social nnd economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Icc Co. v. Liebrruum. 28S U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
162. CAL. \VELF. & INST. CoDE § IS600-1S6S7.3 (West Supp. 1997).
163. See id. § IS6000)(h)(i).
164. See id. § 15657.
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representative or successor.
In addition, if a conservator has been
previously appointed, the Act extends jurisdiction over the new civil
166
action to the court that deals with probate conservatorships.
As a result, courts skilled in dealing with issues which often emerge with the
elderly capacity, memory, undue influence, etc. will be the forum for
such suits.
Another group of innovative statutes deal specifically with financial
abuse. Illinois' recent Financial Exploitation of the Elderly and Dis167
abled Act creates, in addition to criminal penalties, treble damages
and attorney fees for a civil judgment deciding property has been converted or stolen from a senior citizen by threat or deception. These
enhanced remedies are available regardless of the outcome of the criminal case. In Maine, a statute allows an elderly, dependent individual
who has transferred property as a result of undue influence to secure a
court order forcing return of the property. If real estate, or 10% or
more of such an individual's money or personal property, was taken for
less than fair market value, and a confidential .or fiduciary relationship
existed, a presumption is created that the elderly person has been undu168
ly influenced in making the transfer.
Statutes like this make civil
suits against the financial exploiter more ·feasible, and even attractive,
for attorneys. In some states, civil remedies provide for punitive damages.t69
Other jurisdictions have created additional means of relief. In the
District of Columbia, a statute pennits the city's Corporation Counsel to
secure a judicial order against the abuser, shifting the costs of conduct170
ing the investigation and providing protective services to the victims.
Several states provide a civil cause of action against the perpetrator and
171
shift plaintiffs attorney's fees to a losing defendant.
All states now have domestic violence laws designed to protect

165. See id. § 15657.3(d).
166. See id. § 1567.3(a).
167. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-1.3 (West 1995).
168. See ME. REv. STATS. ANN., til 33, §§ 1021-1024 (West Supp. 1997). Examples of
"confidential or fiduciary" relationships under this statute include family, accountants, brokers,
individuals providing care and services to the elderly person, etc. See /d. § 1022.
169. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657 (West Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
415.1111 (West 1998).
170. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2510 (1997); see also WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 74.34.130(6)
(West Supp. 1998) (respondent required to pay filing fees and attorney costs).
171. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657 (West Supp. 1998); OREG. REV. STAT. §
124.100 (1998); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 74.34.130 (\Vest Supp. 1998); WJSC. STAT. ANN. §
46.90 (West 1997).
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172

victims of abuse.
Although restricted in some jurisdictions to spouse
or partner abuse cases, in other states these statutes provide for a judicial "protection order'' for all family or household members threatened
173
with physical harm.
Under these la\VS, the court may order the abuser to: (i) refrain from abusing the elder; (ii) move a\vay from, and stay
out of, the residence shared \vith the victim; (iii) refrain from contact174
ing the victim; and (iv) provide alternative housing for the victim.
In addition, some domestic violence statutes protect "high risk adults''
(e.g., "vulnerable adults") from neglect and financial exploitation as
175
well. Prompt orders of an equitable nature can be used to enjoin
116
other fotzns of mistreatment in the same manner as physical abuse.
Often restraining orders can prevent future maltleatment. \Vhile the
details of these statutes vary from state to state, the use of a "protection order'' can often spark police involvement and bring the case to
the attention of adult protection and social service agencies.
VIII.

LEGAL AcnONS AGAINST PROFESSIONALS FOR FAlLURE TO
AsSESS, TREAT, AND REPORT

A. Background

..

Mandatory reporting la\vs seek to create social and legal interventions into elder mistreatment cases by (1) requiring certain professionals, or "any person" with "reasonable belief'' or ''suspicion," to report

CO~fP. STAT.

ANN. 5/111-8 (\Vest 1989). A comprehensive discussion on domestic violence cases and statutes is found in Cntherinc F. Klein & Lcslyc E
Orloff: Providing Legal Protection for Battered JYomen: An Analysis of State Statutes & Case
Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801 (1993).
173. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 2091\ §6 (\Vest Supp. 1998) f'\VhenC\·cr any
law officer has reason to believe that a family or household member hns b«n abused or is in
danger of being abused, the officer shall use all reasonable means to prevent further nbusc • •
••"); Aio. REv. STAT. § 455:035, :045, :085 (\Vest 1997) (providing judicial remedies for
adults abused by present or former adult household members); NJ. STAT. §§ 2C-2S-28. 2C-25·
172. See, e.g., 725 ILL.

32 (same). For discussion of the lawycr•s role in abuse and neglect, see Linda G. ~iills. On
the Other Side of Silence: Ejfoctive LaHyering for Intimate Abuse, 81 CORNELL L REv. 1225
(1996).
174. See statutes cited supra note 173; see also 1\iE. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 19 § 4001 (\'lest

1998) (temporary emergency protection orders available against family or household memb~;
after one year, orders may be made final; defendant may be ordered to pay plaintiff's attorney
fees).
175. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 7434.110(2) (\Vest Supp. 1998).
176. See, e.g.• 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103 (\Vest 1998).
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that infortnation to designated public authorities; (2) providing immu178
nity from liability for those reporting in good faith; and (3) initiating
investigative and treatment services by Adult Protective Services or
179
other agencies.
Licensed health care and social service providers are
likely to examine and treat injured elders and their caretakers, and are
presumed qualified to identify the symptoms and to diagnose mistreatment of the aged. The statutory inclusion of these groups as mandatory reporters is legislative recognition of their access to, and relationship
with, the elderly. Their strategic position in emergency rooms, physicians' offices, clinics, social service agencies and other locales where
the aged and their caregivers appear makes it logical to place a duty to
report upon them. The professional nature of these relationships increases the probability that an elder will confide in them if appropriate
180
interviewing and screening techniques are used.
In addition, these
professionals should be knowledgeable about community agencies that
deal specifically with elder related problems.
Mandatory reporting has always been controversial, and a long
181
debate has raged regarding its propriety and efficacy.
The arguments
of those opposed to mandatory reporting may be grouped under four
headings. First, compulsory reporting is said to violate the elder's right
to self-detennination and to constitute an ageist response to this social
182
The aged are presumed competent to manage their affairs,
problem.
and victims of elder mistreatment have the capacity to control their
183
own decision-making and seek assistance when, and if, they choose.
•

177. See infra Appendix E, columns 1-11.
178. See infra Appendix H.
179. See infra Appendix G.
180. See infra notes 238-52 and accompanying text
181. See generally U.S. General Accounting Office, Elder Abuse: Effoctiveness of Reporting
Laws and Other Factors (Apr. 1991) and infra notes 182-203 and accompanying text.
182. See generally Lawrence P. Faulkner, Mandating the Reporting of Suspected Cases of
Elder Abuse: An Inappropriate, lneffictive and Ageist Response to the Abuse of Older Adults,_
16 FAM. L.Q. 69 (1982) (exploring ramifications of mandatory reporting laws and cautioning
that moving too quickly to adopt such Jaws may actually worsen the situation for an already
dependent elder); Ariella Hyman et al., Laws Mandating Reporting of Domestic Jllolence: Do
They Promote Patient Well Being?, 273 JAMA 1781 (1995) (describing state reporting ln\VS,
their effect and how physicians can minimize potential hann to patients); John Palincsnr &
Deborah Crouse Cobb, The Physician's Role in Detecting and Reporting Elder Ab11se, 3 J.
LEGAL MED. 413 (1982) (describing physician's role in addressing elder abuse and neglect tn
infonn.al settings).
183. See Faulkner, supra note 182, at 84-86; Katheryn D. Katz, Elder Abuse, 18 J. FAM. L.
695, 710-11 (1980); Palincsar & Cobb, supra note 180, at 436; Vicki Gottlieb, Beyond Granny
Bashing: Elder Abuse in the 1990's, 28 CLFARlNGHOUSE REv. 371 (1994).
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Critics contend the aged are already disempo\vered and devalued in our
society, and mandatory reporting perpetuates society's perception that
184
they are helpless and childlike.
These \vriters often highlight the fact
that for the elderly the loss of a caregiver (albeit an abusive and/or
otherwise flawed caregiver) \Viii be perceived as leading to institutionalization and other negative consequences.
A second attack leveled against mandatory reporting is that it violates the confidentiality which is inherent in a professional-patient/client
relationship and disrupts the trust that professionals need to operate
185
effectively.
Moreover, the required reporting may publicize a situation which the elder has consciously chosen not to reveal. tS6 The attendant humiliation and embarrassment may be particularly traumatic for
the parent or spouse in such a family situation. A third common argument, building on the previous two points, posits that required reporting
is counter-productive because it discourages elders from reporting abuse
themselves and deters victims from seeking professional, especially
187
Fourth, opponents maintain that mandatory remedical, assistance.
porting \viii flood the existing social service system, prevent infortned
decision-making distinguishing valid reports from those based on supposition and fear of legal consequences for not reporting, and ultimately
188
engulf the overtaxed APS system.
Proponents of mandatory reporting respond 'vith equally strong
arguments. The most important consideration, they maintain, is the
189
physical safety and financial integrity of the aged person involved.

184. See Faulkner, supra note 182, at 8+86; see also Hyman ct nl., supra note 182, at 1785
(similar argument used regarding battered spouses).
185. See, e.g., \Vanda G. Bcyant & Sondra Panico, Plty.slclans' Legal Responslbllille.s to J'lctims of Domestic Violence, SS N.C. l\iED. J. 418, 420 (1994) (stating. in context of domestic
violence, mandatory reporting will prevent relationship of trust bet\'feen doctor nnd patient);
Robert M. Gordon & Susan Tomita, The Reporting of Elder Abuse and Neg/eel: },fandalory or
Voluntary?, 38 CANADA'S f\.iENTAL HEALlH 1, 3 (1990). See also Jane R. ltiatla\V & Jane B.
Mayer, Elder Abuse; Ethical and Practical Dilemmas for Social IYork, 11 HEALm & SOCIAL
'VORK 85-94 (1986) (discussing dilemmas that result from multidisciplinruy intervention in abuse
cases, including the decision to report, its ramifications, and the effect on the victim's right to
self-detennination).
186. See Palincsar & Cobb, supra note 182, at 429.
187. See Gottlieb, supra note 183, at 371, 375; f\ietcalf, supra note SO, nt 753.
188. See, e.g., David P. Matthews, Comment, 17ze Not-So-Golden Years: The Legal Response
to Elder Abuse, 15 PEPP. L. REv. 653, 664 (1988).
189. Examples of serious misbeatrnent fill congressional n:por1S nnd academic studies. A fC\v
examples, as recounted by the 1990 Elder Abuse House Repo~ arc included here as illustrative
of abuse encountered by older Americans in domestic situations.
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Elder abuse is often a "family affair" in which wrongful behavior is

In New Jersey, a 70-year-old woman was beaten by her 32-year-old son, who did
not contribute to the household expenses and whom she suspected of abusing alcohol
and drugs. She said she was terrified of his unprovoked attacks and that he had
broken her glasses and once attacked her in bed while she was sleeping. A social
worker saw her badly bruised left breast, the result of the son punching her.
In Massachusetts, an elderly couple's alcohol-addicted son went on a rampage, breaking windows, ripping lights from the ceiling, strjking his father, spitting in his moth·
er's face and threatening to kill both because they would not give him money.

In Texas, a 61-year-old woman with Alzheimer's disease and diabetes was being
neglected by her daughter. They lived in a house which was dirty and cluttered.
Th.e older woman had a large, 4" deep decubitus ulcer on her buttocks and numerous other decubiti. She had pulled out her feeding tube, had an elevated tempera·
ture and her blood pressure was very lo\v. Her alcoholic sister was supposed to be
assisting in her care but did not bathe the client or dress her wounds. A second
daughter who lived nearby used part of the client's Social Security check to pay her
own household expenses. The family would not permit the elderly woman to enter
a nursing home because they then wouldn't have access to her Social Security.
An elderly woman in Vennont was found frozen to death in her home. Court pa·
pers indicate that her younger brother, her legal guardian, was empowered to oversee
her finances, her care and her medical attention. This 82-year-old woman had been
living in a house without running water or toilet facilities, and had been forced to
heat the house herself by stoking a coal stove, which required great physical stamina.
When the police arrived, they found piles of frozen human excrement, no food and
no heal Authorities became aware of the situation when the brother petitioned to
complain about the tax assessment for the home, which he referred to as "nothing
but a shell."
'

An 80-year-old Texas man lived alone in a small house, his only family a stepson
who lived nearby. The client suffered a massive stroke which left him totally incapacitated. His stepson left the older man alone in the house with no food or water
for three days and would not allow him to be hospitalized for fear of being held rc·
sponsible for the medical bills. Without the intervention of State caseworkers, the
man would have died. He was finally admitted to the hospital.
An 8I ·year-old woman from Texas suffered a broken hip when her husband '•fell"
on her. He refused to allow her to go to a doctor for 4 days after this accident
This 5'8" woman had gone from "obese," according to social workers' reports., to
weighing a mere 78 pounds in 4 months. The husband refused to allow a provider
to bathe or othenvise help his wife.
When a caseworker visited the woman at
home, she found her naked, lying on a green rubber sheet She was covered with
urine and feces, and was unable to speak or to move without assistance. Her bus·
band insisted she remain naked so she wouldn't dirty her clothing. \Vhen the wom·
an was finally seen by a doctor, she was seriously malnourished. She lived for only
three weeks after being removed from this situation.
1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-9.
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not revealed to outsiders.

190

Ill

The aged person may desire to "save face"

and thus be un\villing to create or exacerbate intrafamilial conflicts.
Moreover, victims do not self report because of dependency, fear of
191
institutionalization, feelings of po,verlessness, or other deterrents.
Non-reporting on the part of the victim may thus be a co:erced decision, either objectively or subjectively. Moreover, although the aged
are typically competent and may decide most issues for themselves,
autonomous decision-making al\vays takes place \vhen the person is in a
social context. Abused and neglected elderly people tend to be socially
isolated, with fewer contacts and \Veaker support -systems than non-mis192
treated elders.
This means victims of elder abuse are unlikely to
have the support they need to make a free choice about self-reporting.
193
In most instances, the mistreatment is a crime, sometimes violent
against those who are not able to protect themselves. Many· non-elderly victims wish that public authorities are not alerted, and that the
crime would not be prosecuted. Similar arguments have been made
with respect to whether battered \Vomen have the right to prevent pros194
The prosecutor, ho,vever, represents the
ecution of their batterers.
state, not just the victim; the victim's choice is not the only criterion
195
used in deciding whether ,a public response is activated.
Moreover,
190". See, e.g., Kosberg & Nahmiash, supra note S, at 42•.
191. See Matthews, supra note 188, at 662 (positing that many abused elders do not come
forward on their own and that only mandatory reporting \Viii help them); Blunt, supra note
135, at 2S (reporting that in cases of financial exploitation. elderly victims may· not be reliable
sources of information due to illness, unwillingness to discuss their rmances and reluctance to
testifY against family members).
192. See Pillemer, supra note 136; Pillemet & Finkelhor, supra note 2. nt S4 (discussing latk
of support systems); .see also Ruth Gavison. Feminism and the Publlc/Prh·ate Dlstlncllon, 4S
STAN. L. REv.. 1, 35-38 (1992) (strung that the inherent private nature, ,o f family relations leads
to presumption that a family should be free from external interference); Elizabeth 1-1. Schneider,
11re Violence of ,Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 973. 974 (1991) (specifically addressing battered
women and recognizing the "dark and violent side of privacy"). "Police traditionally managed
violence in the home, very differently from violence on the street. They tried to mediate domestic "disputes" • • • [t]hc message was that assaults in the home \\·ere permissible; victims
were not afforded adequate protection and assailants \\~ere not subject to consequences."
Howard Holtz & Kathleen Furniss, The HealJh Care Provider's Role in Domestic J'lolence, 8
TRENDs IN HEALTH CARE, L. & Ennes No.2, 47, SO (1993).
193. See statutes collected in infra Appendices A & D.
194. See generally Donna R. l\1ooney & 1\iichael Rodriguez, 1\iD, Cal!fomltz Heallhcare·
Workers and Mandatory Reporting of Intimate Jliolence, 7 liASTINGS \VO~fEN•s W. 85 (1996)
(arguing mandatory reporting and public decision-making abo,ut criminnl enforcemen-t removes:
autonomy from women and may v.·orsen abuse in many situations).
195. Many victims of elder abuse arc spouses or p3l1ners, so the categories often overlap.
See, e.g., Metcalf, supra note SO, at 775; (1986) (estimating 20~~ of elder abuse otcurs in married couples); FaulknerlJ supra note 182, at 86.
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often services may be offered to victims without unnecessary intrusion

into their lives. In many states, aged persons may refuse consent to an
196
investigation by APS.
Public control of such investigation may be
reasserted if an emergency exists or there is reasonable cause to believe
197
the aged person refusing consent is incapacitated.
Here, as in many
legal issues concerning the elderly, societal values of personal autonomy and protection of the individual exist in uneasy tension.
Further, while there has been a long tradition of safeguarding the
confidentiality of infonnation gathered in the professional-client relationship, exceptions have always been made when the public interest
198
There is no realistic possibility of
outweighs the private interest.
liability where infonnation is disclosed by a professional pursuant to
199
court order or legislative command. Every state bas a statute that
provides some type of immunity for rep,orters of elder mistreatment.
The form of these statutes varies. The majority provide immunity from
200
liability if the report is made in "good faith," while others protect the
professional unless he acted ''maliciously;" in "bad faith,'' or knew the
201
report was false.
Such immunity is recognized even where the report

196. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.017(d) (Michie 1996) (requiring consent of alleged
victim or court order to investigate); UTAH Cone ANN. § 62A·3-304(1). (1997) (same); WISC.
STAT. ANN. § 46.90(g) (1997); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 209.030(6) (Michie 1998),
197. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.24.016 (Michie 1996).
198. See, _e.g., StQrch v. Silvennan, 186 Cat App. 3d 671 (1986) (absolute immunity granted
mandatocy reporter under California child abuse statute); Hope v. Landau, 486 N.E. 2d 89, 91·
92 (Mass. 1985) (holding in the context of child abuse that a writer or a report required by
statute is immune from liability regardless of correctness of beliet). See generally Robert F.
Danelen, Statutory Immunily Under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act: From First
Impression to Present Day, 12 J. Juv. L. 16 (1991) (discussing absolute immunity for mandatory reporters under the CaJifo_mia Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act); Dorothy Ann Gil·
bert, The Ethics of Mandatory Elder Abuse Reporting Statutes, 8 ADV. NURS. SCI. St (1986)
(discussing mandatory reporting of elder abuse by nurses and immunity from liability ·fr reports
are made in good faith)._
199. See, e.g., Arnett v. Baskous, 856 P_2d 790, 791 (Alaska 1993) (holding physician not
liable for breach of patient -confidence for releasing a patient's medical records pursuant to n
court order); Bryson v. Tillinghast, 749 P~2d I 10, 113 (Okla. 1988) (holding a doctor's disclosure of patient infonnation leading to conviction did not violate the physician-patient privilege
and benefited the public at large).
200. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.. §' 47.24.120(a) (M'ichie 1996) ("A person who in go-od faith
makes a report under AS 47.24.010, regardless of whether the person is required to do so, Is
immune from civil or criminal liability that might othenvise be incurred or imposed for making
the report").
201. See, e.g., GA. CoDE ANN.. § 30-5-4 (1997) ("[A]nyone who makes a report ••• shnU
be immune from any civil or criminal liability . . . unless such person acted in bad faith or
with malicious purpose~"); IDAHO CODE § 39-5303 (Michie Supp. 1997) (same);MONT. CODE
.
ANN. § 52-3-814 (1997) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § .lOSA-102 (1997) (same).
.
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202

turns out to be incorrect.
Moreover, since patients \viii be infonned
that the report to authorities is statutorily required, disclosure is unlikely to reduce trust in the relationship, and in fact may give the client
more confidence in the professional \Vho cares enough to attempt to
protect him or her. Nor is it likely that elders \'lill not seek medical or
other help when they need it, given the exigent nature of such needs.
Despite considerable debate in the professional literature, no consensus has emerged regarding the wisdom or the efficacy of mandatory
203
reporting.
Existing studies provide no clear ans\ver. The lack of
rigorous control of variables in studies that have been conducted, together with inconsistent definitions in the various states, makes it unlikely any conclusion to this debate \Viii emerge in the foreseeable
future. More significantly, however, legislatures in forty-t\vo states and
204
the District of Columbia have manifestly decided this question by
enacting mandatory reporting laws. These la\VS represent the state's
assessment of the gravity of the problem and the pivotal role professionals play in case finding. Non-reporting and non-enforcement flouts
legislative choice, creating discretionary situations such statutes are
meant to obviate. The near unanimity in favor of mandatory reporting
requirements also reflects the relative isolation of at-risk elders. Many
aged adults have few social engagements and emerge from their homes
infrequently or not at all.
There is much evidence of failure to comply \Vith the mandatory
reporting statutes. In 1991 the House of Representatives Subcommittee
on Health and Long-Tet1n Care evaluated questionnaires returned by all
state agencies to Congress to detennine the extent of underreporting.
The subcommittee found that the states \vere unanimous in responding
205
that a significant number of elder-abuse cases are never reported.
Doctors are the most frequently named professional group \Vith a

202. See, e.g., Zamstein v. Marvasti, 692 A2d 781 (Conn. 1997) (no duty on part of mandatory reporters to accused abuser, because potential liability '"·ould discouroge rcJWrtinS);
Simonson v. Swenson~ 177 N.\V. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920) (physician not liable to patient for
disclosing a contagious disease when the physician acts in good faith, even if mistaken diagnosis made).
203. See, e.g., Karen I. Fredriksen, Adult Protecth·e Services: Changes Hilh the lntroducJ/on
of Mandatory Reporting, 1 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECf 59-70 (1989) (calling for more re-

search on effectiveness of mandatory reporting in elder abuse).
204. See generally infra Appendix E (cataloging mandatory reporters and penalty for noncompliance).
205. See Elder Abuse: What Can be Done? Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Services of the House Select Cornrn. on Aging. 102d Cong. 46 (1991); .see also supra notes 142-43
and accompanying text
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206

duty to report, but evidence indicates substantial non-compliance. An
Alabama study, conducted eleven years after the passage of that state's
mandatory reporting law, reported 60% of doctors believed an experienced physician could accurately diagnose cases of elder abuse. However, the study also showed that 77% expressed doubt about the definition of abuse; over one-half reported they were not sure that Alabama
had procedures for dealing with abuse, and 60% were unc_ertain of the
procedure for reporting abuse cases. Many doctors reported they were
deterred from reporting by the necessity of court appearances, by fear
of arousing the anger of the abuser, and by concern about loss of confidentiality.207 Another study found the overwhelming majority (84%)
of physicians in North Carolina and Michigan were uninfonned about
208
the existence of their states' mandatory reporting laws.
In a more
recent study in Michigan, of I 7,238 cases of possible elder abuse reported to authorities during 1989-93, physicians reports were only 2%
of the total. Nor are doctors more accurate in their diagnos_es. Comparison of substantiation rates showed no significant differences between
209
physician reports and other professional reporting sources.
Many
victims are treated at hospital emergency departments, but physicians
210
are often unsure even about the mechanisms for reporting.
Numerous other observers confirm that elder abuse laws have had
211
Studies regarding the
little impact on physicians' failures to report.
mistreatment of the aging rank physicians as the professionals most in
212
need of training on elder abuse.
Under federal law, local area Agencies on Aging must identify public and private entities in their geo.

.

206. See infra Appendix E, col. 2.
207. See R. Stephen Daniels et al., Physicians' Mandatory Reporting of Elder Abuse, 29
GERONTOLOGIST 321 (1989).

208. See James G. o•anen, Elder Abuse and the Primary Care- Physician~ MED. TIMES, Dec.
1986, at 60·64; Elder Abuse: Ba"iers to ldent!fication, and Intervention (paper presented at the
1985 Annual Meeting of Gerontological Society of America).
209. See .Donie_ E. Rosenblatt et al., Reporting Mistreatment of Older Adults: The Role of
Physicians, J. AMER. GERIATRICS SOCJEI'Y Jan. 1996, at 65-70.
210. See C.L. Clark-Daniels et al., Abuse and Neg/eel of the Elderly: Are Emergency Depart·
men.l Personnel Aware of Mandatory Reporting Laws?, 19 ANN. EMERG. MED. 970-77 (1990).
211. See generally Mark Lachs, Preaching to the Unconverted: Educating Physicians About
Elder Abuse, 7 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 1 (1995) (listing possible reasons why physicians
fail to report); C. Cochran & S. Petrone, Elder Abuse: The Physician's Role In Identlflcatlon
and Treatment, 111 ILL. MED. J. 241-46 (1987) (suggesting elder victims of domestic violence
tend to be overlooked by physicians).
212. See B.E. Blakely et al.~ Improving the Responses of Physicians to Elder Abuse and
Neglect: Contributions of a Model Program, 19 J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 35, 37
(1993).
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graphic areas which are engaged in the prevention, identification and
213
treatment of elder abuse and neglect.
\Vorkers in these agencies
initiate and maintain face-to-face contacts \Vith seniors to assess cases
and advocate on their behalf. A national survey of these direct practice
workers examined their perceptions of the usefulness of fourteen occupational groups in the discovery and treatment of elder mistreatment.
Generally, doctors were rated bet\veen "not very helpful" and "no help
at all" in the discovery of cases, and bet\veen "some\vhat helpful" and
214
"not very helpful in treatment"
Physicians, in fact, \vere ranked near
the bottom of the list of occupations in discovery and treatment.
It is unlikely that other professionals \Vith a statutory duty to report
are complying at a dramatically higher rate than physicians. In the
same survey of fourteen occupations by direct service \Yorkers, not one
group achieved even a rating of "some\vhat helpful" in the discovery or
treatment of cases. The groups rated included visiting nurses, hospital
social workers, mental health \Vorkers, nursing home personnel, and
215
many others.
Recent testimony before the Senate's Special Committee on Aging highlights the problem.
I took an informal poll this morning of about I 0 emergency
department staff at Maine Medical Center, \vhich sees about
45,000 patients a year, 10,000 of whom are pediatric. So in a
35,000 adult population, you can imagine a good many of those
are dependent adults. I asked the staft in the last year, h0\'1
many adult protective DHS referrals they made, and the ans\vers were from zero to one each. And I think that some of
the ones who said "one" were probably trying to please me and
216
may have been stretching back more than a year.

A common fear is that reporting would be a breach of the
professional's duty of confidentiality for infonnation gathered in the
course of a professional relationship. This legally enforceable duty is
217
of ancient origin and may indeed provide a cause of action for its
213. See Older Americans Act of 196S, Pub. L. No. 89-73. 79 Stat. 218 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
214. B.E. Blakely & Ronald Dolon, The Relalr:e Contrlbullons of Occupation Groups in the
Discovery and Treatment of Elder Abuse and Neglect, 11 J. GERONIOLOOICAL Soc. \VORK.
183" 189-94 (1991 ).
215. See id.
216. HEARING BEFORE nm SENATE SPE.CIAL CO~U.f. ON AGING, 104th Cons., 1st Sess., 39
(Portland, Maine, April 11, 1995) (statement of Emmy Hunt, Head Nurse, Emersency Department, Maine Medical Center).
217. The Hippocratic Oath provides, in part: "\Vhatsoever things I see or hear concerning the

~
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218

breach in some circumstances.
There is no possibility of liability,
however, when reporting is in compliance with statutory command.
The reporting laws represent a decision that public knowledge and
intervention is of higher social value than confidentiality in these circumstances.219 In d·iscussing this duty in an analogous child abuse reporting case, a Missouri appellate court noted:
[W]hen the cost of imposing this duty and the economic burden
upon the actor are balanced against the magnitude of preventable injury suffered, the outcome overwhelmingly weighs in
favor of imposing a duty . . . . The burden imposed on an
individual in fulfilling this duty is greatly outweighed by the
potential or actual harm suffered as a result of failure to fulfill
this duty.

220

The statutory immunity clauses for mandatory reporters of elder abuse
make it abundantly clear that disclosure outweighs confidentiality in
221

such circumstances, and case law is uniform ·in upholding this legisla222
tive choice.
Some states explicitly abrogate any claim of professional
life of men, in my attendance on the sick or even apart therefrom, which ought not to be
noised abroad, I will keep silence thereon, counting such things to be as sacred secrets/' 1S
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, A HISTORY OF MEDIC~ 199 (14th ed. 1959). Today, the Amerl·
can Medical Association's Privileges of Medical Ethics provides:
Confidentiality. The information disclosed to a physician during the course of the
relationship between physician and patient is confidential to the greatest possible
degree. The patient should feel free to make a full disclosure of infonnation to the
physician in ·order that the physician may most effectively provide needed services.
The patient should be able to make this disclosure with the knowledge that the phy·
sician will respect the confidential nature of the communication. The physician
should not reveal confidential communications or infonnation withou.t the express
consent of the patient, unless required to do so by law.
218. See, e.g.• Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1973) (finding disclosure of m'cdlcal
infonnation to be breach of implied contract); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696
P.2d 527 (Ore. 1985) (canvassing various theories explaining origin of duty to keep medlcnl
information confidential). See generally Almeta E. Cooper, The Physicians Dilemma: Protection
of the Patient's Right to Privacy, 22 ST. LoUIS U. LJ. 397, 412-19 (1978).
219. See generally Ralph Slovenko, Child Abuse and the Role of the Physician In the Proof
of a Case, 11 J. PSYCmATRY & LAw 477, 480-81 (1989) (discussing social value of reporting
in instances of child abuse); Hope v. Landau, 486 N.E.2d 89 (Mass. 1985) (giving weJght to
policy).
220. Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 310 (Mo. Ct App. 1995).
221. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.1036 (West 1998) ("Any person who participates In
making a report under § 415 . 1034 or participates in a judicial proceeding resulting therefrom is
presumed to be acting in good faith and, unless lack of good faith is shown by clear wtd
convincing evidence, is immune from any liability, civil or criminal, that otherwise might be
incurred or imposed • . . .").
222. See, e.g., Arnett v~ Baskous, 856 P.2d 790, 790 (Alaska 1993) (holding that a physician
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223

privilege.

B. Criminal Liability

Failure to report elder mistreatment to public authorities is typically
224
Although education and voluntacy compliance
a criminal offense.
might be the preferred methods for encouraging professionals and others to report, a majority of states make such an omission a misdemeanor.225 The use of criminal penalties is obviously designed to provide a
deterrent to~ and punishment for, noncompliance. Often, though, to
226
produce criminal liability the failure to report must be '\villful,"
227
''knowing," or a similarly elevated standard.
Although reporting of suspicious cases is thus statutorily required,
criminal enforcement of these reporting laws is typically nonexistent.
Few actual cases of prosecution against professionals can be found. A
computer search of published court decisions in all fifty states bet\veen

cannot be held civilly liable for releasing the medical records of a patient, pursunnt to a valid
court order, for use in his criminal trial for sexual abuse of a child); Bryson v. nJJingbast,
749 P.2d 110, 113 (Okla. 1988} (finding that there was no common law or ethical basis to
hold a doctor civilly liable for furnishing information to police thllt ultimately led to his pa·
tient's arrest and conviction for rape, and that the doctor-patient privilege does not extend ~
yond trial testimony).
223. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.109 (\Vest 1998):
The privileged quality of communication bem·een ~ • • any professional person and
his patient or client, and any other privileged communication • • • , as such commu·
nication relates to both the competency of the witness and to the exclusion of confidential communications~ does not apply to any situation involving kno\\n or suspected
adult abuse, neglect, or exploitation and does not constitute a ground for failure to
report as required by § 415.103, for failure to cooperate with the department in its
activities . • • , or for failure to give evidence in any judicial proceeding relating to
abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an aged person or disabled adull
224. See infra note 225.
225. See infra Appendix C, coJ. 12; see also ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-4S4(J) (\'lest
1997) ("A person who violates any provision of this section is guilty of a class 1 misdemean·
or.); CAL. \VELF. & INST. CODE § 15634(d) (\Vest 1991) ("Any person \Vho fails to report an
instance of elder or dependent adult abuse, as required by this article, is guilty or a misde·
meanor .... •).
226. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-S-111.1(4) (Supp. 1998) ("A person \\·ho is required
to report suspected . • • abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a disabled or elder ndutt • • .. tllld
who willfully fails to do so, is guilty of a class B misdemennor."). See also VT. STAT ~.
tit 33 § 6913(e) (Supp. 1998).
227. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-10 (Michie 1992} ("Any physician or other practitioner of
the healing arts who shall knowingly fail to make the report required by this chnptcr shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor •••."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2(J)(l) (\Vest 1986) rAny
person who knowingly and willfully fails to report as provided by Subsection C, shall be fmed
•.. or imprisoned ••• or both."); see also infra Appendix E, col. 12.
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1994-1997 found only one prosecution based on a failure to report
elder mistreatment statute, and even that case did not directly involve a
228
failure to report.
The ratio of reported cases to all instances of mistreatment is impossible to calculate; however, when estimates of the
number of reported cases are compared to prevalence studies, it is clear
that the threat of criminal penalties has done little to ensure reporting.
Prosecutors are rarely aware of the failure to report; therefore, lack
of criminal enforcement is not surprising. Even when they do become
aware, prosecutors are loathe to proceed against white collar professionals. Moreover, difficulties in securing evidence for these cases, te., the
victim.' s reluctance to testify or a disability that renders testifying difficult, likewise makes criminal prosecution unlikely.
C. Civil Liability

1. Introduction
Since there have ·been few criminal .Prosecutions of mandated reporters, it is logical to tum to the civil law system as a more effective
vehicle for encouraging professionals to diagnose and report elder mistreatment. The relationship between law and professional conduct involves several intersecting subjects, -including malpractice litigatio-n,
federal and state regulatory initiatives, and peer and institutional selfgovernance. The civil law has often been the catalyst creating change
229
in professional behavior.
Physicians surveyed in the famous Harvard
study- on iatrogenic medical injuries in New York felt that the threat of
230
civil litigation was efficacious in maintaining standards of care.- Both
malpractice suits and licensure sanctions may be more effective than
criminal prosecutions in enforcing reporting laws. Although both are
231
often inconsistently applied, their primary purpose is to hold provid228. See People v. Heitzman, 886 P.2d 1229 (Cal. 1994). A Westlaw computer search, under the "All-States" database library, revealed only the Heitzman case.
229. See, e:g., Harold L. Hirsch, New Developments in Health Care, 20 LoY. U. CHI. L.J,
713, 713 (1989) (noting that medical negligence actions cause the modification of process_es and
procedures, and enhance that categocy of quality assurance referred to as "risk managementsuccessfully reducing patient injury by controlling_exposures to risk").
The power of Jaw to change behavior regarding the elderly is illustrated in the dramatic
reduction of various practices in nursing homes. Since the Nursing Home Reform Act of
1987, the use of physical restraints has declined by SO%; inappropriate use of anti-psychotic
drugs has declined by 25%. See Bruce C. Vladeck, The Past, Present and Future of Nursing
Home Quality, 215 JAMA 425 (1996) (presenting overview of statistics and articles).
230. See HARVARD MEDICAL PRACI'ICE StuDY, PATIENTS, DocTORS AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LtnGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK, 9·1 (1990).
231. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Dr. No, Review of Medical Malpractice on Trial by
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ers accountable for deviations from the standard of care and thus deter
232
injury-producing b-ehavior~
In principle~ malpractice cases produce an
incentive structure designed to induce professionals to i.nvest ti'aining
and time in injury prevention. One economist has estimated that the
"current . . . non-trivial incidence of' injury due to negligence \Vould be
at least 10 percent higher, were it not for the incentives for injury
prevention created by the one in ten incidents of malpractice that result
233
in a claim."
The possibility of civil litigation, \Vith its inherent costs
and potential jury damage a\vards, is a threat all contemporary professionals can readily appreciate.
The shocking prevalence of elder ,mistreatment, discuss,ed earlier,
and the potentially lethal consequences of such behavior should alert
professionals to the need for competent assessment of clients for possible abuse or neglect The ability to make an accurate assessment requires sensitivity to the sometimes subtle indications, of abuse as \Veil
as general knowledge of, and orientation to, the problem.. Professionals
in family service agencies, hospital emergency departments, primary
care clinics or offices, and other institutions serving the aged must be
able to recognize the signs and symptoms of various fonns of elder
mistreatment and act appropriately.
Elder abuse and elder neglect are recognized diagnoses. National
organizations have acknowledged the need for adequate assessment.
For example, the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health
Organizations, (JCAHO) is the leading accrediting organization for
234
JCAHO stanAmerican ,health care facilities, especially hospitals.

Paul C. Weiler, 58 U.. CHI. L. R£V. 1499, 1500-02 (1991) (rcvic\ving PAUL C. \VEJLER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1990)~ estimating that only SO,OOO patients claim compensation
out of 400,000 injured each year in American hospitals).
232. See generally SYLVIA A. LAW & STEVEN POLAN, PAIN &. PROFIT: THE Pouncs OF
MALPRACTICE (1978) (analyzing relationship betv;ccn professional licensure and malpractice).
233. Patricia M. Danzon, Ph.D., An Economic AtWiy.sls of the Afedlca/ ,A{alpracllce System. 1
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 39, 53 (1983); see also Randall R. Bovbjerg, }.fed/cal Afalpracllce on Trial:
Quality of Care Is the Important S/atU/ard, 49 LAw & CONm.tP. PROBS., Spring 1986. at 321.
234. Accreditation by JCAHO is critical because most states incorporate this private accredita·
tion into their hospital licensure standards. See, e.g.• ALAsKA STAT. § 18.20.080(a) (Michie
1996); OHIO REv. CODE § 3727.02(a) (\Vest 1997). In addition, JCAHO accredited hospitals
are "deemed" to meet almost all f\1edicarc certification requirements, a critical contemporary
source of income for most hospitals. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 139Sx(c), 1395bb (\Vest 1992); 42
C.F.R. § 488.5 (1996).
(a) Deemed to meet Institutions accredited as hospitals by the JCAHO or AMA arc
deemed to meet all of the Medicare conditions of participation for hospitals, except(I) The requirement for utilization review as specified 'in section 1861(c)(6) of
the Act in §48230 of this chapter;
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dards require hospital emergency departments and ambulatory care services to have written policies and procedures for identifying possible
235
victims of abuse and neglect, including the elderly.
In addition, hospitals must have specific plans for educating _professional staff about
criteria for identifying, and procedures for treating, possible victims of
236
mistreatment.
The American Medical Association ( . · ) has also
established guidelines for physicians which suggest elder abuse as a
237
possible diagnosis in many cases.
The AMA recommends that every clinical setting have a protocol
238
for the detection and assessment of elder mistreatment.
"All person-

(2) The additional special staffing and medical records requirements that arc
considered necessary for the provision of active treabnent ill psychiatric hospitals
(s.ection 1861 (f) of the Act) and implementing regulations; and
(3) Any requirements under section 186l(e) of the Act and implementing regulations that HFC~ after consulting with JCAHO or AOA, identifies as being
higher or more precise than the requirements for accreditation (section
1865(a)(4) of the Act).
42 C.F.R. § 488.5 (1996).
235. See JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH 0RGAN1ZA110NS, COMPREHENSIVE
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK (1998) (hereinafter JCAHO
Standards]. These policies and procedures address the following issues:
PE 1.8 Possible victims of abuse are identified using criteria developed by the hos·
pitals.
·
Intent of PE.l.8 • • • The hospital has objective criteria for identifying and
assessing possible victims of abuse and neglect, and they are used throughout the
organization. Staff are to be trained in the use of these criteria.
The criteria focus on observable evidence and not on allegation alone. They
address at least the following situations:
a. Physical assault;
b. Rape or other sexual molestation;
c. Domestic abuse; and
d. Abuse or neglect of elders and children.
When used appropriately by qualified staff' mambers, the criteria prevent any action
or question that could create false memories of abuse in the individual being us·
sessed.
Staff members are able to make appropriate referrals for victims of abuse and
neglect To help them do so, the hospital maintains a Jist of private and public
community agencies that provide help for abuse victims.
236. See id at HR.3. HR.3 requires that '"[t]he leaders ensure that the competence of all
staff members is. assessed, maintained, demonstrated, and improved continually." !d.
237. See SARA C. ARAVANJS, AMERICAN MED. AsS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND TREATMENT GUIDE•
LINES ON ELDER ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1992) [hereinafter AMA ELDER ABUSE GUIOBLINES].
See also Teri Randall, AMA, Joint Commission Urge Physicians Become Pari of Soltlllon Jo
.Family Violence Epidemic, 266 JAMA 2524 (1991).
238. See AMA ELDER ABusE GUIDELINES, supra note 237, at 8. See also Mark S. Lochs &
Terry Fulmer, Recognizing Elder Abuse & Neglect, 9 CLINICS IN GERIATRIC MEDICINE 66S,
665-81 (1993) (discussing need for written protocols and better training of stafl).
'

'

'
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nel who come in contact with older patients, including nurses, nursing
assistants, social workers, and physical therapists should be familiar
with the protocol and should be alert to the various types of mistreat239
ment and possible risk factors."
The foitn of the protocol may vary;
a narrative, a checklist, or many other means \Viii enable doctors, nurses, and other care providers to rapidly assess the patient for elder abuse
240
and neglect and to document it.
Abusers often bring the patient to
the health care site and could be reluctant to leave the victim alone
with the professional. Because of this, the intervie\v and examination
of the patient should nonnally be conducted a\vay from the caregiver or
241
suspected abuser.
The protocol should screen for specific types of
mistreatment about which the professional has been previously educated.
It should include direct questions to the patient dealing \vith physical,
242
Affinnative ans\vers
psychological, and financial abuse, and neglect
should be follo\ved up to deter1nine ho\v and \vhen the mistreatment
occurs, who perpetrates it, and the patient's attending feelings and coping mechanisms.
Immediate efforts are required to ensure patient safety and to prevent the behavior from recurring. The clinician must have infonnation
on state reporting requirements, protective seiVices, and other community resources. Physicians are specifically advised to educate patients
about different fottns of abuse and neglect, the older person's right to
243
be free from mistreatment, and ho\v to access local resources.
\Vrit244
ten materials on elder abuse should be routinely provided to patients.
When mistreatment is detected or reasonably suspected, the professional
must ensure the safety of the victim, and report to the appropriate state

239. AMA EIDER ABUSE GUIDEIJNES, supra note 237, at 9.
240. See AMA ELDER ABUSE GUIDELJNES, supra note 237, at 8.
241. See Judy S. Bloom et al., Detecting Elder Abuse: A Guide for Pllyslclans, GERIATRICS
June 1989, at 40, 43.
242. The AMA Elder Abuse Guidelines suggest questions such as:
Has anyone at home ever hurt you?
Has anyone ever touched you without your consent?
Has anyone ever made you do things you didn't want to do?
Has anyone taken anything that was yours without asking?
Has anyone ever scolded you or threatened you?
Have you ever signed any documents that you didn't understand?
Are you afiaid of anyone at home?
Are you alone a lot?
Has anyone ever failed to help you take care of yourself ·when you needed help?
AMA ELDER ABUSE GUIDELINES, supra note 233, at 9.
243. See id.
244. See id.

122

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[VoL 31:77

245
agency in accordance with laws that govern elder abuse and neglect.
If personnel are not trained, proper questions not asked and investigations not undertaken, cases will be undiagnosed and undetected.
Lack of detection may result in additional injury because elder abuse,
like spouse and child abuse, often follows cyclical patterns, with the
246
victim being mistreated again often more severely.
"Mistreatment is
likely to escalate in frequency and severity over time . . . . The longtertn trajectory of abuse is such that if intervention is not initiated after
abuse is first observed in a clinic or examining room, the chances are
247
good that it will continue."
Physicians are cautioned by the AMA
that if they treat abused elders and do not report suspected mistreat248
ment, they may be civilly or even criminally liable.
Numerous protocols and other tools for assessing mistreatment reflecting professional
249
standards are also available to nurses, social workers and caregiv252
251
ers,250 health care workers, and law enforcement professionals.
Where questioning, examination, or other infonnation provides the
basis for reasonable suspicion or belief that mistreatment has occurred,
253
Thorough, well-documentfollow-up is required by the professional.
254
ed records are essential.
The verbal statements of the patient, his

245. See id at 9, 23.
246. See COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MED. AsS'N., Elder Abuse and Ne•
glee/, 251 JAMA 966-71 (1987); H. O'MALLEY ET AL., ELDER ABUSE IN MASSACHUSE'J*fS: A
SURVEY OF PROFESSIONALS AND PARAPROFESSIONALS (1979) {Legal Research and Services for
the Elderly, Boston, Mass.) (estimating 70% of reported cases involved repeated instances of
abuse).
247. Lorin A. Baumhover & S. Colleen Beall, Prognosis: Elder Mistreatment In Health Care
Settings, in ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND ExPLOITATION OF OLDER PERSONS: STRATEGIES FOR AS·
SESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 241, 248 (Lorin A. Baumhover & S. Colleen Beall cds., 1996)
[hereinafter Baumhover & Beall].
248. See AMA ELDER ABUSE GUIDELINES, supra note 237, at 20.
249. See, e.g., Sue Haviland & James O'Brien, Physical Abuse and Neglect of the Elderly:
Assessment and Intervention, ORTHOPAEDIC NURS. July-Aug. 1989, at 11; Jeanne Floyd, Collect·
ing Data on Abuse of the Elderly, J. OF GERONTOL. NURS., Dec. 1984, at 11.
250. See, e.g., MARY JOY QUINN & SUSAN K. TOMITA, ELDER ABUSE AND NEGLECT:
CAUSES, DIAGNOSIS AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES (1986).
251. See, e.g., TERRY T. FULMER & TERRANCE A. O'MALLEY, INADEQUATE CARE OF TilE
ELDERLY: A HEALTII CARE PERSPECTIVE ON ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1987); l-1. Ramsey·
Klawsnik, Recognizing and Responding to Elder Mistreatment, 12 PRIDE INST. J. OF LoNG
TERM HOME CARE, No. 3, 12-20 (1995).
252. See, e.g., ROGER NASH, ILL. DEP'T OF AGING, ELDER ABUSE: INFORMATION FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS (1986).
253. See AMA ELDER ABUSE

GUIDELINES, supra note 237, at 13-14 (detailing recommcndn·
tions for intervention and case management).
254. The AMA Guidelines, for example, recommend the following be documented:
Chief complaint and description of the abusive event or neglectful situation, using the
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affect, etc. must be recorded. In addition to complete \vritten records,
255
photographs and other imaging studies are particularly valuable.

Time gaps and subsequent changes should be avoided and nonnal procedures follo\ved. This documentation provides protection for both
professional and client, and may be used in subsequent legal proceedings. For records to be admissible in court, they must have been contemporaneously made during the "regular course of business" in accordance \vith routinely follo\ved procedures, properly stored and secured.256 Contemporaneous medical records may be used at trial to
prove the physical condition of the elderly patient at the time of treatment.257
The required response may vary depending on \Vhether the patient
resides at home or in an institution. In cases of abuse or neglect in
the community, the professional should be a\vare of the variety of services available, including, for example, respite care, visiting nurses, and
social \Vork evaluations. In institutional settings~ state Ja,vs typically

patient's own words whenever possible rather than the physician's assessment
Complete medical history.
Relevant social history.
A detailed description of injuries, including type, number, size, location, stages ,o r
healing, color, resolution, possible causes, and explanations given. \'/here applicable,
the location and nature of the injuries should be recorded on a 'body chart or dra\V·
•
Ing.
An opinion on whether the injuries \\·ere adequately explained.
Results of all pertinent laboratoey and other diagnostic proced.ures.
Color photographs and imaging studies, if applicable.
If the police are called, the name of the investigating officer nnd any nctions taken.
AMA. ELDER ABUSE GUIDELINES, supra note 237, at 18.
'255. The AMA Guidelines suggest:
\Vhen possible, take photographs before medical beatment is given.
Use color film, along with a color standard.
Photograph from different angles, full body and close-up.
Hold a coin, ruler, or ,other object to illustrate the size of nn injury.
Include the patient's face in at least one picture.
Take at least two pictures of every major trauma area.
Mark photographs precisely and promptly with the patient's name, location of injury,,
date, time of day, and names of the photographer and others pn:senL
Id at 19.
256. FED. R. Evio. 803(6), Hearsay Exceptions • •• Records of Regularly Conducted A.clivlties. See also In re Estate of Poulos, 229 N.\V.2d 721, 727 (I0\\"3 1975) \\Ve have long held
that medical and hospital records are admissible, upon proper foundation, as an exception to the
hearsay rule.1; Hytha v. Schwendeman, 320 N. E.2d 312. 316 (Ohio CL App. 1974)
("[M]edical diagnosis, made by a qualified physician and contained in nn othen'tisc duly au·
thenticated record, is admissible .•••").
257. See, e.g., United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 60-66 (7th Cir. 1911) (hospital records
used to prove "appearance, conduct and reactions" of ,patient on arrival at hospital).
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mandate that admissions to residential facilities be made by a physician
and, after the admission, patients must be under the supervision of
258
specified medical or nursing personnel.
As a result, instances of mistreatment in these institutions should be identified, treated, and reported.
State laws often specifically provide for reporting of elder mistreatment
259
in long-tertn care facilities.

2. Malpractice Liability
Malpractice is legal fault, a breach of the standard of care in the
260
It involves unreasonable risk of hann to others, measured
profession.
by the utility of the behavior compared to the probability and gravity
261
of the hann it presents.
Professionals who fail to diagnose, treat, and
report reasonably identifiable cases of elder maltreatment should be
262
civilly liable if the failure subsequently leads to further damage.
Plaintiffs in such cases might be the elderly victim who has escaped
from an abusive situation, a relative acting as "next friend," a guardian,
or a public agency.
Civil actions have a number of important advantages over criminal
enforcement of mandatory reporting laws, which is why malpractice is
a valuable avenue for curing this epidemic. First, previously noted,
263
criminal prosecutions are virtually nonexistent. . Private civil actions
are under the control of the individual and not subject to prosecutorial
discretion. Second, a liability detennination provides the opportunity to
compensate a victim for injury suffered as the result of the unreported
abuse, while providing a financial deterrent to noncompliance with
applicable reporting statutes in other cases. Third, the lower standard

258. See, e.g., \VIS. STAT. § 50.04(2m) (West 1994 & Supp. 1996) ("No nursing home may
admit any patient until a physician has completed a plan of care for the patient and the patient
is assessed or the patient is exempt . . . ."}; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-804(29) (West 1996)
("The nursing home must have an agreement with a physician and a hospital that will care for
a patient who does not have a private physician or hospital of choice.").
259. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § S-28-203(b)(2} (Michie 1997) ("A report for endangered
adults residing in long-term care facilities shall be made immediately to the local Ja\V enforce·
ment agency in which the facility is located, and to the Office of Long-Tenn Care of the
Division of Economic and Medical Services of the Department of Human Services pursuant to
regulations of that office."); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5093(2)(i) (Michie 1997) (Reports of abuse
are mandated from "[a]ny person who maintains or is employed by a facility or establishment
that provides care for older persons.").
260. See, e.g., Bardessono v. Michels, 478 P.2d 480, 484 (Cal. 1970}.
261. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965}.
262. See, e.g., Landeros v. Flood, SSt P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976) (see discussion infra notes 354·
65 and accompanying text).
263. See supra note 228 and accompanying text
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of proof and wider discovery possibilities in civil litigation like\vise
make it a more attractive path than criminal prosecution. To succeed
in such a suit, the plaintiff must establish the elements of malpractice
and counter possible defenses. Each of these \viii be d'iscussed individually.
:a.

Duty

The plaintiff in a negligence action must prove that the defendant
2
owed him a duty to exercise due care to protect his interests. M The
existence of a duty of care is a legal question to be decided by judges,
265
weighing a variety of considerations.
These considerations include,
in addition to foreseeability,
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the
closeness of the connection benveen the defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future hann, the
extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences· to the
community of imp·osing ,a duty to exercise care \Vith res,ulting
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of
266
insurance for the risk involved.
Once the plaintiff demonstrates a duty

to him, the question becomes \vhat the appropriate standard of care is, and \Vhether the
defendant's conduct fell belo\v that standard. In contrast to the often
more stringent requirements for prosecution of non-reporters under
267
some criminal statutes,
individuals and: institutions are required to
report even if they simply have a "reasonable basis" or a "reason to
\Vas O\Ved

264. See KEEToN ET AI..., supra note 159, § 30, at 164; see also RFSJI\1£!-.fENT (SECO~'D) OF
TORTS § 281 cmt c (1965) (stating that "in order for the actor to be negligent \\tith respect to
the other, his or her conduct must create a recognizable risk of hnrm to the, other individually,
or to a class o.f perSons of which the other is a member} .
265. See KEEToN ET AL., supra note 159, § 37,. at 236; see also RESTAWIENT (SECO~'D) OF
TORTS § 328B cmt e (1965) (stating that "it is the further function or the court to determine
whether the law imposes upon the defendant any legal duty to act. • • • -. This decision is al·
ways for the court").
266. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
267. Criminal liability in such an instance is often dependent on a '\\·illful" or "kno\'fing'"
failure to report, see supra notes 226-27 and App. E, col~ 12. See also ALAsKA. STAT. §
47.24.010(c) ("A person who ••, • because of the circumstances, should have had reasonable
cause, to believe that a wlnerable adult suffers from abandonment, c."<ploitation. abuse, neglect,
or self-neglect but who knowingly fails to -comply with this section is guilty or a class B miS-

demeanor.").
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believe" that an individual has been abused or neglected.
Protocols,
guidelines, and other assessment tools provide specific examples of
what constitutes reasonable cause for the professional in clinical settings
269
to believe or suspect maltreatment has occurred.
JCAHO standards
have been used to establish liability against .hospitals using a corporate
270
negligence theory.
A hospital's breach of such standards is generally
271
accepted as evidence of negligence.
1) Standard

Mandated reporting is not conditioned on actual knowledge of maltreatment; rather the statutory test is an objective one whether a prudent professional would have reasonable cause to believe mistreatment
may be occurring if confronted with the same totality of factual cir272
cumstances as that presented to the defendant profess'ional.
Statutes
273
calling for reporting based on "suspicion" or "reasonable suspicion';

268. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38..:9-S(a) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1996) ("All physicians and
other practitioners of the healing arts having reasonable cause to- believe that any adult protect·
ed under the provisions of this chapter has been subjected to physical abuse, neglect or explol·
tation shall report or cause a report to be made .• ,••''); ALAsKA STAT. § 47.24.010(a)(10)
(Michie 1995) ("[T]he following persons who, in the perfonnance of their professional duties,
have reasonable cause to believe that a vulnerable adult suffers from abandonment, expJoitntion,
abuse, neglect, or self-:neglect shall ••. report the belief to the department,s central infonnation
and referral service for vulnerable adults •.. .''); Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. § 46-4'4 (West 1998)
("A physician, hospital intern or resident, surgeon, dentist, psychologist, social worker, pence
officer or other pers.on who has responsibility for the care of an incapacitated or vulnerable
adult and who has a reasonable basis to believe that abuse or neglect of the adult has occurred
. • . shall immediately report or cause reports to be made • • • •").
269. See J. Jones et al., Emergency Department Protocol for the Diagnosis and Evaluation of
Geriatric Abuse, 17 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 191 (1988); The Role of the Emergency
Phy-sician in the Prevention of Domestic Jliolence, ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED., OcL 1987;
see also supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text
270. See, e.g~, Darling v. Charleston Community Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (111. .1965)
(using JCAHO standards and state licensing regulations to establish hospital's standard of care).
1
271. See id. See-also Blanton v. Moses H. Cone- Mem 1 Hosp., 354 S.E.2d 455, 458 (N.C.
1987) (holding that although the doctor was not an agent of the hospital, the hospital was
negligent for allowing an unqualified physician to perfonn operations).
272. See, e.g., statutes cited at supra note 268 and accompanying text See also Op. Mass.
Att'y Gen. 139, 140 (1974-75) (construing identically worded duty to report suspected child
abuse as not requiring documentation of abuse or neglect allegations; "reasonable cause''' standard was intended to increase, not restrict, reporting).
273. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § S-28-203(a)(l) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) ("Whenever
any physician, surgeon, coroner, dentis~ osteopath, resident intern, registered nurse, hospital
personnel,, who are eng_ag~d in the administration, examination, care, or treatment of persons,
has reasonable cause to SU$pect that an endangered adult has been subjected to conditions or
circumstances which would reasonably result in abus,e, he shall immediately report or cause n
report to be made in accordance with the provisions of this section.,') (emphasis added). See
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274

Iike,vise incorporate objective standards.
The reasonable belief or
suspicion may derive from the professional's personal exantination,
interview or infonnation, or credible hearsay. The statutes evidence a
purpose to have the investigating state authorities filter substantiated
cases of mistreatment from the unsubstantiated. No state requires a
mandatory reporter to have "clear and convincing" evidence or a simi275
larly elevated evidentiaxy standard to trigger the duty.
Mandatory
reporting statutes are thus consistent \Vith negligence principles that attempt to ensure professional competence.
2) Sp-ecial Relationships
While the common la\v has been traditionally reluctant to recognize
276

courts have often recognized a duty to act \Yhere a
special relationship is present Such relationships have included com277
178
mon carriers and passengers, innkeepers and guests, shopkeepers
279
280
and business visitors, jailors and prisoners, and a host of others. A
common carrier, for instance, may have a duty to protect its passengers
affirmative duties,

also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17(b)-451 (1997) (quoted Infra note 286).
274. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1297 (Slh ed. 1979) ("suspicion" dcfmcd as having "a
slight or even vague idea concerning;" "not necessarily involving kno\\·Jcdgc or belief or likelihood •• •}. See also Op. Mass. Att'y Gen. 157 (197+-75) (equating "reasonable- cause" to
known and "suspected" instances of child abuse and neglect); Op. ~1nss. Att'y Gen. 175 (197475).

275. See, e.g., \Voodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1986) (requiring government to prove denatu·
ralization case by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence}.
.,
276. See generally KEEOON ET AL., supra note 159, § 56; ~i.ARSHALL S. SUAPO, ntE DtiiY
TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER, AND PUBUC POUCY (1977) {describing ~o duty to rescue" prin·
ciple as based on moral vision of individualism and autonomy): Chastain v. Fuqua Indus. Inc.,
275 S.E2d 679 (Ga Ct. App. 1980) (holding that an aunt had no duty to \\11m 11-year old
nephew of loose seat on riding mower).
277.. See, e.~. Gilstrap v.. Amtrak, 998 F.2d SS9 (8th Cir, 1993) (reversing sununary judgment for Amtrak and remanding to detcnninc if the heightened duty that the common carrier
owed passenger was breached when a sexual assault occuned on the train). See also Lopez v~
Southern Cal. ·Rapid Transit DiSt, 710 P.2d 907 (Cal. 1985).
278. See, e.g~, Coyne v. Taber Ptms. I, 53 F3d 454 (1st Cir. 199.5) (finding that a hotel had
a duty to protect a guest from the violent attack of strikers). See also Kveragas v. Scottish
Inns, Inc~ 733 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1984).
279. See, e.g., Figueroa v~ Evangelical Covenant Church, 879 F.2d 1427 (7th Cir~ 1989) (stating_that there is an exception to the general rule that a party has no duty to protect a person
from the criminal attacks of another unless there is a special relationship like th3l of n business
invitorfmvitee). See also Maguire v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 899 P.2d 393 (Ha\V. 1995).
280. See, e.g., Iglesias v. \Veils, 441 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. Ct App. 1982) (holding that the
sheriff had a duty not to release a prisoner who was too drunk to protect himself from the
severe winter '"1'eather). See also Thomas v. \Villiams, 124 S.E.2d 409 (Ga Ct. App. 1962);
Smith v. Miller, 40 N.\V.2d 5.97 (Iowa 1950); Fanner v. State,. 79 So. '2d 528 (Miss. 1955);
Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 104 N.E2d 872 (N.Y~ 1952).
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281

from third parties who have threatened criminal actions.
This duty
can even extend to warning a passenger who seeks to leave the bus or
282
train in a dangerous area.
·
The common thread linking these cases is that one party had special means with which to prevent the hann to the other, or that their
283
interaction surpasses what is common or usual. In J.A. W. v. Roberts,
a victim of child molestation sued several defendants, including clergy,
who knew about the continuing abuse, but did nothing to intervene.
The court held that in order to impose an affinnative duty to act a
special relationship must be present. It examined the following factors
to determine if such a relationship existed: 1) the relationship between
the abused individual and the person who could report it, 2) the rea284
sonable foreseeability of hann, and 3) public policy concems.
An
essential element of malpractice, a branch of negligence, is the relationship between the professional and the patient/client. The duty of care
arises out of that relationship, and is based upon both the level of expertise of the professional and the level of dependence of the pa285
tient/client.
In the context of elder abuse, these factors are accentuated dramatically. In enacting the mandatory reporting statutes, legislatures were
very clear in naming specific professionals who bear a duty of care to
286
report suspected cases of mistreatment to public authorities.
Some
<

•

281. See McPherson ~ Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 183 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1967) (driver
heard threats against an African-American passenger who sat in the front of a bus).
282. See Wemdli v. Greyhound Corp., 365 So. 2d 177 (Fia Dist Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that a bus driver had a duty to warn a passenger who wished to disembark that the area was
known for its frequent criminal activity and its danger).
283. 627 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. Ct App. 1994)~
284. See id. at 808, 813. The court found that three of the defendants had no special rein·
tionship with the plaintiff, but additional evidence was necessary to determine if a fourth defen·
dant had a relationship that created a "level of interaction or dependency" that would give rJsc
to a special relationship.
285. See id. at 809.
286. See, e~g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 17b451 (1997):
(a) Any physician or surgeon licens~d under the provisions of chapter 370 or 371,
any resident physician or intern in any hospital in this state, whether or not so Ji.
censed, any registered nurse, and nursing home administrator, nurse's aide or orderly
in a nursing home facility, any staff person employed by a nursing home facility.
any patient's advocate and any licensed practical nurse, medical examiner, dentis~
osteopath, optometrist, chiropractor, podiatrist, social worker, clergyman, police officer,
phannicist or physical therapist, who has reasonable cause to suspect or believe that
any elderly person has been abused, neglected, exploited or abandoned, or is in n
condition which is the result of such abuset neglect, exploitation or ~bandonment, or
who is in need of protective services, shall within five calendar days report such
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states even place such a duty to report on "any person."

..

The abused

and neglected individual is often physically and emotionally po,verless
to defend himself; his safety is in jeopardy. The professional kno\VS or
should know that a system for reporting, investigating, and stopping
suspected elder abuse or neglect is in place. Often -the victim 'viii not
be aware of this system or that the abuse or n-eglect is illegal and can
be redressed.
The professional relationship thus gives rise to affirtnative duties,
minimally to diagnose and report. Professionals have, or should have,
been trained in diagnosis or treatment of abuse or neglect; established
protocols or guidelines should be in place. A \vritten contract is unnecessary to create such a relationship, and indeed, is not customary in
relationships with medical, mental health, social \Vork, and other professionals. An implied contract may be created by a physical exa•nina288
tion, an interview, or some other means of therapeutic intervention.
The standard of care that is applied in professional negligence cases
is derived from professional journals, protocols, and other peer discussions.289 Over time, these coalesce to folnl a clinical policy, \Vhich
290
becomes "standard practice."
Today, databases are available in ,a]l
291
clinical practices.
Professionals may consult articles and proto~cols on
elder mistreatment :from countless sources. Computerized research allows access to case reports, books, articles, and other infonnation. The
standard of care derived from these sources provides guidance to judge
or jury on ho\v a reasonable professional \Vould respond to the individual facts presented.- Of course,- such material may also be used defensively by a professional-defendant to demonstrate confonnity to accept-

Id.

infonnation or cause a report to be made • • • •
See also infra Appendix E (listing reporting statutes and mandatory reporters in -each

state).

287. See, e.g., FIA STAT. ch. 415.1034 {\Vest 1996) \(a) Any person, .~ •• \•;ho knoY.-s, or
has, reasonable cause, to suspect, that a disabled adult or an elderly person has been or is being
abused, neglected, or exploited shall immediately report such kno\vledgc or suspicion • • • .}.
288. See, e.g.., Daly v. United States, 946 F.2d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding radiolo-.
gist liable for non!"(fisclosure of abnonnalitics in chest x-ray disco,.·cred in pre-crnployment physical); Green v. \Valker, 910 F.2d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 199,0) (fmding doctor had duty to disclose
findings emerging from workplace examination); \Vcaver v. Universlty of ~iich. Bd. or Regents,
506 N.\V.2d 264, 267 (Mich. Ct App. 1993) (unplying contractwil obligation from medical advice given by phone to patient if patient specifically seeking such ndvicc).
289. See generally David Eddy, Clinical Policies and lhe Quail/)' of Clinical Pracllce, 301
NEW. ENG., J. MED. 343 (1982).
290. See id.
291. MEDL~ for example, which has- more than six million references and articles from
thousands of journals.
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ed practice. Professionals are also bound by a fiduciary duty to their
clients/patients, which is one of the defining characteristics of their
92
work. The duty is recognized by the law and by the professionals'
codes of ethics, which safeguard the integrity of the practice and care
293
and safety of the client/patient.
3) Expert Witness

The plaintiff will typically use a qualified expert witness to establish the standard of care and to provide an opinion that the defendant's
behavior- whether of omission or commission breached the standard.
Expert witnesses may testify based on their '"knowledge, skill, experi94
ence, training or education"z and render opinions on whether the defendant-professional, confronted with the injuries or facts presented,
should have diagnosed the mistreatment and rep-orted the incident to the
appropriate public authorities. If assessment and diagnosis were reasonably possible, the at-risk elder should have received the intervention
that the reporting statutes are designed to trigger, thus preventing future
295
hann. Protocols and guidelines by professional authorities provide a
particularized standard that an expert may use as a measuring device
against which to test the defendant's conduct. Experts may also base
296
opinions on their own practice and experience, and research literature.297

4) States with Explicit Statutory Liability

Only four states explicitly set out civil liability for non-reporting

292. See, e.g., Norton v. Hamilton, 89 S.E.2d 809, 812 (Ga~ Ct. App. 19SS) (stressing that a
physician's obligations emerge not only from contract but also from his fiduciary obligations
and other considerations "inseparable from the nature and exercise of his calling'').
293. See~ e.g., AMERICAN NURSES Ass'N, CODE FOR NURSES 'No. 3.1 (1985) ("The nurse's
primary commihnent is to the health, welfare, and safety of the client.'').
294. E.g.• FED. R. EVID. 702.
295~ See, e.g., AMA ELDER ABUSE GUIDELINES~ supra note 237 and protocols described
supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text
296. See, e.g., Peiffer v. State Farm Mul Auto. Ins. Co., 940 P.2d 967,- 970 (Colo. Ct. App.
1996) (finding in an insurance bad faith case that expert testimony, based on the expert's own
knowledge and practice in the, insurance industry, should have been admitted); Dominguez v.
St John's Hospital, 632 N.E.2d 16, 19 (Ill. Ct. App.) (allowing expert testimony about a possible genetic defect that caused birth defects, instead of malpractice based on the experience and
specialized knowledge of the expert).
297. See, e.g., Young v. Horton, 855 P.2d 502~ 504 (Mont 1993) (allowing expert testimony
based on medical journals -on how much surgical patients remember about the risks related to
them by their surgeons);; Capps v. Manhart, 458 N.W.2d 742, 746 (Neb. 1990) (upholding the
use of research literature as a proper basis for expert testimony in a dental malpractice action).
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298

professionals.
The remaining mandatory reporting statutes do not
explicitly provide a civil remedy against mandatory reporters for failure
299
Typically, these statutes include criminal penalties for
to report.
00
violation.l The Restatement of Torts, ho\vever, provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable
man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or
in part
(a) to protect a class of persons \Vhich includes
the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest \Vhich is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of
harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular
301
hazard from \Vhich the hann results.
The reporting statutes, as \Veil as protocols and guidelines, thus define
the standard of care of professionals \vho tre<~t elderly clients/patients.
5) Civil Use of Criminal Statutes
The fact that the reporting statute is penal in nature does not negate
302
its use in negligence litigation.
The criminal sanction does not make
a civil duty unnecessary; to the contrary, it provides a legislative judgment that protection of the elderly is of such importance that it deserves the expenditure of public prosecutorial and judicial resources.
There has long been a tradition that courts \viii create civil remedies to
protect individuals whom the legislature sought to protect \Vhen passing
303
a statute.
Indeed, such a tradition dates back to the very develop304
Professor Foy quotes Sir Ed\vard
ment of English common la\v.

298. See ARK. CODE ANN. § S-28-202{b) {1\iichic 1997); IOWA CODE § 23583(10) (1998);
MICH. Co~W. LAws § 16.411e {1997); :f\iiNN. STAT. § 626.557(7) (1997).
299. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 415.1034 (\Vest 1997); l\.fD. CODE ANN., FMf. LAW § 14·302
(1997}.
300. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2512(a)(l) (1997) ("Any person required to rcp()rt under
[the mandatory elder abuse reporting statute] who willfully fails to do so shull be guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon conviction, subject to a fmc not exceeding $300."); ALAsKA STAT.
47.24.010(c) (Michie 1997).
301. REsTA18tENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
302. See KEEToN ET AL., supra note 159, § 36, at 220.
303. See id at 222.
304. See, e.g., Caroline Forell, The Statutory Duty Acllon In Tori: A Stalulory/Common

Law
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Coke, the famous English banister and jurist: "[E]very act of Parliament made against any injury, mischiefe [sic], or grievance doth either
expressly, or impliedly give a remedy to the party wronged, or grieved
,,305
• • • •

On the other hand, courts will not create such a cause of action if
the statute was enacted to protect the- interests of the public, protect a
class of persons other than the one whose interests are sought to be
vindicated in the civil suit, or was intended to protect against other
306
hazards than that from which the harm has resulted.
A court's investigation of the legislative intent is likely to be detenninative. In ascertaining such intent, particularly where legislative history is ambiguous
or nonexistent, courts will consider various factors: a law's relative
specificity; the adequacy of existing remedies; the impact of creating a
statutory tort action against a defendant; the significance of the legislative purpose at issue; how current law will be affected by recognizing
new implied private torts; and the burden such causes of action will
307
create for the judicial system.
The hann suffered must be of the

Hybrid, 23 IND. L. REv. 781 (1990) (examining the sources and tYpes of statutory duty actions
and proposing analysis for judges to apply when presented with statutory duties); H. MUes Foy,
III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication and Implied Private Actions In the State and
Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REv. SOl~ 524-32 (1986) (tracing English and American im·
plied private actions back as far as the fifteenth century); Thomas J. Andre, Jr., The Implied
Remedies Doctrine and the Statute of Westminster 11, 54 TUL. L. REv. 589 (1980) (tracing ori·
gins of implied remedies doctrine in early English Common Law)..
305. Foy, supra note 304, at 524 (quoting EDWARD COKE, niB SECOND PART OF ntE lNSTJ·
1lJTE OF 1liE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (1642) (emphasis added)).
306. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288 (1965)!
The court will not adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is
found to be exclusively
(a) to protect the interests of the state or any subdivision of it as such, or
(b) to secure to individuals the enjoyment of rights or privileges to which they arc
entitled only as members of the public, or
(c) to impose upon tlle actor the perfonnance of a service which the state- or any
subdivision of 'it undertakes to give the public, or
(d) to protect a class of persons other than the one whose interests are invaded, or
(e) to protect another interest than the one invaded, or
(t) to protect against other harm than that which has resulted, or
(g) to protect against any other haz.ards that from which the bann has resulted4
307. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 159, § 36, at 222-29~ See also Credit Mnn·
agers Ass'n v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 617, 624 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that courts will imply a private cause of action when statute protecting a class of
persons exists, the remedy will further legislative intent, and private remedy will promote the
effectiveness of statute); Lally v. Copygraphics, 413 A.2d 960, 968 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
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In the absence of exclusions, the statute should be assumed to include all risks that reasonably
309
may be foreseen .as likely to follo\V from its violation.
The issue is thus whether courts should imply a civil cause of action derived from a criminal statute which requires specified professionals to report reasonably suspected elder mistreatment cases to public
authorities. In child abuse cases, courts have rendered decisions. both
310
ways. In Landeros v. Flood, the Supreme Court of California approved both common law and statutory negligence elabns against a
non-reporting physician. At least two federal courts have opined that
they would imply a cause of action from state reporting statutes. In
311
Ham v. Hospital of Mo"istown, the court noted that "[t]he reporting
statute creates a legal obligation to report suspected brutality, neglect or
physical or sexual abuse of children and failure to report 'can give rise
312
13
to liability. "'
A Kansas federal coutf stated that it \Vould be in14
clined to follow the reasoning in Landeros1 if a similar question \vere
15
presented to it? In addition, the S.upreme Court of Arkansas, in First
316
Commercial Trust Company v. Rank, found that the failure to diag~
nose and report suspected child abuse could create a medical malpractice action?

17

A number of courts, ho\vever, have declined to recognize a civil

1980), aff'd, 428 A.2d 1317 (NJ. 1981) (holding that v.·berc an administrative remedy is provided to an aggrieved employee, but the remedy is nol adequate to address nll damages. a
judicial remedy must ccrexist so that the employee can proceed in either system); CPC Int'J.
Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E2d 116 (N.Y.. l987) {holding that there is no private cause
of action under the Martin Act for corporate fraud because the right of n'tion is meant to
benefit the state•s Attorney-General, not private citizens); RFSl~l£\tENT (SECO~'D) OF TORTS §
874A cmt h (1979) ("The primary test for determining whether the courts should provide a
tort remedy for violation of the legislative provision is whether this remedy is consistent \\ilh
the legislative proviSion, appropriate for promoting its policy- and needed to assure its effccti,vcness.").
308. See generally Clarence 1\iorris, 17te Relation of Criminal Statures to Tort Liability, 46
HAR.V. L. REv. 453; 473 (1933)~
309. See KEEToN ET Al..., supra note 159, § 36, at 227.
310. 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976), discussed infra notes 3S4-6S and accomp3nying text.
311. 917 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Tenn. 1995)..
312. /d. at 537.
313. See Doran v.. Priddy, 534 F. Supp. 30 (D. Kan. 1981).
314. See infra notes 354-65 and accompanying tcxl
315. See Doran, 534 F. Supp~ at 33 ("[Landeros] seems a well reasoned cast;- and this_Court
would be inclined to follow it if it were necessary.").
316. 915 S.,V.2d 262 (Ark. 1996), modified on reh'g denied, 911 S.\V.2d 167 (Ark. 1996).
317. See id. The Arkansas Medical l\ialpracticc Act "encompasses a cause of action for fail·
ure to diagnose child abuse under the facts of this case." ld at 267.
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cause of action against professionals for failing to report suspected
318
child abuse.
Some of these cases hold that such reporting laws are
intended to protect the gen~ral public rather than a specific class of
319
children.
Most have used reasoning similar to that of a 1989 Florida
320
In that case, a psychiatrist was
appellate case, Fischer v. Metcalf.
treating an adult because of the patient's physical and mental abuse of
his children, and failed to report his alleged knowledge or suspicions of
the maltreatment to state authorities. The court held that there was no
civil liability on the part of the psychiatrist to the child-victims because
the legislature intended the statute to protect the public, not a specific,
limited class of victims.
The subsequent history of [the reporting statute] ... evidences
a legislative intent to increase the number of classes protected
by the legislation. The young, the aged, and the infim1 all find
shelter under the statutory provisions. It strains credulity to
presume the legislature intended so broad a result as that a
private right of action be available, by implication only, to
321
classes which comprise half of our population.

318. See, e.g., lsely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1145 (E.D. Mich. 1995)
(holding that Michigan reporting statute does not create a statutory negligence action); Lctlow v.
Evans, 857 F. Supp. 676, 678 (W.O. Mo. 1994) (holding that Missouri statute requiring school
officials to report suspected child abuse does not create a statutory negligence action); Cechmnn
v. Travis, 414 S.E.2d 282, 285 (Ga. CL App. 1991) (finding a doctor breached no lcgnl duty
by failing to discover and report a case of possible child abuse); Borne Northwest v. Allen
County Sch. Corp, 532 N.E.2d 1196, 1203 (Ind. Ct App. 1989) (holding legislature did not ln·
tend a cause of action against school district or school personnel for failure to report suspected
abuse of student, and the common law also did not recognize one); Kansas State Bank & Trust
Co. v. Specialized Transp. Servs., Inc., 819 P.2d 587, 592 (Kan. 1991) (holding that statute did
not create a statutory negligence action for psychologist's failure to report suspected child
abuse); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 312-14 (Mo. Ct App. 1995) (indicating that statuto
did not create statutocy negligence action for psychologist's failure to report suspected chUd
abuse); Scott v. Butcher, 906 S.W.2d 16, 20 (rex. Ct App. 1994) (at common law a nonfamily member had no duty to prevent or report suspected child abuse and the court thus de·
clined to create one). But see Kansas State Bank & Trust, 819 P.2d at 611·13 (Lockett. J.,
concurring in part) (disagreeing with majority opinion that Kansas legislature did not Intend n
statutory negligence action).
319. See, e.g., Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist, 637 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (E.D. Mo. 1986),
alfd, 901 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1990) (refusing to recognize a statutory negligence action
for violation of a child abuse reporting statute because the statute created a duty owed to the
general public, rather than to individuals); Freehauf v. School Bd. of Seminole County, 623 So.
2d 761, 764 (Fla. Disl Ct App. 1993) (stating that the Florida child abuse reporting statute Is
meant to protect the general public, not any individual or particular class of people and does
not create a private cause of action).
320. 543 So. 2d 785 (Fla. Disl Cl App. 1989).
321. /d. at 790.

SAYING GRANNY FROAI THE IYOLF

1998]

135

The Fischer court, ho\vever, failed to ask the appropriate question.
That question is: did the Florida child abuse reporting statute create a
legal duty on the part of the psychiatrist to report suspected child abuse
or neglect to the specified public authority? The language of the statute, ("Any person . . . who knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect,
that a child is an abused or neglected child shall report such kno\vledge
322
or suspicion . . . .") and the total statutory scheme indicate the anS\ver to that question sh-ould be yes, and there is no need for the Iegis_lature to explicitly create a cause of action \Vhere it creates a legal
duty.

When a statute provides that under certain circumstances particular acts shall or shall not be done, it may be interpreted as
fixing a standard for all members of the community, from
which it is negligence to deviate . . . . The fact that the legislation is usually penal in character, and carries a criminal penalty,
\viii not prevent its use in imposing civil liability, and may
23
even be a prerequisite thereto.l
.

.

The legislatures that have enacted these la\vs have expressed the
intent to create a legal duty. The Fiscl1er court ackno\Vledged the
evident legislative purpose: ''[t]hat the thrust of the legislation is to help
those who are abused, neglected or exploited; to preserve family life,
where possible; to deal with the impact of such abuse on siblings, family structure, and the citizens of Florida; and to intenene, treat and
24
rehabilitate to forestall further harm. ,, . These purposes are undoubtedly better served if civil liability for failing to report is imposed on
professionals in appropriate factual instances. It is \Yidely ackno\vledged that there is significant underreporting of elder abuse and neglect.325 Allowing private causes of· action does not th\vart legislative
intent as is suggested in Fischer; rather, it allo\vs legislative intent to
find its fullest expression. Using these statutes to imply a civil cause
of action for elders against non-reporting professionals \viii help motivate them to take action that facilitates the protection of victims the
very protective purpose that motivated the legislature to create these
statutes.

322. FLA. STAT. ch. 415.504 (\Vest Supp. 1998).

323. KEEToN ET AL., supra note 159, § 36, at 220.
324. Fischer; 543 So. 2d at 789-90 {emphasis added).
325. See supra notes 205;..16 and accompanying texl
•
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Mandatory reporting laws delineate socially responsible behavior for
the protection of the aged and the vulnerable. It is difficult to envision
such statutes as simply protecting the general public. In creating such
a cause of action the court furthers what one writer, discussing child
abuse reporting, described as the "almost universal assumption throughout the English-speaking world. . . . that . . . abuse reporting laws are a
necessary and integral part of a protective . . . abuse legislative program."326 Accepted negligence principles thus allow the statute to es327
tablish the standard of care.
Public health laws mandating professionals and others to report a
variety of medical conditions and incidents are not unusual. Typical
328
statutes require such reporting in the case of communicable diseases,
329
330
wounds inflicted by violence,
poisonings and industrial accidents.

326. Susan Maidmont, Some Legal Problems Arising Out of the Reporting of Child Abuse, 31
LEGAL PROBS. 149, 150-51 (1979).
327. See source cited supra note 301 and accompanying text; see also Gabel v. Hughes Air
Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612, 617 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (Finding the Federal Aviation Act created a
duty for the benefit of passengers on aircraft, the district court stated: "The fundamentals here
are that a duty is imposed by law; that the complaint alleges that defendants violated that duty;
and that the plaintiffs were injured by that violation. Those three things are, and always have
been the essential elements of tort liability.").
328. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. REALm LAw § 2101 (Consol. 1997) (''Every physician shall immediately give notice of every case of communicable disease required by the department to be reported to it, to the health officer of the local health district where such disease occurs.").
329. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-1-101 (Michie 1997):
(a) All hospitals, clinics, . . . doctors, . . . nurses, . . . or other persons called upon
to tender aid to persons suffering from any wound or other injury inflicted by means
of a knife, pistol, gun, or other deadly weapon, or by other means of violence, or
suffering from the effects of poison, or suffocation, shall report the same immediately
to the chief of police . . . .
See also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.995 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994):
(2)(a) Any person licensed, certified or registered by the state . . . \Vho treats a
patient suffering from any of the following shall report . . .
2. Any wound other than a gunshot wound if the person has reasonable cause to be·
lieve that the wound occurred as a result of a crime.
3. Second-degree or 3rd-degree bums to at least 5% of the patient's body or, due to
the inhalation of superheated air, swelling of the lamyx or a burn to the patient's
upper respiratory tract, if the person has reasonable cause to believe that the burn
occurred as a result of a crime.
330. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.34 (\Vest 1996).
Any physician having under professional care any person whom the physician be·
lieves to be suffering from poisoning from lead, phosphorus, arsenic, brass, silica
dust, carbon monoxide gas, wood alcohol, or mercury, or their compounds, or from
anthrax or from compressed-air illness or any other disease contracted as a result of
the nature of the employment of such person shall within five days mail to the de·
partment of health a report stating the name, address, and occupation of such patient
• • • •

1998]

SAVING GRANNY FROJ.f THE IJ'OLF

137

These statutory duties are analogous to legislation requiring professionals and others to report suspected elder mistreatment in order to avoid
future injury to the elderly victim.
Liability may result from violation of such a statute. An illustra331
tive example is De"ick v. Ontario ComnJunity Hospita/, a negligence
action based, in part, on California statutes \vhich required physicians to
report infectious diseases to the department of health. The plaintiff; a
patient in the defendant hospital, contracted such a disease from another
patient, allegedly because the defendant doctors failed to report the
32
condition to the local health officer as required by statute.l This failure to report prevented the health officer from taking appropriate mea333
sures to avoid contagion and therefore contributed to the plaintiff
contracting the disease. The court held that the plaintiff could maintain
a suit based on the disease reporting statute because a duty \Vas creat-

ed.

..

It thus appears that Health and Safety Code, sections 3110 and
3125 were enacted to protect the public against the spread of
contagious, communicable diseases and that section 3125 does
impose upon Hospital a duty to plaintiffs to report kno\vn infectious, contagious or communicable diseases to the local,
334
health officer.
Since liability can be imposed for the failure to make reports of this
type, it should likewise be imposed for the failure to make a report of
suspected elder abuse/neglect.
b. Breach of Duty

Whether a defendant has breached his duty is a mixed question of
335
law and fact.
The professional's failure to diagnose and/or treat
identifiable elder abuse or neglect should constitute a breach of his
duty, most especially \Vhen subsequent injucy or damage results. Mal-

331.. 120 Cal. Rptr. 566 (Ct App. 1975).
332. See id.. "All physicians, nwses, .. • . in any • • • building, • . • or other ptnce \\·here
any person is ill of any infectious, contagious, or communicable disease, sh3ll promptly report
that fact to the health officer •..." CAL. HEALlH & SAFETY CODE § 3125 (\Vest 1995).
333. See De"ick, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 569-71. See also CAL. HEALnt & SAFETY CODE §
120175 (\Vest 1996) ("Each health officer knowing, or having reason to believe, that any case
of . . . contagious, infectious. or communicable disease exists, • • • shall tnke such measures as
may be necessary to prevent the spread of the disease or occurrence of ndditional cases.").
334. De"ic~ 120 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
335. See Kf£ION ET AL., supra note 159, § 37, at 235.

138

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:77

practice is unskillful practice, resulting in injury to the client/patient
caused by a failure to exercise a "reasonable degree of skill, knowl336
edge, and care" under the unique factual circumstances of that case.
Professional competence is measured by the "standard of care." In the
case of doctors, for example, this non-delegable duty is typically described as:
given the circumstances of each patient, each physician has a duty
to use his or her knowledge and therewith treat through maximum
reasonable medical recovery, each patient, with such reasonable
diligence, skill, competence, and prudence as are practiced by
minimally competent physicians in the same specialty or general
337
field of practice throughout the United States ....
Malpractice liability of other professionals follows these same basic
338
principles.
A long line of malpractice cases involves the failure of a professional, typically a physician, to reveal a foreseeable danger arising from
the patient's condition or illness to the patient, his or her family, or to
public authorities. Often, these cases are based on statutory duties, as
in the elder abuse context, to report to public agencies specific diag339
These obligations are analogous to
nosed conditions creating danger.
the duty to report suspected elder mistreatment to public authorities in
order to avoid future injury to the victim or third parties, and liability
is imposed for breach. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides
that a professional may be liable to a third person for harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care if the "harm is suffered
because of reliance of the other or third person upon the undertak341
ing."340 The cases tend to involve specific, identifiable third persons.
336. Bardessono v. Michels, 478 P.2d 480, 484 (Cal. 1970).
337. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 872-73 (Miss. 1985).
338. See generally D. Eddy, Clinical Policies and the Quality of Clinical Practice, 301 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 343 (1982).
339. See, e.g., Gammill v. United States, 727 F2d 950, 954 (lOth Cir. 1984) (physician may
be found liable for failing to warn a patient's family, treating attendants, or other persons likely
to be exposed to the patient of the nature of the disease and the danger of exposure); Jones v.
Stanko, 160 N.E. 456, 463 (Ohio 1928) (wrongful death action based on Ohio statutes \Vhlch
required physicians to report enumerated contagious diseases to public authorities); Bradshaw v.
Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn. 1993) (physician liable to non-patient for failure to \Vam
of risk of exposure to noncontagious disease). See generally Tracy A. Bateman, Liability of
Doctor or Other Health Practitioner to Third Party Contracting Contagious Disease from Doctor's Patient, 3 A.L.R.Sth 370 (1992); 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians and Surgeons § 88 (1987).
340. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
341. See, e.g., DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, 583 A.2d 422, 425 (Pa. 1990)
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Another line of cases involves affinnative obligations imposed upon
professionals by the common law to disclose even confidential infonnation in order to protect third parties against hazards created by their
patients. Kno\vn threats from a dangerous psychiatric patient is the

prototypical case. The first successful instance of liability for failure to
wain in this situation was Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Califomia.342 In Tarasoff, a psychotherapist \Vas counseling a patient \Yho
had thre3:tened a woman \Vho \Vas readily identifiable as a fonner girlfiiend.343
The defendant.;..therapist took a number of affirtnative
steps ·asking the police to detain the patient (\Yhich they briefly did)
344
and initiating commitment proceedings, \Vhich \Vere later stopped.
Ho\vever, the defendant never \Varned the young \Voman, and she \Vas
subsequently murdered. Her parents sued, alleging that failure to \Vam
345
constituted malpractice.
The California Supreme Court held that a
therapist treating a mentally ill patient O\Ves a duty of reasonable care
to warn identifiable third persons against foreseeable danger created by
346
the patient's condition.
The duty to act to protect such an endangered third person emerged from the relationship bet\veen the physician
347
or therapist and the patient, and \Vas breached by the failure to act.
(doctor liable_to sexual partner of patient exposed to hepatitis B for fnilwc to '"-am patient to
refrain ftom sexual relations with partner; court relied on RESii\lt::r?.tENT (SEC0!-.1>) OF TORTS §
324A). See also Shepard v. Redford Community Hosp., 390 N.\V.2d 239. 243 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1986) (treating physicians held negligent in failing to \Vam mother of risk of transmission
of spinal meningitis to her young son, who died of the disease). But see Knier v.. Albany
Med. Ctr. Hosp., 500 N.Y.S2d 490, 492 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (no duty to \\-am public tlml person
has contagious disease).
342. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)..
343. See id. at 341.
344. See id.
•

345. See id
346. See id. at 340.
347. See id at 343. "[I]he common law has traditionally imposed liability only if the defendant bears some special relationship to the dangerous person or to the potential victim. • • •
[T]he relationship between a therapist and his patient satisfies this requirement ••••" /d.
See also Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F._Supp. ISS (D. Ncb.. 1980) (holding that
therapist-patient relationship is sufficient to impose an afrunuitivc duty to control conduct of
patient for benefit of third persons)~ But see Boynton v. Burglnss,_590 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Dist
Ct App. 1991) (rejecting Tarasoff duty to warn).
There is a vast body of caselaw and literature on Tarasoff tmd its implications. See generally Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.\V.2d 302, 306..09 ~fo. Ct. App. 1995) (listing jurisdictions imposing a TarllSojf-type duty to warn or control); Estates of t.forgan v. Fnirfield Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311 (Ohio 1997) (psychiatrist-outpatient relationship justifies duty to
protect third parties); Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.\V.2d IS9 (\Vis. 1988) (upholding claim
based on psychiatrist's failure to warn patient's family and failure to seek commitment); Tunotby E. Gammon & John K. Hulston, 'Ihe Duty of Afenral Health Care Prmt'ldcn to Restrain
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The justification for this obvious breach in confidentiality by a profes-

sional is the state's interest in protecting public safety and potential
348
victims.
The therapist need not predict such violence with absolute
accuracy, but only needs to exercise reasonable skill and care, as de349
fined by the standard of practice in that profession.
The Tarasoff reasoning is applicable-to elder abuse or neglect. If a
professional should have identified elder mistreatment, or learns of the
abuse or neglect through treatment of the abuser perhaps in marital or
psychological counseling a duty to act to forestall future harm akin to
the Tarasoff principle . is created.- In this instance, however, a mere
warning to the victim is likely to be ineffective in preventing further
harm for several reasons. First, the aged person, of course, typically
already knows of the threat; what is needed is action, not a warning.
Second, the presence of state systems for investigating reports of abuse
50
or neglecf makes intervention relatively easy for the professional. A
351
report mandated by statute simply is made to the appropriate agency.
Moreover, in these cases, the professional is far more likely to discover
abuse or neglect through contact with the victim than with the abuser,
and the relationship between a treating professional and the victim of
abuse is far closer than that which created the affirtnative duty in
Tarasoff. The professional usually has examined and treated the victim,
and often will have more concrete evidence of past and ongoing harm.
The duty, though important, is not difficult to discharge. The professional need not control the actions of the abuser nor rectify the situation. It merely requires a reasonable professional to diagnose and treat
the victim with the means available, which includes the established
systems for reporting abuse or neglect.
Tarasoff and its progeny strengthen this argument for other reasons
as well. Confidentiality is more significant in the psychotherapist-pa•
tient relationship than in other contexts because the psychotherapist gets
his or her infonnation solely from the patient. Here, there are no xrays or other physical diagnostic tools available, other than intimate
conversation. If the interest in confidentiality can be outweighed in
such a situation, surely it can be outweighed in other relationships.

Their Patients or Warn Third Parties, 60 Mo. L. REV. 749 (1995); Peter Lake, Revisiting
Tarasolf, 58 ALB. L._REv. 97 (1994).
348. See Tarasoj£ 551 P2d at 346-47.
349. See Estates ofMorgan, 613 N.E.2d at 325-29.
350. See infra Appendix G.
351. ld
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Moreover, damage actions, or the threat of such actions, against health

professionals can change behavior patterns. A survey of 2,875 psychotherapists conducted after Tarasoff \Vas decided revealed that most began to \Vam third part.ies \Vhen a patient uttered a threat; they felt
themselves bound. by Tarasoff even though that case technically applied
352
only to California therapists~
These professionals believed they could
assess the dangerousness of the patient and \Vere comfortable issuing a
353

waming.

The best kno\vn instance of liability imposed on a professional for
failure to meet statutorily required reporting is the California Supreme
354
Court's 1976 decision in Landeros v. Flood.
A child \Vas brought to
a hospital with a spiral fracture of the tibia and .fibula, apparently
caused by a nvisting force for \Vhich there \Vas no natural explanation?55 The child also had bruises and abrasions over her entire body,
56
and exhibited other symptoms of "battered child syndrome.":s · The

physician failed to diagnos.e mistreatment and failed to report the case
357
to the proper authorities.
The child \Vas returned to her parents and
358
severely beaten again, suffering pennanent, physical injury.
Subsequently, the child's guardian ad litem brought a malpractice action
359
against the physician and the hospital.
The California Supreme Court
360
held the physician could be liable for the child's subsequent injuries.
The court also upheld the claim on the theory that violation of the
California statutes requiring reporting of suspicious injuries demonstrat361
ed the physician's failure to exercise due care.
The ·fact that such
reporting was not customarily done by doctors. \Vas. brushed aside by
362
the court.
Whether the physician \vould have follo\ved the procedure of reporting plaintiff's injuries to the authorities, ho\vever, is not solely a
question of good medical practice. The above-cited reporting statutes
(Pen. Code, §§ 11160.-11161.5) \Vere in force in 1971. They evidence
352. See Daniel J., Givelber et al., Tarasoj[. J.fylh and Reality: An Empirical Study of Prn·ate
Law iJt Action~ 1984 \VISe. L. REv. 443, 473-74.
353. Id. at 485..
354. 551 p.2d 389 (Cal. 1976).
355. See id. at 391~
356. Id.

357. See id.
358. See id.
359. See id. at
360. See id. at
361. See id. at
362. See id. at

390.
395-96.

396.
393-94..
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a detennination by the legislature that in the event a physician does
diagnose battered child syndrome, due care includes a duty to report
that fact to the authorities. In other words, since the enactment of
these statutes, a physician who diagnoses battered child syndrome will
not be heard to say that other members of his profession would not
have made such a report. The same is true of each of the persons and
363
entities covered by this legislation.
The court likewise rejected the doctor's defense that such a report
364
would breach the doctor-patient privilege.
The plaintiff was entitled
to attempt to prove that the doctor should reasonably have foreseen the
resumption of abuse and further injuries to the child if returned to the
365
status quo ante.
In those jurisdictions which do now, or will in the future, allow a
cause of action for failure to diagnose and report child abuse, the reasoning in Landeros can be applied to cases of unreported elder
abuse/neglect. Although the aged are presumed competent and could
self-report, the dynamics of many abusive situations prevent a free
366
choice by the victim~
Much elder abuse is cyclical, makin,g it reasonably foreseeable that mistreatment will be repeated and increased
injury suffered. As Professors Baumhover and Beall note, "(b]ecause
many victims of elder mistreatment are out of touch with the outside
world, ,a clinical examination and subsequent intervention may be the
367
only opportunity to prevent future abuse."
The ·potential defendants

363. See id. at 394 n~8. The statutes referred to by the court included: CAL. PENAL Coos §
11160 (West 1970) ("Every person . . . to which any person suffering from any wound • • •
where injuries have been inflicted upon any person in violation of any penal law of this state
shall come or ,be brought, shall report the same immediately .• ~ .n); CAL. PENAL Coos §
11161 (West 1970) ("Every physician or surgeon who has under his charge or care any person
suffering from any wound or injuzy inflicted in the -manner specified in Section 11160 shall
make a report of the kind specified in this article to the appropriate officials named in Section
11160."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161..5 (West 1970) (In any case in which a minor is under a
physician's care or is brought to bim for diagnosis, examination or treatment, and uit appears
to the physician" that the minor has physical injuries ''which appear to have been inflittcd
upon him by other than accidental means by any person," the physician must report such injuries).
364.., See L<znderos, SSl P2d at 394 n.8 ("The statute also lays to rest defendant Flood's con·
cern that if he were required to report his findings to the authorities he might be held liable
for violation of the physician·patient privilege. (Evid. Code, § 992.) Section 11161.5 spccifi·
cally exempts the physician from any civil or criminal liability for making a report pursuant to
.I•ts .te nns.").
365. See id at '396.
366. See-supra note 191 and accompanying text
367. Baumhover & Beall, supra note 247, at 250.
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in cases of failure to diagnose or rep.ort include licensed professionals,

such as doctors, nurses, and social \Vorkers, as \vel.l as others \Vho are
statutorily required to report elder abuse. In addition, their employers,
such as hospitals, clinics, nursing· homes, and community agencies, may
also be liable under vicarious liability theories.

Although some state courts have resisted allo\ving damage suits
368
premised on violation of mandatory reporting statutes, others have
embraced private causes of action against negligent social service agen369
Typically, these
cies that violate the same child protective statutes.
cases arise when a report of suspected abuse is made to the agency and
the report is never investigated. If the child is banned. after the agency
37
negligently failed to investigate, civil liability has been found. ° Courts
usually have no difficulty finding legislative intent to allo\v private
actions in these cases because, ''when the legislature has been suffi~
ciently specific in detailing both a duty on behalf of a particular government officer or employee and the identity of a particular class of
persons in a particular situation to \Vhich the special duty is O\Ved there
371

must be a remedy."

This reasoning should be applied to elder abuse cases and the failure to report by mandated reporters. The legislatures, by enacting mandatory rep-orting Jaws, have imposed a duty on specific individuals and
delineated the class of persons to \Vhom the duty is O\Ved. If the duty
is breached, there should be a remedy. Under state licensure, a doctor
or other professional is allo\ved to··practice only upon the condition that
he or she perfonn their statutory duties. The reasons for imposing civil
liability on social service agencies like\vise apply to mandated reporters..
Imposing civil liability for failing to take action \Vbich might prevent the criminal or tortious acts of another is neither ne\v nor novel.
Similar cases are present in numerous areas. Liability for failure to
protect a person from the criminal acts of third parties, ·for exatnple,
368. See supra notes 318-21 and accompanying text
369. See, e.g., Mammo v. State, 675 P.2d 1347 (~ App. 1983); Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 Ald 662 (D.C. 1987).
370. See, e.g., 1\iammo v. State, 675 P~d 1347 (Ariz. App. 1983) (holding that a stntc ngen...
cy was under a duty to act with reasonable care after it received infonnntion about an abused
child and could be held civilly liable for damages for failure to investigntc such a report);
Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A2d 662 (D.C. 1987) (fmding that the District of Columbia could be held civilly liable for failing to remove children from their abusive fnther after a
sp.ecific report of abuse was filed witb the Dis.trict); Jensen v. Anderson County Depl of Soc.
Servs., 403 S.E.2d 615 (S.C. 1991) (stating that negligence in failing to investigate a. report of
child abuse could give rise to a private v.rongful death action).
371. Jensen, 403 S.E2d at 618.
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372

has long been established in the landlord-tenant context.
If a criminal attack by an outsider is reasonably foreseeable and preventable, a
373
Likewise,
landlord will be liable for injuries to his tenant, or others.
in a long series of cases, common carriers have been found negligent
374
These lines of
for injuries to passengers inflicted by third parties.
cases provide a useful analogy to the reporting of elder abuse or neglect. The cyclical nature of abuse makes further harm foreseeable,
and the professional who treats a victim of abuse or neglect knows, or
should know, that further abuse is likely if there is no intervention. In
addition, because various aids in diagnosing abuse are available, and
public agencies can investigate and respond to mandated reports, further
mistreatment of the aged victim is reasonably preventable. Even if
future harm cannot be completely eliminated, at least the treating professional should be required to take the minimal step of making a report so that the needed services are made available to the abuse or
neglect victim.
c. Negligence Per Se
It has previously been argued that mandatory reporting statutes
generate a duty on the part of the professional to act when reasonable
belief or suspicion should be aroused by injuries, the general condition
of the patient,- inconsistencies between explanations and injuries, or

other circumstances. Failure to report to designated state authorities in
such a situation is common law negligence. A court, however, may
find these circumstances do more than create an implied civil cause of
action. Where such a protective statute was intended to protect the
plaintiff against the -risk of harm which has in fact occurred as a res_ult
of its violation, the breach can be conclusive on the issue of negli-

372. See, e.g., Kline v. ISOO Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(holding that where a landlord has notice of repeated criminal assaults on his property, there Is
a duty to use preventive measures to protect tenants and guests from the criminal _attacks of
others).
373. See, e.g., Medina v. l87th St. Apartments, Ltd., 405 So. 2d 485, 486 (Fia, DisL Ct.
App. 198 I) (owner of apartment complex could be held liable when a person was mugged in
the complex's parking Jot because the owner had knowledge that similar crimes had been com·
mitted there in the past).
374. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co., 641 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (stating
that a bus company could be held liable for the sexual assault of one of its passengers by
another passenger if it \Vas on notice of the attacker's violent tendencies); Hines v. Garret~ 108
S.E. 690 (Va 1921) (railroad could be held liable for damages when it carried young girl past
station and put her off near a "tramps' hollow'' where she was raped by two- unidentified per-

sons).

•
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gence, and the court should so direct the jury. In Thelen v. St. Cloud
315
Hospita/, a case dealing with Minnesota's statutory civil liability for
failing to report suspected abuse of a vulnerable adult, the court explained ho\v statutory duties affect a tort action.
Generally the tort liability resulting from violation of a statute does
not differ from ordinary negligence. The only difference benveen a
statutorily imposed duty of care and a duty of care under common la\Y
is that the duty imposed by statute is fixed, so its breach ordinarily
constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence, or negligence per se,
while the measure of legal duty in the absence of statute is detennined
376
under common-law principles.
When the standard of care is detennined by the statute, '~urors
377
· have no dispensing polver by \Vhich to relax 'i t"
On the other hand,
some courts have held that a violation of the statute is only evidence of
negligence, or prima facia evidence of negligence, \Vhich may be ac378
cepted or rejected by the jury.
In either case, issues of causation,
contributory negligence, and damages may still remain.
d. Causation

All negligence actions require that a causal connection bet\veen the
79
negligent act and the resulting hann be proven.l The requisite causal
connection bet\veen the professional's negligent failure to report and the
actionable injucy to the aged person is arguably created \Yhen subsequent injury o,ccurs after the time \Vhen the report should have been
made.3soThe defendant-professional in such a malpractice suit \Viii argue that
even if his behavior fell belo\v the standard of care, it did not create
damage to the elderly person. Rather, that hann emanated from the
perpetrator's tortious and/or criminal acts. To succeed, the plaintiff
must thus establish that the defendant \vas both a cause in fact and the
381
proxirnate cause of the elder's subsequent injuries.
Proximate cause

375. 379 N~\V2d 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
376. See id. at 192-93.
377. Martin v. HeJZOg, 126 N.B. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) (Cardozo, J.).
378. See KEEToN ET AL., supra note 159, §' 36, at 230 & n.9 (citing Salinero v. Pon. 177
Cal.. Rptr. 204 (1981) Oisting factors necessary under California Evidence Code tO create presumption of negligence)).
379. See KEE"I"ON ET AL., supra note 159, § 41, at 263.
380. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §' 281 (1'965) (explaining \\·hen an netor is liable

for. an invasion of an interest of another).
381. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 159, § 30,

at 165.
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requires a court to engage in a policy oriented examination of the factual situation and any statutes implicated. It often overlaps the discus82
sion of whether there is a duty to the plaintiff?
There are many instances when a close connection between the failure to report elder mistreatment and subsequent injuries can be perceived even if the specific harm was inflicted by a third person. The
plaintiff must prove that but for the professional's failure to report, the
damage subsequent to the omission would not have occurred. It is well
settled that intervening negligent and/or criminal acts ~-in this instance
by a relative, caretaker or others whic,h the defendant might reasonably anticipate do not supersede or cut off the defendant's liability for
383
his own act or omission.
Elder abuse is typically not an isolated
event, but part of a pattern of repeated mistreatment that continues and
escalates until there is appropriate medical, social or legal intervention.384 The dynamics are often similar to that found in partner abuse.
There, the perpetrator may begin with psychological or financial abuse,
progress to property destruction or animal abuse, and finally to physical
385
assault
Elder mistreatment may follow this "cycle of violence," or
take different paths, resulting in violation of the aged person's civil
rights, physical violence or other damage.
The widespread adoption of reporting statutes attests to the fact that
the enacting legislatures presumed and anticipated such cyclical behavior. Therefore, once ,a professional suspects or has reason to believe
that an older person has suffered abuse or neglect, he should also reasonably anticipate future repetition, or, indeed, escalation. The premis-e
of reporting legislation is that elders may b_e protected only by identifying those at risk, and instituting protective and therapeutic measures.

382. See~ e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (classic exposition
of whether defendant should be liable for plaintiff's injury, in which the majority speaks in
terms of duty rather than proximate cause). ,For more on the vast literature of proximate cau·
sation hlW; see generally 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., 1HE LAW OF TORTS _§ 20J, at 8S·89,
§§ 20.4-.6,. at 130-85 (ld ed. 1986 & Supp~ 1995); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1S9, §§ 42-44,
at 272-319 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1995); Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence
Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49 (1991).
383. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965) ("If the likelihood 'that a third per·
son may act in a particular manner is the hazard ot one of the hazards which makes the actor
negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious~ or criminal does not
prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.").
384. See COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, s11pra note 246,, at 966-71. See also supra notes
246-47 and accompanying text
385. See generally LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING. LoVE 42-47 (1990) (describing cycle of
violence)..
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The ameliorative systems, ho\vever, cannot be expected to \VOrk unless
they are triggered. In many instances, consequences of the failure to
report are quite certain; there \Viii be no detection by public authorities
and the abuse will continue. At the very least, the failure to report
may be viewed as a contributing or substantial cause of additional mal386
treatment, if it is not the sole cause.
387
In the \vell-kno\vn Landeros case, ' \Vhere a child \Vas returned by
a physician to parents \Vho later beat the child repeatedly, the California Supreme· Court held that the subsequent beatings and injuries \vere
proximately caused by the doctor's inaction, even though physically
388
caused by the parents~
The court utilized section 449 of the Restatement to respond to defendant's causation defense: ''If the likelihood that
a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of
the hazards which makes the act negligent, such an act, \Yhether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or crinzinal, does not prevent the
389
actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.,
The principle stated in the Restatement is demonstrated in Stevens
390
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, \vhere the
391
plaintiff was beaten by a fello\v student.
He then sued the school
district for failing to properly supervise the attacker, a child \Vith
392
known violent tendencies.
The trial court found that the causal connection between the school's negligence in failing_to supervise and_the
injury to the plaintiff was broken by the intervening criminal attack of
393
the student~
The Supreme Court of lo\va, ho\vever, held that the
causal link was not broken, because the risk of attack by the other
student was the exact risk that the duty to supeiVise \vas- designed to
394
prevent.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the
386. See KEEToN ET AL, supra note 159, § 41, at 268 ("If the dcfendn.nt's condu-ct \\1lS a
substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injwy, it follo\\"S that he \Viii not be absolved from
liability merely because other causes have contributed to the rcsull • • ."); \1/illiams v. United
States, 352 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1965) (discussing contributory negligence nnd negligent nets of
third parties).
387. Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976); see discussion supra notes 3S4~S and accompanying text
388. See Landeros, SS 1 P.2d at 395.
389. See id. (quoting REsTAlBtENT (SECOND) OF TORlS § 449).
390. 528 N.\V.2d 117 (Iowa 1995).
391. See id. at 118.
392. See id.
393. See id.
394. See id. at 119.
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fact that the risk, or a substantial or important part of the risk,
to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed
come to pass. Foreseeable inteiVening forces are within the
scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening
causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the
395
defendant's responsibility.
Applying this reasoning to the elder mistreatment context, if a mandated report of suspected abuse is not made, that failure would be a proximate cause of subsequent injuries. The intervening act of the abuser
does not relieve the defendant professional of liability because ,this is
the exact harm sought to be prevented by requiring that reports be
made.
.
e. Damages
Plaintiff claims for compensation should include any damages suffered after the professional's failure to act, e.g., bodily hann, emotional
distress, financial loss, medical expenses, and other injuries. All are
396
compensable under nor1nal tort principles.
On the other hand, loss of
income from future employment and other elements of dama,ges will
often not be recoverable for an aged person. In addition, b,ecause
plaintiff's life expectancy is apt to be shorter than in a normal suit,
loss of enjoyment and consortium may have less value than in the
usual case.
Suits on behalf of the elderly will present special litigation problems. The elderly bruise more easily, and suffer more falls and frac397
tures than younger people.
Aged persons are apt to have chronic
physical disabilities, diseases or impairments that diminish their health,
strength and mobility. Defendants may attribute the results of abuse or
neglect to the nonnal aging process, or a fact finder may confuse the
two. Moreover, delays in the litigation proc,ess can have disastrous
consequences for the elder's suit; in some states the action will not

395. /d. (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 159, § 44, at 303-04).
396. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (explaining that compensatory damages
that may be awarded for bodily harm or for emotional distress, without proof of pecuniary
loss); see also id. § 924 (explaining that when an individual's personality has been tortiously
invaded, that person may recover for, inter alia, past or future bodily harm and emotional dis·
tress, loss or impairment of earning capacity and/or reasonable medical and other expenses).
397. See, e.g., J. O'Brien, Elder Abuse, in PRIMARY CARE GERIATRICS, 466•72 (R.J. Hamm
& P. Sloan eds., 1994).
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survive the death of the plaintiff before trial.
Often little or no social value is ascribed to older people, thus making jury verdicts problematic.399 When ageism is combined \Vith sexism, older female plain400
tiffs may be especially disadvantaged, and proving damages may be
difficult. Some aged persons may be poor \Vitnesses because of speech,
hearing, or other physical impairtnents. Poor memory, or fear and
intimidation may make testimony difficult. If the action is brought by
a competent elder, the issue of his or her ability to take steps to stop
401
the abuse will again be relevant.
But such cases also present intriguing litigation possibilities. Judges
and jurors are instinctively able to understand that older persons are
less able to defend themselves or to escape from threatening situations.
As a result, the failure of professionals to report and thus to initiate
protective services may be vie\ved quite harshly. Evidence of physical
or sexual abuse is apt to elicit a visceral response. Contemporary medical documentation and photos may be used to sho\v bodily hann.
Many injuries from which a younger victim recovers quickly may have
402
long-te11n disabling effects on an ~lderly victim.
Non-physical fonns
of mistreatment may also have important and demonstrable consequenc401
es; they can cause demoralization and depression in aged victims, as
398. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.20 (\Vest 1997) ("\Vhen a person~ injwy to the decedent results in death, no action for the personal injury shall survive, and any such action ~nd
ing at the time of death shall abate.").
399. The tenn "ageism," coined in 1968 by Dr. Robert N. Butler, the fust director of the
National Instirute on Aging, was originally defined as:
a systematic stereotyping of and discrimination against people because they arc oJ~
just as racism and sexism accomplish this with skin color nnd sender. Old people
are categorized as senile, rigid in thought and manner, old-fashioned in morolity and
skills. . . . Ageism allows the younger generation to sec older people as different
from themselves; thus they subtly cease to identify \Vith their elders as human be·
•
mgs.
Robert N. Butler, Dispelling Ageism: 71te Cross..Cutling Inten·entlon, ANNALS /V.f. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. SCI., May 1989, at 138, 139 & n.2. See also ROBERT N. BUTLER. \VHY SURVIVE?:
BEING OLD IN MIERICA (1975) (Pulitzer prize-winning book \\'hich elaborates on ngei.sna).
400. See generally Linda S. \Vhitton, Ageism: Paternalism and Prejudice, 46 DEPAUL L.
REv. 453 (1997} (discussing paternalistic interventions that encourage the dependence of elderly
women); LEO DRIEDGER & NEENA L. CHAPPELL, AGING & ErnNICJIY: TO\VARD AN INTERFACE
(1987).

401. See infra notes 416-32 and accompanying text
402. See l\iORTON BARD & DAWN SANGREY, THE CRI~tE VICitt.t'S BOOK 24 {2d ed. 1986)
("The elderly . . . feel the threat of a blow or of being knocked dO\\n more ncuteJy than a •
. . younger person does. Old bones break so easily and mend so slo\\·Jy.").
403. See Mary C. Sengstock & Sally C. Steiner, Assessing Non Phys/CQ/ Abuse, In ABUSE,
NEGLECl~ AND ExPLOITATION OF OLDER PERSONS: STRA'IEGlES FOR. AssESS~tENT M'D INTER·
VENTION 1OS, 107-08 (Lorin A Baumhover & S. Colleen Beall eds., 1996).
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404

has been demonstrated with battered women.
The consequences of
psychological or emotional abuse have been shown to be more severe
405
Appetite and sleeping patfor older people than for younger people.
terns may be disrupted, with loss of ability to function in daily life or
406
Many elderly persons depend upon
to take prescribed medication.
fixed public or private pensions or benefits, so financial exploitation,
even of small amounts, may prevent them from obtaining needed food,
407
medicine, or utility services.
Economic losses can reduce even financially comfortable elderly people to a state of dire need. Expert testimony may highlight the physical or sexual abuse and its psycho-social
consequences. Symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder
are frequent, including a re-experience of the trauma through nightmares, intrusive thoughts, and other suffering. Psychological effects on
408
elderly crime victims range from isolation and depression to suicide.409 These are facts and consequences that judges and jurors can
easily absorb and comprehend.
Punishment for extreme behavior and deterrence of future harm
resulting from a disregard for the safety of others are the bases for an
410
award of punitive damages.
In determining the amount of punitive
damages which are appropriate to accomplish these goals, a jury may
consider the potential harm to the victim and the possible harm to other
411
It is also free to consider the
victims if the behavior is not deterred.
412
wealth of the defendant.
If a mandated reporter fails to report a case of suspected elder
abuse or neglect, and the failure exceeds mere negligence, punitive
damages may be appropriate. In situations where the professional is_

404. See Jacquelyn Campbell & Nancy Fishwisk, Abuse of Female Partners; in NURSINO
CARE OF SURVIVORS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 68-104. (J. Campbell & J. Humphreys eds., 1993).
405. See Kosberg & Nahmiash, supra note S, at 33.
406. See generally id. at 31.
407. See Lois Herrington, Crime Has a Devastating; Tragic Impact on the Nation's Elderly,
JUST. AsSISTANCE NEWS, Aug. 1983, at 2 (excerpted testimony before Senate Subcommittee on
Aging).
408. See After-Ejfocts of Crimes Against Elderly Said Intense, CRIME CONTROL, DJG., Dec. 8,
197St: at 2-3.
409. See Crime Fears Led to Suicides, CRIME CONTROL DIG., Oct II, 1976, at 9.
410. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977) ("(1) Punitive damages are dnmng•
es, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for
his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the fu·
ture.").

·

4] 1. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources, 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (discussing deterrence as a factor in awarding punitive damages).
412. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977).
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unaware of the reporting requirement or reasonably believes_that there
is no real danger to the aged person, the failure to report \Vould not
merit an award of super-compensatory damages. Punitive damages are
appropriate, however, \vhen the mandated reporter's conduct in not
reporting susp,ected abuse or neglect is, in the Restatement's \Vords,

''outrageous" because of ''evil motive" or a ~'reckless indifference" to
413
the rights of the patient~client.
\Vhile evil motive \Viii be_exceed.ingly rare, several behaviors could demonstrate reckless indifference to the
rights of the elder. For instance, if the reporter kno\VS there is a reporting requirement, knows that there is the good possibility of continued abuse and fails to report, such actions \vould tend to sho\v, at least
a reckless, if not a kno\ving, disregard for the safety of the elder.
In addition to assessing punitive damages against the mandated
reporter, when a professional \vho fails to report is an employee acting
in the course of employment e.g., a nurse in a hospital or clinic
staff: punitive damages may be a\varded against the principal in ,certain
414
situations.
Also, if the hospital failed to institute pro-cedures to ensure reporting or supervise staff, punitive damages may be appropriate.415 An award of sufficient punitive damages against a hospital or
other care facility would. undoubtedly encourage that more comprehen-

413.. Section 908 reads in part
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outmgeous, becnusc of :the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the cbarneter of the
defendant's act, the nature and extent of the hann to the plaintiff that the defendant
caused or intended to cause and the v.·eaJth of the defendanL
414. See id. § 909. Section 909 reads as follov,-s:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded againSt a master or other principal because of an act by an agent i~ but only if,
(a) the principal or managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of
the act or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent \\'US reckless in
employing or retaining h~ or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and \\'US acting in the
scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or ,approved the
act
415. See United \V. Med.. Centers v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682 (Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that, if statutory provisions regarding the pleading of punitive damages nrc complied
with, it is possible to recover punitive damages from a hospital for the negligent- or intentional
failure to supervise its employees that results in the sexual assault or a patient); Fnrogo v.
Sacred Heart Gen. Hosp., 562 A2d 300 (Pa. 1989) (stating that \Villful misconduct or gross
negligence in failing_to provide· a safe and secure environment for a patient \\·ho \\11S raped by
another patient at the hospital could result in an award of punitive damages).
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sive training and sup-ervision procedures be instituted, thereby preventing future injuries.
3. Defenses

Even if a professional is found to be negligent in the failure to
diagnose and/or report suspected elder abuse or negle_ct, defenses such
as contributory and comparative negligence or assumption of risk may
be used by the defendant to avoid liability. However, for each of these
defenses, there are sound rebuttals which allow recovery 'by the victim.
If the fact-finder detennines that the plaintiff-elder's conduct fell
below the standard of care which he or she should have confonned to
for his or her own protection, contributory negligence (sometimes referred to as "plaintiff's negligence") was traditionally a complete bar to
416
recovery.
The defendant-professional, in a suit for failure to report,
will likely raise this defense, or its more modern counterpart~ comparative negligence; which is not a complete bar but apportions damages
417
according to relative fault.
It may be argued that the failure of the
elder to report the abuse himself; or to take some other action to end
or avoid it, is negligence. However, the failure to report or perfonn
those acts is not legal negligence unless a reasonable person under like
circumstances would report, and like circumstances .must include an
analysis of the role that age, experience, and actual circumstances play
418
in the decision not to report.
If a reasonable elderly person 'in the same circumstances would not,
or could not, have taken steps to report the abuse, then the plaintiff
419
There will often b-e a well-founded fear of the
was .not negligent.
consequences of reporting, such as retaliatory abuse. Moreover, as one
expert has noted:
Elder abuse victims commonly experience strong feelings of
shame and humiliation, particularly if the ·abuse has included
sexual or extensive physical assault. The sense of shame can

416. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 465, 467 (1965). See generally \Vex S.
Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946) (discussing
early contributory negligence cases with an emphasis on jury control).
417. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 159, § 67, at 470.
418. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 464 (1965) ("Unless the actor is a child or an
insane person, the standard of conduct to which he must confonn for his own protection is thnt
of a reasonable man under like circumstances.") (emphasis added).
419. See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 228 U.S. 351 (1913) (taking account of
circumstances and the age of plaintiff in determining that her actions did not constitute contributory negligence).
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be exacerbated if the offender is a family member. Ambivalent
feelings are common in victims of family abusers because they
may simultaneously love and resent their offenders. Elder
abuse victims may have difficulty accepting intervention, especially if they have strong affective relationships \vith offenders,
420
such as spouses and adult children or grandchildren.
Today most states employ comparative, rather than contributory
negligence; even a finding of some measure of plaintiff negligence \viii
not usually be a complete bar to recovery._ There are three different
types of comparative negligence: "pure'., systems, \Vhich apportion
421
awards strictly according to fault; "modified'~ systems, \Vhich apportion damages if plaintiff's negligence \Vas not as great as the defendant's;422 and "slight-gross" systems; \Vhich apportion damages if the
423
plaintiff's negligence was "slighf' in comparison to the defendant's.
If the elder's failure to report abuse or neglect or take other steps to
protect himself is found to be only slightly negligent, or less negligent

420. Holly Ramsey-Kiawsnik, kses.sing Physical and Sexual Abuse In Health Ctzre Settings,
in ABUSE, NEGLECr AND ExPLOITATION OF OLDER PERSONS: STRA1EGIES FOR ASsESSMENT
AND lNTER.VENllON 67; 73-74 (Lorin A Baumhover & S. Colleen Beall eds., _
1996).

421. See, e.g., Hoffinan v~ Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973) {".l f plaintiff and defendant are· both at fault, the fonner may recover, but the amount of his recovery may be only

such proportion of the entire damages plaintiff sustained as the defendantts negligence bears to
the combined negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendanl").
422. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111 (\1/cst 1998):
(1) Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action by nny person or
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in
injury to person or property, if such negligence M'tU not tu great as the negligence
of the person against whom recovery is sought, bul any damages aliO\\·cd shall be
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person for
whose injury, damage, or death recovery is made.
(Emphasis added). See also OR. REv. STAT. § 18.470 (1996):
(1) Contributocy negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or the
legal representative of the person to recover damages for death or injury to ~rson
or property if the fault attributable to the claimant 1sw not greater tltDii th·e combined fault of all persons specified in subsection (2) of this section, but any damages
allowed shall be diminished in proportion to_ the p~ercentnge of fault attributable to
the claimant
(Emphasis added.)
423. See, e.g., S.D. C0DIF1FD LAws ANN. § 20•9·2 ~iichic 1997):
In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a person or his property

caused by the negligence of another, the fact that the pluinillf may have been guilty
of contributocy negligence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff was slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant, but in
such case~ the damages shall be reduced in proportion to the mnount of plaintifrs
contributory negligence.
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than the fault of the professional mandated to report, recovery will be
allowed. Once again, as with contributory negligence, the plaintiff's
focus must be on demonstrating that any failure on the part of the
victim was reasonable, given age and situation. If this can be proven,
comparative negligence, as well as contributory negligence, will not 'bar
recovery against one who had a duty to report suspected abuse or neglect.
Assumption of risk is another defense a defendant is likely to raise,
but it cannot realistically be maintained that an elderly person assumes
the risk of abuse. To establish such a defense, defendant ·must ·prove
that plaintiff voluntarily and freely assumed the risk that he would be
424
harmed through the negligence of another.
Where the elder knows
of the threat of further abuse and does not leave the situation or report
it, there is no assumption of risk unless there is a reasonable altemative.425 Elderly abuse victims will often perceive no other option than
to remain in the abusive situation. They may be dependent on the
abuser for food, medical assistance, shelter, and other caregiving necessities; may fear continued or worse abuse as retaliation for reporting;
and often do not know that services are available to them. There is
nothing voluntary or freely chosen about remaining in an abusive situation under these circumstances. Where there is only a choice of evils,
426
there is no assumption of risk.
Moreover, in such an implied statutory action the court is creating a
new tort against which traditional common law defenses, e.g., contributory negligence, assu·mption of the risk, comparative fault1 shou'ld play
no role at alL The Restatement provides that a court, in deciding
which defenses may apply in an action implied from a statute, should
424. KEETON ET AL., supra note 159, § 68, at 487.
425. See id at 490-91. See; e~g., Neal v. Prince George's County, 700 A.2d 838 (Md. App.
1997) (overruling the granting of a summary judgment motion on the basis that an applicant
who was seeking to obtain medical benefits for her son may not hav,c assumed the risk of
falling on an icy sidewalk because there may have been no reasonable alternative by which she
could obtain the needed care for her son); Mack v. Kranz Farms, Inc~, 548 N.W.2d 812 (S.D.
1996) (remanding for trial because there was an issue of fact as to whether a fann worker
voluntarily assumed the risk of being injured while removing frozen silage from a feed trough
when the only other alternatives would have caused a greater risk to his safety than the melh·
od he chose)~
426. See KE~E'I'ON ET AL., supra note 158, § 68, at 40-41. See also York v. Winn·Dixic At·
lanta, Inc., 459 S.E.2d 470 (Ga. App. 1995) (finding that delivecyman who had the cho1cc of
using a slippery platfonn or losing his job may not have voJuntarily assumed the risk of falling); Marshall v. Ranne; 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1974) (holding that there was no assumption o£
risk for a homeowner to leave his home knowing that there was a dangerous animal kept by
his neighbor loose where the- only other choice was to re-main a prisoner in his own home).
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look for guidance to the statute from \vhich the claim arises.
\Vhere
the statute reflects the legislature's desire to protect those \Vho cannot
adequately guard themselves, such defenses should not be applicable.
One of the reasons for the enactment of mandatory reporting statutes is
428
that many elderly victims are unable to protect themselves adequately.
In cases involving defendants who violate special safety, juvenfle, or
other laws protecting vulnerable groups, courts have held these statutes
to be essentially strict liability provisions requiring defendants to safeguard such individuals from foreseeable hann. To allo\V common la\V
defenses would undennine the legislative purpose in enacting these
429
Iaws.
One court held exactly that in its interpretation of the Minnesota Vulnerable Adult Act, which mandates the reporting of suspected
abuse or neglect:

427. REsTA1EMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874(A) emL j (1979) \Defenses to the action may
be suggested by the legislative provision itself.").
428. In the battered woman context, see LENORE E.. \VALKER. THE BAl"IERED \VO~fAN SYN·
DROM£ 42-54 (1979); Naomi Hilton-Archer, Note, Battered IYomen and the Legal System: Post,
Present, and Future, 13 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 14S, 147-49 (1989).
429. See Thelen v.. St Cloud Hosp., 379 N.\V.2d 189, 193-94 ~1inn. Ct. App. 1985) (imposing absolute liability for failing to report suspected abuse of a vulnerable adult as required by
statute and stating that affutnative defenses such as contributory or compamti\'c negligence arc
not available when a statute is intended to protect one 'vho cannot protect heJSc:U). See also
\Vren v. Sullivan Elec., Inc., 797 F.2d 323, 326-27 {6th Cir. 1986) (subcontrnctor \Vhich did
not install adequate temporazy lighting at construction site, in violation of state and federal
safety statutes and regulations, could not assert assumption of the risk or contributory negli·
gence defenses against injured construction v;orker); Boyles v. Hamilton, 4S Cal. Rptr. 399
(Cal. Dist Ct App. 1965) (holding that assumption of risk and contributory negligence could
not be used as defenses to an action based on the violation of child labor la\\-s); Tmnimni Gun
Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421, 422-24 (Fla. 1959) (store \\·hich sotd rifle to minor in viola·
tion of state statute and municipal ordinance could not assert contributory negligence defense
against minors); Slager v. H\VA Corp., 435 N.\V.2d 349, 352-SS (I0\\11 1989) (lavern \\'hicb
served alcohol to minor in violation of state dram shop statute could assert neither contributory
negligence nor comparative fault defense against minor); Lomayestc\va v. Our Lady of ~1ercy
Hosp.:. 589 S.\V.2d 885, 887 (Ky. 1979) (hospital \'ihich violated state regulation requiring
detention screen could not assert contributory negligence defense ngninst patient \Vho fell from
window); Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So. 2d 1164, 1169-70 (La. 1978) (defendant \Vho employed
15-year old boy to drive commercial motor vehicle in violation of state child labor la\\'S could
not assert contributory negligence defense against claim by boy•s survi,.·or); Zerby v. \'lanen.
210 N.\V.2d 58, 62-63 (Minn. 1973) {retailer \vh.ich sold glue to minor in violation of state
anti-glue sniffing statute could assert neither assumption of the risk nor comparative negligence
defense against claim by trustee of another minor who shared the glue \vith its actual purchaser); Larabee v. Triangle Steel, Inc., 451 N.Y.S.ld 258 (App~ Div. 1982) (finding that eontnoutory or comparative negligence and assumption of risk should not be aJIO\\"Cd ns defenses in an
action based on the failure to follow safety regulations relating to excavation and demolition
sites); cj. KEEToN ET AL., supra note 159, § 36, at 227-28; § 36, nt 230; § 65, nt 461-62
(discussing safety laws and assumption of risk).
.

.
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The doctrine of absolute liability applies to preclude affirmative
defenses when the legislature intends by enacting the statute to
place the entire responsibility for the injury on the individual
who violated it . . . We agree with the trial court and hold
that the Vulnerable Adult Act imposes absolute liability upon
one who violates its provisions. To allow affirmative defenses
would defeat the purpose of the statute. The legislature must
therefore have intended that no defense would displace the
430
responsibility imposed by the statute.
The Restatement describes this situation as follows:
There are . . . exceptional statutes which are intended to place
the entire responsibility for the hann which has occurred upon
the defendant. A statute may be found to have that purpose
particularly where it is enacted in order to protect a certain
class of persons against their own inability to protect themselves. Thus a statute which prohibits the sale of fireanns to
minors may be clearly intended, among other purposes, to protect them against their O\vn inexperience, lack of judgment, and
tendency toward negligence, and to make the seller solely responsible for any hann to them resulting from the sale. In
such a case the purpose of the statute would be defeated if the
contributory negligence of the minor were pennitted to bar his
431
recovery.
To allow defenses to a suit alleging violation of a mandatory reporting
la\v on the basis of the elder's O\vn vulnerability would negate the
purposes of these Jaws to protect elderly victims of mistreatment and
to remove the discretion to report from the professional.
Although it is not a defense, the professional who fails to report
suspected elder abuse or neglect may implead the perpetrator in an
attempt to lessen his own comparative fault and financial responsibility.432 At first glance, anything that lessens the professional's potential

430. Thelen, 379 N.W.2d at 193-94; see also discussion supra note 375 and accompanying
text
431. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 cmt. c (1965). See also REsTATEMENT (SEC~
OND) OF TORTS § 496(F) cmts. d-e (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 159, § 68, at 493.
432. See, e.g., Nikolous_v. Superior Court, 756- P.2d 925 (Az. 1988) (holding that the defcn·
dant, who was in an auto accident with the plaintiff, could implead the City because it was
aJieged that a fire truck negligently caused the accident and the City may ultimately be linblc
to the defendant); Smith~ Kline & French Lab. v. Just, 191 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. App. 1972) (find·
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liability may seem to be contrary to the goal of encouraging increased
reporting of abuse or neglect. Ho\vever, that goal is simply the means
to the reduction of elder abuse; the larger goal may b.e better served by
allowing the professional to bring the abuser into court and assessing
damages against him as \Veil. The professional still retains an incentive
to report because defending such an action and impleading the abuser is
costly, and imposing liability ··criminal or civit . directly on the abuser
furthers public policy. If the professional
is
not
held
responsible
for
•
his failure to report, there will be no action in \Yhich to ·implead the
abuser.
•

4. Express Statutory Liability

•

A civil cause of action for failing to report suspected elder abuse or
neglect as required by la\V has been created by statute in four states433
Arkansas, lo\va, Michigan, and Minnesota.
These statutes have not
been tested in litigation involving elder abuse an·d neglect~ The duty
and breach of duty elements needed to establish liability under these
statutes vary, but in all four states the damages must have bee.n proxi434
mately caused by the failure to report.
One area in \Vhich the statutes differ is the mental state required for
recovery. Minnesota imposes civil liability for a failure to report that
43
is "negligent or intentional.,. s In Michigan any individual required to
report (including any person '\vho is employed, licensed, registered, or
certified to provide health care • • • ") \Vho "suspects or has reasonable
cause to believe that an ·adult has been abused" is liable for breach of

ing that a physician sued for prescribing the \Vrong drug could implead a drug manufacturer
because the physician claimed that the drugs \Vere unsafe nnd not fit for the intended usc);
IND. TRIAL RULE 14 (1997) \A defending party, as a third p3rty plaintiff, may cause a sum·
mons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the netion \\ho is or may ~
liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against hiRL].
433. See ARK. CODE ANN. § S-28-202(b) (1\iichie 1997)' t'AnY person or caregiver required
by this chapter to report a case of suspected abuse. neglect, or exploitation \\·ho. purposely falls
to do so shall be civilly liable for damages proximately caused by the failure."); IO\tJA CODE §
23583(10) (\Vest 1998) \A person required by this section to report a SUSpected case of dependent adult abuse who knowingly fails to do so is civilly Unblc for the damages proxinmtely
caused by the failure.,"); MICH. CO~w. LA\VS § 16.411e(l) (\V~t 1997) ("A person required to
make a report pursuant to section lla \vho fails to do so is liable civilly for the damages
proximately caused by the failure. to repo~ and a civil fmc of not more th3.R S.SOO.QO for each
failure to report."); MINN. STAT. § 626.557(7) (\Vest 1997) \A mandated reporter '~ho negligently or intentionally fails to report is liable for damages caused by the failure.").
434. See MINN. STAT. § 626.557(7) (\1/est 1997).
435. /d.
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436

the statutory command.
Michigan's statute contains no specific
437
mental state needed for liability.
A case interpreting Michigan•s
438
child abuse reporting statute, which is almost identical to the elder
abuse statute, held that negligence sufficient to support civil liability
439
oan be inferred if the child abuse reporting statute is violated.
In
such a state, a variety of evidence could be used to establish the stan440
dard of care.
The standard of care could also be established by ex-pert testimony regarding standard training and practice in the particular
field of the defendant.
The Arkansas and Iowa statutes both require an elevated level of
441
mental culpability to support civil liability.
Arkansas requires that
the failure to report be "purposeful,'' and Iowa requires that the failure
42
to- report be "knowing.'~
Presumably these statutes require actual
knowledge of the reporting requirement and a conscious choice not to
report. Holding a mandated reporter liable under these circumstances
443
Also, the existence of a statute allowing civil
would be difficult.
liability and specifying the necessary mental state might preclude using
a common law malpractice theory.
Though statutes creating civil liability for failure to report exist in
these four states, litigation has b,een rare. In Arkansas, Iowa, and
Michigan, there are no reported or unreported cases interpreting or
444
applying these laws.
One state supreme court decision dealt with the

436. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 16.4lla{l) (West 1997).
437. See MICH. COMP. LAws § l6.4lle(l) (West 1997)..
438. See MICH. COMP. LAws ,§ 722.633(1) (West 1997) (''A person who is required by this

act to report an instance of suspected child abuse or neglect and who fails to do so is civilly
Hable for the damages proximately caused by the failure.").
439. See Williams v. Coleman, 488 N.W.2d 464, 472 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding a
jwy instruction which allowed the jury to infer negligence on the part of the defendants if they
found the reporting statute had been violated). See also People v. Caviani, 432 'N.\V.2d 409,
413 (Mich. Ct App. 1988) (holding a "reasonable suspicion" triggers obligation to report child
abuse). But see Marcelletti v. Bathani, 500 N.W 2d l24, 130 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that the failure of a mandated reporter to report suspected child abuse by a babysitter imposed
liability only for the ·injuries of the- child examined and not for the injuries of a child later
abused by the same person).
440. See supra notes 289-97 and accompanying text
44l. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5..;28-202(b) (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ,§ 23S B.3(10) (\Vest
1998).
442. See- ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28-202(b) (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE § 2SS B.3(10) (West
1998).
443!1 But see First Commercial Trust Co. v. Rawls, 915 S.W.2d 262 (Ark. 1996) (approving
of medical malpractice, action against physician who failed to report suspected child abuse}.
444. Computer search usirig both Lexis and Westlaw databases and utilizing the cites of these
statutes as search terms revealed no cases on point
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Minnesota statute, peripherally mentioning, and seemingly approving,
445
statutory civil liability.
In order to encourage reporting of suspected
elder abuse or neglect, courts should find liability and assess damages
as they are authorized to do by statute. Litigation in these four states
could provide the catalyst for a more \Videspread acceptance of damages actions for failing to report suspected elder abuse.
D. Respondeat Superior

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior ("let the mas.ter ans\ver'')
a principal (e.g., an employer) is held liable for the negligent acts of
446
his agent (e.g., an employee) acting. \Vithin the scope of employment
447
or within the legitimate scope of the agent's authority.
Recognizable
examples of agents in failure to diagnose, report and treat actions
would include psychologists and social \Yorkers in mental health clinics
or social service agencies, and staff (e.g., interns,. residents, nurses, etc.)
at hospitals. The basis for vicarious liability is that the employee's
448
actions are presumed to be on behalf of the employer.
In some settings, most notably hospitals, professionals such as doctors are ''independent contractors" rather than employees; thus the institution may argue it is legally relieved of vicarious Uab,ility for the
negligence of a non-employee physician. Often, ho\vever, \vhen courts
have considered the range of situations in \Vhich doctors provide care in
hospitals, agency principles have been extended to limit this independent contractor defense. In some deparbnents, such as the emergency
room, the hospital has increasingly been perceived as directly offering
services to the patient through the doctor, even though the latter is not

445. See Hoppe v. K.aniyohi County, 543 N.\V.2d 63S. 638 {lt1inn. 1996) ("\'lc note that despite the mandate to agencies and individuals to both report suspected abuse or neglect and
then to investigate those reports, the legislation itself only defines the consequences of a failure
to report as mandated-a criminal penalty is imposed for an intentional failure nnd civil liability is imposed for both negligent and intentional failure.").
446. See, e.g., Mid-Continent Pipeline Co. v~ Crauthers, 267 P.2d 568. 571 (Okla. 1954)
(finding that agen~ of the defendant company that allowed oil to escape into a stream acted
within the scope of employment and that the company could hnvc been held liable for the
resulting damages~ but for a valid release of liability that had previously been exc~ted).
447.. See, e.g., Roger.; v. Town of Black J\.fountain, 29 S.E.2d 203. 205 (N.C. 1944) (holding
that a driver who deviated from his employer's instructions and drove a ccmpany vehicle on a
personal errand was not acting within the scope of :the authority granted by his employer so as
to give rise to vicarious liability).
448 . See. e.g.• Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310~ 324 n.t6 (Colo. r993) (distinguish·
ing the tort of negligent hiring from vicarious liability and finding thnt the defendant \\415 not
vicariously liable, but may be liable for negligent hiring).
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an employee.
Where a hospital holds itself out to the public as providing a given
service, in this instance, emergency services, and where the hospital
enters into a contractual arrangement with one or more physicians to
direct and provide the service, and where the patient engages the services of the hospital without regard to the identity of a particular physician and where as a matter of fact the patient is relying upon the hospital to deliver the desired health care and treatment, the doctrine of
respondeat superior applies and the hospital is vicariously liable for
damages proximately resulting from the neglect, if any, of such physicians. 449
E. Professional License Sanctions

While lawsuits against mandated reporters may encourage increased
reporting of elder mistreatment, sanctions regarding professional licenses
have the potential to cause even greater changes in behavior. All
members of licensed professions, as a condition of practice, are subject
0
to disciplinary control by a legislatively designated Agency or Board.4'
Since health care and other professionals are usually in the best -position to discover and treat abuse, the threat of licensure sanctions may
451
provide the best means to encourage reporting.
Professionals may
insure against damages for malpractice liability, but suspension or revo'

449. H~u'dy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358; 371 (Miss. 1985) (emphasis added).
450. Licensure of professionals in the United States has a lengthy history. Professional nsso·
ciations, such as the- American Medical Associationt sponsored state licensing statutes during the
late nineteenth century. The Supreme Court gave impetus to this in Dent v. West Jlirglnla,
129 U.S .. 114 (1889), which upheld the constitutionality of the Wes.t Virginia Medical Practice
Act By 1930 all states had some fonn of mandatory medical licensure. See generally RoBERT DERBYSHIRE, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE IN 11m UNITED STATES (1978). Many
other health care workers, such as dentists, optometrjsts, phannacists, veterinarians, practical and
registered nurses, and psychologists and social workers are currently Ucensed in aU SO states.
See NEIL WEISFELD, NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCJENCESt LICENSURE OF PRIMARY CAR£ P-RACTlTIO.
NERS 8 (1977).
The Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to state regulation and licensing of profes·
sions:
We recognize that the States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions
within their boundaries and that as part of their power to protect the public health,_
safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for
licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bart 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (citations omitted).
451. See, e.g., In Re Schroeder, 415 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (failure of mental
health professional to file mandatory report of suspected child abuse upheld as basis for lleen·
sure sanction).

161

SAYING GRANNY FROI.I THE IJ.'OLF

1998]

cation of their licenses directly threatens their livelihood and standing
in the community and in their profession. Statutes \Vhicb enumerate
the grounds far license discipline of a professional can be applied to
the failure to report elder abuse or neglec_
t The District of Columbia
Code is explicit:
Any

health~care

administrator or health professional licensed in

the District who willfully fails to make a report required by §
6-2503(a)(l) [reports of suspected elder abuse or neglect], or
willfully makes a report under § 6-2503 containing infonnation
that he or she knows to be false, shall be guilty of unprofessional c_onduct and subject to any sanction available to the govermnental board, commission, or other authority responsible for
452
his or her Iicensure.
The portion of the Dela\vare Code \Yhich deals \Vith long tenn care

facilities that seiVe the elderly population is also very specific in this
regard.
Upon a finding of abuse, mistreatment, or neglect, or failz1re to
report such instances by a licensed or registered' professional,
the Department or the Attorney General shall notify the appropriate licensing or registration board. If, _after a hearing, a
licensed or registered professional is found to have abused,
mistreated or neglected -a patient or resident or Jzas failed to
report such instance, the appropriate board shall suspend or
453
revoke such person's license.

Some states require that licensure boards be notified of professionals454
convicted of failure to report elder abuse.
The vast majority of
states, however, do not have license discipline statutes \vbich specifically reference the failure to report elder abuse/neglect.
Even without such a specific provision, other statutes may be used
as the basis for discipline. Physicians may serve as an illustrative

452.. D.C. CoDE ANN. § ~2512{5) (l\iichic 1997).
453. DEL CODE. ANN. til 16, § 1137 (1\iichic- 1996) (emphasis ndded).
454. See, .e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.24.010(c) (\Vest 1998) ("If a person convicted under this
section is a member of a profession or occupation Utat is licensed, certified, or regulated by

the state~ the court shall notify the appropriate licensing,
conviction.").

certifyin~

or regulating entity of the

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

162

[Vol. 31:77

example. Five jurisdictions (Florida, Maryland, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and West Virginia) make the failure to file "any report required by
455
law'' grounds for revocation of a doctor's professional license.
Since
a report of suspected elder abuse is mandated in the vast majority of
states, a failure to make such a report could 'be grounds for discipline.
Twelve states (Alabama, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisi456
ana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah)
allow sanctions against physicians who violate a law that relates to the
practice of medicine. Georgia's civil code, section 43-1-19, for example, provides:
(a) A state examining board shall have the authority to refuse
to grant a license to an applicant therefor or to revoke the
licence of a person licensed by that board or to discipline a
person licensed by that board, upon a finding by a majority of
the entire board that the licensee or applicant has:
(8) [v]iolated a statute, law, or any rule or regulation of
this state, any other state, the state examining board regulating the business or profession licensed under this title,
the United States, or any other lawful authority (without
regard to whether the violation is criminally punishable),
which statute, law, or rule or regulation relates to or in
part regulates the practice of a business or profession
451
licensed under this title ... .

455. See~: e.g., ltl. GEN. LAws § S-37-S.l (Michie 1995). The statute provides:
The tenn "unprofessional conduct'' as used in this_chapter shall include but not be
limited to the following items or any combination thereof and may be further defined
by regulations established by the board with the prior approval of the director • • .
• • •

(9) Willful omission to file or record, or willfully impeding or obstructing a filing
or recording, or inducing another person to omit to file or record medical or other
reports as required by law . . .
ld See also FLA. STAT. ch. 455.227 (West 1996); MD. CODE ANN., HEALru Occ. § 14-404
(Michie 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 26; § 1354 (1996); W. VA. CODE § 30-14-11 (Michie
1996).
456.. See ALA. CODE § 34-24-360 (Michie 1996); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 490 (West
1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 43~1-19 (Michie 1996); HAW. REv.. STAT. §, 4368-19 (1996); IND.
CODE § 25~1-94 (West 1996); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37.1285 (West 1996); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 5 (West 1996); Mo~ RE.V. STAT. § 334.100 (1995); OHIO REV. CODB
ANN. § 4731.22 (West 1996); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 422.41 (West 1996); TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. art 4495b {West 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-61-401 (Michie 1996).
451. GA. CODE ANN. § 43--1-19 (Michie 1996).
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The criminal nature of most of the mandatory reporting statutes makes
these licensure laws particularly useful in the effort to encourage reporting. A violation of the reporting statute \Vould subject the professional
to both criminal and licensure sanctions.
An additional twelve states (Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, \Vashington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming) allo\v discipline if the physician is found to
458
have engaged in ''negligent practice.,
The Michigan statute, for example, provides:
[T]he disciplinary subcommittee shall proceed under section
16226 if it finds that 1 or more of the follo\ving grounds exist:
(a) A violation of general duty, consisting of negligence or
failure to exercise due care, including negligent delegation
to or supervision of employees or other individuals, \Yhether or not injwy results, or any conduct, practice, or condition. which impairs, or ·may impair, the ability to safely
459
and skillfully practice the health profession.
This standard relates very closely to the previous discussion of private
causes of action against those \vho fail to report. The principles \vhich
support a negligence suit could be used derivatively to impose license
sanctions in these states. More generally, almost all statutes \vhich
govern discipline of· a professional license holder include a generic
prohibition against "unprofessional conduct," as a basis for discipline.
The Kansas statute is representative of this group of la\vs:
A licensee's license may be revoked, suspended or limited,
or the licensee may be publicly or privately censured, or an
application for a license or for reinstatement of a license may
be denied upon a finding of the existence of any of the follo\ving grounds:
• • •

(b) The licensee has committed an act of unprofessional or

45'8. See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 12-36-117 (\Vest 1996). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-13c
{West 1994);_IDAHO CODE § 5+1814 ~1ichic 1996); ft{E. REv. STAT. ANN. tiL 32, § 3282-A
(West 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.16221 (\Vest 1996); ~iQ\'N. STAT. § 147.091 (\Vest
1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-3·323 (\Vest 1995); NEB. REV~ STAT. § 71·148 (1996); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-14 (1997); \VASH. REv. CODE § 18.130.160 (\Vest 199.6); \VIS. STAT. §
448.02 (\Vest 1995); and \VYO. STAT. § 33026-402 (lt.iichic 1996).
459. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.16221 (\Vest 1996).
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dishonorable conduct or professional incompetency~

460

All these statutory criteria may be applied in appropriate cases to fail-

ure to assess, treat, and report suspected elder abuse or neglect. Public
licensing boards which oversee doctors, nurses, social workers, and
other professionals need to be more aggressive in ensuring that practitioners are complying with the reporting requirement and the standard
of care in their jurisdictions.

IX.

CONCLUSION

After the leaves have fallen, we return
To a plain sense of things. It is as if
We had come to an end of the _
imagination,
Inanimate 1n an inert savoir.

'

It is difficult even to choose the adjective
For this blank cold, this sadness without cause.
The great structure has become .a minor house.
461
No turban walks across the lessened floors.,
-Wallace Stevens, at seventy-three
Elder abuse and neglect is a complex phenomenon, without unitary
causation or simple solution. Maltreatment of older persons can, however, be substantially reduced. There are opportunities for many professionals to make a significant contribution to its treatment and prevention. When these opportunities are missed or ignored, further damage to older persons and to our communities is the result. Criminal
and civil legal processes can be invaluable resources in the effort to
ameliorate this great American tragedy. To ignore that potential is to
acquiesc.e in individual and social injustice.

460. KAN. STAT.. ANN. § 65-2836 (1995).
461. Wallace Stevens, The Plain Sense of Things, in COLLECTED POEMS (1952), reprinted In

nm.

ART OF GROWING 0LDE&: WRITERS ON LIVING AND AGING

1996)~

288 (Univ. of Chicago Press
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Appendix A
STATUTES PROTECTING OLDER PERSONS

•

ALA.

§§ 38-9-1 to -11 (1992 & Supp. 1997).

CODE

ALAsKA STAT.

§§ 47.24.010 to .900 (Michie 1996).

ALAsKA STAT.

§ 11.81.900 (Michie 1996).

ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-451 to -454 {West 1997).

ARK.

ANN. §§ 5-28-101 to -306 (Michie 1997).

CODE

CAL. WELF.

COLO.

REv.

& !NST. CODE§§ 15600 to 15660 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998).
STAT.

CONN. GEN. STAT.

ANN.

§§

26-3.1-101 to -106 (West 1998).

ANN. §§ 17b-450 to -461 (West 1998).

DEL.

CODE

ANN. tit. 31, §§ 3902 to 3913 (1997).

D.C.

CODE

ANN. §§ 6-2501 to 6-2513 (1995 & Supp. 1998).
ANN. §§ 415.101 to .113 (West 1998).

FLA. STAT.

GA. CODE ANN._§§ 30-5-1 to -8 (Harrison 1994 & Supp. 1997).
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-80 (Harrison 1994 & Supp. 1997).
HAW.

REv. STAT. §§ 346-221 to -253 (1993 & Supp. 1996).

IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5301 to -5312 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1998).

320 ILL.

COMP. STAT.

15/0.01 to 15/10 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998).

320 ILL. Co:MP. STAT. 20/1 to 20/12 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998).
720 ILL. Co:MP. STAT. ANN. 5/12 to 5/21 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998).

IND.

CODE

ANN. §§ 12-10-3-1 to -31 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1998).

IOWA CODE

ANN. §§ 235B.1 to .6 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).

KAN.

ANN. §§ 39-1430 to -1442 (1993 & Supp. 1997).

STAT.
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KY.

Rsv. STAT. ANN. §§ 209.010 to .160 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).

LA.

REv.

STAT.

ANN. § 14:403.2 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998).

LA.

REv.

STAT.

ANN. § 40:2009.13 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998).

ME.

REv.

STAT.

ANN. tit. 22, §§ 3470 to -3487 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).

MD.

CODE

ANN.,

CTS. & JUD. PROC. §

MD.

CODE

ANN.,

PAM. LAW

5-359 (1995 & Supp. 1997).

§§ 14-101 to -404 (1991 & Supp. 1997).

MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A, §§ 14 to 36 (West 1994 & Supp.
MICH. COMP. LAWS

MINN.

Miss.

Mo. ANN .

ANN. §§ 400.11a to .11f (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).

ANN. § 626.557 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998).

STAT.
CODE

1998)~

ANN. §§ 43-47-1 to -37 (1993 & Supp. 1998).

STAT. §§
.

660.250 to . 320 {West 1988 & Supp.
1998)._
.

MONT. CODE

ANN. §§ 52-3-801 to -825 (1997).

MoNT.

ANN. § 46-18-212 (1997).

CODE

NEB.

REV.

STAT. §§

28-348 to -387 (1995 & Supp. 1996}.

NBV.

REV.

STAT. §§

200.5091 to .5095 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1997).

•

N.H. REV.. STAT. ANN. §§ 161-F:42 to :57 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
N.J.

STAT.

ANN. §§ 52:27D-406 to -425 (West Supp. 1997).

N.M.

STAT.

ANN. §§ 27-7-14 to -31 (Michie 1997).

N.M.

STAT.

ANN,. § 28-17-9 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1998).

N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 473 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1998).
' .

§§ 108A-99 to -111 (1997).

N.C.

GEN. STAT.

N.D.

CENT. CODE §§

50-25.2-0 to -14 (1989 & Supp. 1997).
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ANN. §§ 5101.60 to .72 (Anderson 1998).

Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5101.99 (Banks-Baldwin 1995 &_Supp. 1998).
OKLA. STAT.

OR. REV.

ANN. tit. 43A, §§ 10-101 to -110 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).

STAT.

§§ 124.050 to .140 (Supp. 1996).

20 PA.

CONS. STAT.

ANN. § 5608 (West Supp. 1998).

35 PA.

ANN. §§ 10225~101 to .103, 10225.301 to .310,
10225.312 (West Supp. 1998)
CONS. STAT.

R.I.- GEN. LAws § 42-66-1 (1995).
R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4-7 (1996).

S.C.

ANN. §§ 43-35-5 to -90 (Law. Co-op. 1997).

CODE

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-46-1 to -6 (Michie 1988).

TENN. CODE ANN. §§

TEx. HUM. REs.
UTAH CODE

71~101

CODE

to -119 (1995 & Supp. 1997).

ANN. §§ 48.001 to .103 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).

ANN. §§ 62A-3-301 to -312 (1997 & Supp. 1998).

VT. STAT.

ANN. tit. 33, §§ 6901 to 6941 (1991 & Supp. 1998).

VA. CODE

ANN. §§ 63.1-55.2 to -55.1 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998).

WASH.

REv.

WASH.

REv. CODE ANN. §§ 74.34.010 to .901 (West Supp. 1998).

WASH.

REv. CODE ANN. §§ 26.44.010 to .160 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).

W.

CODE

VA. CODE §§

WIS.

STAT.

ANN. § 18.51.060 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998) (repealed).

9-6-1 to -15 (1998).

ANN. § 46.90 (West 1997 & Supp. 1997).

WYO. STAT. ANN. §§

35-20-101 to -109 (Michie 1997).
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AppendixB

STATUTES
· ATING PROFESSIONALS AND/OR OTHERS
TO REPORT SUSPECTED ELDER ABUSE/NEGLECT
ALA. CODE' §

38-9-8 (1992 & Supp. 1997).

ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.010 (Michie 1996}.

ANN. § 46-454 (West 1997).

ARIZ. REv.

STAT.

ARK.

ANN. § 5-28-203 (Michie 1997}.

CODE

CAL. WELF. & !NST. CODE § 15630 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998).
CONN. GEN. STAT.

ANN. § 17b-451 (West Supp. 1998).

DEL. CODE

ANN . tit. 31, § 3910 (1997).

D.C.

ANN. § 6-2503 (1989 & Supp. 1998).

CODE

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.1034 (West 1998).

GA.

ANN. § 30-5-4 (Harrison 1994 & Supp. 1998).

CODE

ANN. § 31-8-82 (Harrison 1994 & Supp. 1998).

GA. CODE

HAW. REV.

STAT. §

346.;.224 (1993 & Supp. 1997).

IDAHO CODE§ 39-5304 (1998).
IND. CODE

ANN. § 12-10-3-9 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1998).

IOWA CODE

ANN. § 235B.3 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1431 (1993 & Supp. 1997}.

KY. REv.

STAT.

ANN. § 209.030 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).

REV.

STAT.

ANN. § 14:403.2 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998).

LA.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3477 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).

MD.

CODE

MAss.

ANN., FAM.

GEN. LAWS

LAW §

14-302 (1991).

ANN. ch. l9A, § 15 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.1la

(West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
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MINN.

Miss.

ANN. § 626.557 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998).

STAT.
CODE

ANN. § 43-47-7 (1993 & Supp. 1998).

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 660.255 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997).
MoNT. CODE ANN. § 52-3-811 (1997).
NEB. REV. STAT. § '28-372

NEV.

(1995 & Supp. 1996).

REv. STAT. § 200.5093 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1997).
STAT. ANN~

N.H. REv.
N.M.

STAT.

§

161~F:46

(1994 & Supp. 1997).

ANN. § 27-7-30 (Michie 1998).

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-17~9 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 199.7).
N.C. GEN.

STAT. § lOBA-102

OHIO REv. CODE
OKLA. STAT.

(Michie 1994).

ANN. § 5101.61 (Anderson 1998).

ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-104 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).

OR.

REv. STAT. § 124.060 (Supp. 1998).

R.I.

GEN.

S.C.

CODE

TENN.

LAws § 42-66-8 (1993).
ANN. § 43-35-25 (Law. Co-op. 1997).

CODE

ANN. § 71-6-105 (1995).

TEx. HUM-. REs. CODE ANN. § 48.036 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
UTAH CODE

VT.

STAT.

VA. CODE

ANN. § 62A~3-302 (1997).

ANN. tit. 33, § 6903 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
ANN. § 63.1-55.3 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997).

WASH. REV.

CODE

ANN. § 74.34.030 (West Supp. 1998).

WASH. REV.

CODE

ANN. § 26.44.030 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).

W.VA. CODE§

WYO. STAT.

9-6-9 (1998).

ANN. § 35-20-103 (Michie 1998).
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Appendix C
POPULATION TARGEfED AND MISTREATMENT COVERED BY STATUTE
ST.

Population
Targeted

Physical
Abuse

Neglect

Emotional
Abuse &lor
Mental

Sexual
Abuse

Anguish

Financial
Exploitation,
Fiduciafy
Abuse

Unreasonable
Confmement

AL

18+, or 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

AK

18+, 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

AZ

18+, 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

AR

18+

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

CA

18+, 1
6S+

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

co

18+

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

CT

60+

yes

yes

yes

yes

implied

DE

18+. 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

DC

18+, 1

yes

Yes

yes

yes

yes

FL

18+, 1
60+, 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

GA

18+, 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

m

•any

yes

yes

yes

yes

Abandonmcnl.

Self

Desenion

Neglect

yes
yes

yes

yes

yes
yes

yes

yes

yes
yeJ
yes

yes

yes

adult,• 1

m

18+, 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

n..

60+

yes

yes

yes

yes

IN

18+, 1

yes

yes

yes

1 s: if mentally, physically, or emotionally incapacitated or vulnerable

yes

yes
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POPULATION TARGETED AND ?.fiSTREA*I'9't'llfMENTCOVERED BY STATUl'E
:;'

ST.

Population
Toargeted.

Physical
Abuse

Neglect

Abuse &lor

F'wncial
Exptoiution.

Menf3l

f"ldu:iuy

Anguish

Abuse

Emotional

Scltnl

Unrw;c:ub~

Abu!,c

Cc.afu:e~-:ct

yes

yes

A~c~t~::t·. :ct,
~;:1

Sclt
Nql:a

7

)·es

lA

18+. 1

yes

y~

KS

18+,1

yes

yes

yes

yes

KY

1&+.1

yes

yes

yes

yes

LA

18+,1

yes

yes

yes

yes

.res

ME

18+, or 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

.

)'d

yes
.yes

yes

.

l-ID

1

yes

~fA

60+

yes

MI

18+

yes

MN

18+.1

h-iS

yes

yes

yes

yes:

)·cs

yes

yes

)·es

yes

yes

yes

18+.1

yes

yes

. yes

yes

MO

60+
18+. 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

MT

60+

yes

yes

yes

yes

NE

18+.1

yes

yes

NV

60+

yes

yes

yes

yes

NH

18+.1

yes

yes

yes

yes

)~

)~es

.

•

yes

1 = ifmen~<~Jiy, physicaUy, or emotionally inap.aciuted or wlnmbte

yes

)·cs

.)"c$

yes
yes

yes
yes

yes

yes
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POPULATION TARGETED AND MISTREATMENT COVERED BY STATUTE
Sexual

Abuse-&lor
Mental
Anguish

t.mancial
Exploitation.
Fiduciary
Abuse

Abuse

Unreasonable
Conrmement

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

18+. 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

NC

18+, 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

ND

..an adult,"
1

yes

yes

yes

yes

OH

60+. 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

OK

18+. 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

Population
Targeted

Physical
Abuse

Neglect

NJ

18+p 1

yes

NM

18+, 1

NY

ST.

Emotional

Abandonment,
Desertion

ScJr
Neglect

)'e$
yes

yes

yes
.. isolation~

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

'

yes

6S+

OR

6S+

yes

yes

PA

60+

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

. .

RI

60+

yes

yes

yes

yes

sc

18+.1

yes

yes

yes

yes

SD

18+, 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes
'

TN

18+. 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

TX

65+
18+. 1

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

UT

6S+
. 18+. 1

yes

yes

yes

Yes

1 = if mentally, physically. or emotionally incapacitated or vulnerable

yes
yes

yes

yes

yes
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Appendix C
POPULATION TARGEfED AND 2\fiSTREAThiENT COVERED BY STA'fUT£
ST.

Population

Targeted

Physical
Abuse

Neglect

Emotional
Abu~

&lor

h{enttl
Anguish

F'mnci:ll
Exp'.Olt3UOD,
• .•
Fiducbry

Sexu:~l

Unr=somb!e

A~dlr:! r;::er.

Abuse

Confu:.en~ct

~

Se1t
Nqt:d

Ab\l$C

VT

18+. 1
60+

yes

yes

yes

yes

)'CS

yes

yes

VA

18+.1

yes'

yes

yes.

yes

yes

)"e$.

yes

yes

yes

yes

60+
WA

60+.1

yes

yes

wv

1

yes

yes

WI

60+,

yes

yes

WY

18+.1

yes

yes

or 1

)"CS

yes

)'e$

yes

)"t!

yes

1 = if mentally. physically. or emotionally incapacitated or \'Ulncr.ahle

..

yes

)~e$

yes
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AppendixD

PERPETRATOR PENALTIES
.
.

STATB

MISDBMEANOR

FELONY

NOPBNALTY
NOTED

REFERRAL
OPCASB

Alabama
ALA. CoDE § 38-9·7
(1992 & Supp. 1997)

a. intentional abuse or
neglect w/ serious physical
injwy=Ciass B felony

a. reckless abuse or neglect w/

b. reckless abuse or neglect
w/ serious physical
injwy=Ciass C felony

b. emotional abuse=Class A
Misdemeanor

physical injwy=Class A
Misdemeanor

c. exploitation w/ value of
property~ assets .or n;soun:cs t~
than SIOO=Ciass A Misdemeanor·

~.

intentional abuse or
negtea w/physical
injwy=Ciass C felony
d. exploitation w/ value of
property, assets or
reso~ exceeding
$ l OO=Class C felony
.

X

Alaska

Arizona
•

Arkansas
ARK. CODE ANN. § S28-103 (Michie 1997)

California
CAt.. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 15656 (West
1991 & Supp. 1998)

Colorado

a. willfully or by culpable

negligence causes or
permits injury w/ great
bodily hann=Ciass-D
Felony
.any petSOn who causes a
dependent adult to be
injured or causes their
health to be endangered
shall be imprisoned in the
county jail not exceeding
one year, or in the state
prison for 2,3,4 .yrs.

•

any person who willfully causes
or pennits a dependent adult to
be injured or placed in a
situation where the adult is
endangered is guilty or a
misdemeanor.

X

1998]
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Appendix ,D
PERPETRATOR PENALTIFS
MISDEl\fEANOR

-

.

.R.t-~~ ~.KW'-

OF NO
PENALTY
NOTED

CASE

It as a rcS'J.tl, or a.t~

Connecticut
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17b-460 (West Supp.
1998)

la\'~UO:l ~~! by

pro::dlvc $.UYl"s. a
c!~nnlmt.tl~ Is m~t.:
·thua~«

oth:r F.A."'!! h.u
flr..tt~.ed.. cegl:a:d cr
cxp!~::cd
c!!:rly·

=

•

~Mil

infcunutttt-:1 ot !.b=
will b: rc!cucd b

writitls to m.~•ls

~I to d~tunfr:-:

ifcrim!=l

J:rc>a:cdioss ~!;!.b:.
·initf:t.~ed

Delaware
DEL CODE. ANN. tit. 31
§ 3913 (Michie 1997)

a. intentional exptoibtion
using infiml adutt•s

a. int.cntion31 ~ neglect.
exp..o;tmon. or

resources more than

misbc:um=t-Cbss A
Misdcme:1nor

SSOO=Ciass G felony

'. .

b.in~tio~ ~

b. intmtio:i31 cxp!oit:Wcn using
infirm edult'$ resourc:cs less th:.n
causing boch1y h3nnt
pem.ancnt disfigun:mcnt or SSOG-Cbss A l.fisdcme:.nw
pe1mancnt .dis:ibillt)'<bss

D f'eiony
e. Intentional abUse
resulting in dcath-<:13SS A

felony

D.C.

X

Upon reaipt of
repent or~ the
dep.".ttmtnl or
·etdedy nffzUrs Wll
notify bw
ettfoteeanc:aL

Florida
FLA. STAT. ANN. §
415.1055 (West 1998 )

•

Georgia
GA.. CODE ANN.
§ 30.5·8 (1996)

8buse in Vioblio.u

or

provisio~fisdemt:m<n'
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Appendix D
PERPETRATOR PENALTIES
STATE

FEI,ONY

..

-..... :~'~'I~

OF NO

CASE

PENALTY
NOTED

Upon inves~gntion.
the department shall
talc~ action toward
prcvcntlt1g further
abuse and shtill have
the authority to do
any or all or the
following , • • seck
any protective or
remedial actions
authorized by law.

Hawaii
HAw. REV. STAT. §
346·228 (Michie 1993 &
Supp. 1996)

Any person who abuses,
exploits, or neglects a
vulnerable adult is guilty of a
misdemeanor.

Idaho
IDAHO CODE§ 39..5310
& § l8-1SOS (Michie

1993 & Supp. l997)

Illinois
720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN.§ 5/12·21 (SmithHurd 1993 & Supp.
1991)

If • • • it appears that
the abuse. neglect, or
exploitation has
caused injury or a
•
•
• • on
senous
unpos1tion
the rights of a
vulnerable adult, the
commission shalt
immediately notif)'
'the appropriate I3W
enforcement agency
which shall
investigate and
determine whether
criminal proceedings
should be initiated. ·

Criminal Neglect is a
Class 3 felony

Indiana
IND. CODE ANN.
§ 12-10-3-10 (West
1994 & Supp. 1997)
•

Each endangered
adult report shall be
communicated
immediately to • • • a
Jaw enforcement
agency•
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Appendix D

PERPETRATOR PENAI.:I1ES
FELONY

STATE

1\fiSDE?\iEANOR

!ltit-.,.RVT

OF

CASE

NO
PENALTY

NOTED
Iowa

Wanton neglect of a
dependent ndult is a serious
misdent=mor.

IOWA CODE. ANN..
§ 23SB.3A &. § 726.8
(West 1994 &. Supp.

;

uw cnf~ccrt=:l
'&eccles w!J t:Uc
UJY UU~ CW.S!:J;t

!M p:c:.ed!D:!2

or

d~::~cttt e.du:L

1997)

Kansas

X
knowingly and \\illfully
knowingly rmd willfully !\busing
C3lJsing.min~r phystt31 or m=W
abusing causing serious
physical or mental injwy or injwy or tanpor:uy
pc:nnancnt disabllity=Clas$ di~hilit)-=03ss A mlsdeme:mor.
C felony.

Kentucky
KY.. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 209.990 (Bank,s...
Baldwin 1997)
LoUJstana
••

Jtu~a&r
ln\"CstlsW~ 1b.t 1.:3
tdtJlt
tx:ca t~

·=

LA. REv.. STAT. ANN.
.

§ 14:403.2(E}(6) (West
1986 & Supp. 1998)

~~by
o~~··~lbt
~c s=rob!:m cv::~t
be ·~it:.td~ lrJ
cxtuj~t:bJ

·c=.n.s
· tht t-dn!t po=sie:»
as=:y $.btl refer tb
m:nerto 1b:
~

•• dh1.M

~ ·=
a~n:.ey ••• ~to
m:ry mstim~ UfJ

atmm:d p:oc:c:cdings
ted
··
••
.
ecms~l.:
&lucctd~~

cxistittg b-NS.
.

.X

Maine
.

M:uyland

X

Massachusetts

X

Michigan

•

.'
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Appendix D
PERPETRATOR PENALTIES

STATE

FELONY

MISD~~

OR

REJrtbR.!<ft . OF NO
CASE
PENALTY
NOTED
.

Report is forwarded
to local police

Minnesota
MINN. STAT. ANN~
§ 626.551 {West 1992 &

d~31'tmcnt.

prosecuting attorney,
or county sheriffs Cor
possible criminal
prosecution•

Supp. 1998)

•

Mississippi
Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 43-47-19 (Lawyer's
Co-op. 1993 & Supp.
1997)

Missouri

Mo. REV.

STAT.

willful infliction Qf
pbysieal pain or
inj~clonious abuse
and/or battery; upon
conviction, imprisonment
for not more than 20 yca:s

willful abuse, neglect, or
ccploirntion=misderneanor; upon
conviction, fme of not more than
$1000 or by imprisonment not to
exceed one year, ot both fmc or
imprisonment.

knowing abuse=Class D
felony

diverting fUnds or property or
&Isifying documencs-=Ciass A
misdemeanor

§§ 660.300(11) &
660.305(3) (Vernon
1988 & Supp. 1998)

pwposcly or knowingly ab~
negteets or exploits an older
petson with a developmental
disability, upon farst

Montana
MONT. COD£. ANN.
§ 52-3-825 & § 46-lS.

212 (1997)

Nebraska
NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 28-386 (1995 & Supp.
1996)

convictionsfinc not to exceed
$~00 or imprisonment not to
exceed 6 months, or both and
upon a second
conviction=imprisonment not to
exceed I0 yr. or fine. not to
exceed $10,000 or both.

knowing and intentional
abuse or a vulnerable
adult=Class IV felony

Nothing contained In
this section shall
prevent proceedings
• a person
pgamst
under any statute or
ordinance defudng
any act as a crime or
rnisdemcnnor.

When no penalty
otherwise provided or
ir the offense 1s
designated a
misdemeanor. and no
penalty is otherwise
provided, may
sentence the offender
to a term or
Imprisonment not to
exceed 6 months In
the county jail or a
ftnc not to exceed
five hundred dollars
or both.
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Appendix D
PERPETRATOR PENAL'IlSS
FELONY

STATE

~fiSDE\mANOR

»
.
..,.,..,.~'RAT OF
NO
-· -CASE

NOTEI>

'

Nevada
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 200..5099 (Michie
1997 & Supp. 1997)

a. any person who
abuses an older person.
causing person to suffer
unjustifiable physical
pain or mental
suffering=category B
felony punishable by
•
•
•
unpnsonment
m state
prison for minimum of 1
yr. Maximum of6 yrs.
b. e.'\,loitation of older
person"-"if more than
$250, but less than
SSOOO, ~tegory B
felony by imprisonment
in the state prison for
not less than I ynr and
a maximum tom of not
more than 10 years or
by a fine not more than
$10,000, or by both.

c. exploitation of older
person=if more than
$5000, =category B
felony by imprisonment
in the state prison for
not less than 1 year and
a maximum tom of not
more than 20 years or
by a fine not more than
ru.ooo, or by both.

New Hampshire

,

PENALTY

a. a pe:son \\-ho knowingly n.Gd
wilfully \-iohtes NRS 200.5093
is guilty or a mlsdcmc:"nor.

b. a person who hn.s assumed
responsibility of mt older
person and negtec~s the older
person, permits the older
person to suffer unjustifiable
p3in or mentll suffering or
pomits the older person to be
placed in n situ:Won when:
the older person may suffer
physical p3in or mental

suffering ns the result or
abuse or neglcc:tocgross
misdemeanor.

c. exploitntion of older
person=if Jess thna S2SO,
m1·~ e:~neanor; unpnsonment
in the county jail for not
more th:m I year or fmc not
more th3n $2000, or by both.

. .

d. if exploited ttnd nmount or
property cannot be

determined=gross
mi~emeanor

by

imprisonment in the county
jail for not more thnn I )"CZ
or fmc not more thitn $2000.
or by both.

X
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PERPETRATOR PENALTIES
STATE

RE

FELONY

.w.~.,.~"""~

CASE

OF N0

PENALTY
NOTED

New Jersey
•

NJ. STAT.. ANN..
§ 52:270-4'19 (West

Supp. 1997)

If the county director
has reasonable cause
to believe that a
caretaker or other
person bas committed
•
• a
a cnmc
aga•nst
vulnerable adult, he
shall immediately
repott the lnfonnation
to local taw
enforcement officials
or the prosecutor or
the county in which
the alleged criminal
act was committed.

I ,

New Mexico
N.M. STAT ANN..
§ 28·17·9 (Michie 1996 &.
Supp. 1997)

'

X

New York

North Carolina
N.C. OEN. STAT.
§ 108A·109 (Michie 1997)

I·

Upon ftnding.
evidence Indicating
that a person has
abused, neglected, or
exploited a disabled
adulr. the director
shall notify the
district attOrney
4

North Dakota
. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ S0-25.2-05 (Michie
1989 & Supp. 1997)

The law enforcement
agen~ may
investigate the
allegations in the
report, and institute
legal proceedings it
appropriate~

Ohio

X

Oklahoma

X

Oregon
X

SAYING GRANNY FROAI THE JJIOLF
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-I?

t't .._MR_AT

CASE

.
'

OF NO
PENAL1Y

NOTED
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
R..L GEN. LAWS§ ll·S.
10 (Michie.1994 &
Supp. 1997).

X
Any person who shall

commit an assault and
battery upon a person 60
or older, causing bodily
injury, shall be deemed
to have committed a

felony and shall be
imprisoned not
exceeding S years or
fined not exa:eding

SIOOO, or both..

•
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STATE

FELONY

PERPETRATOR PENALTIES
OR

RE --~OF NO

CASE

PENALTY
NO'I'ED

South Carolina
S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 43-35·85 (Law. Co-op.
1985 & Supp. 1997)

a. a person who knowingly and
willfully abuses or neglects n
vulnerable adult is guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon
conviction, must be imprisoned
not more than 3 yrs.

b. a pmon who knowingly and
willfully exploits a wlnerablc
adult is guilty or a misdemeanor,
and upon conviction, must be
fmcd not more than SS,OOO or
imprisoned not more than 3 yrs.,
or both, and may be required by
the court to make restitution..

c. a person who threatens,
intimidates, or attempts to
intimidate a wlncrablc adult is
guilty of a misdemeanor and.
upon conviction. must be fmed
not more than SSOOO or
imprisoned for not more thnn 3
yrs.
d. a person who willfully and
knowingly obstructs or In any
way impedes an investigation
conducted pursuant to this
chapter, upon conviction, is

guilty or a misdemeanor and
must be fined not more than five
thousand dollars or imprisoned
for not more than 3 yrs.

•
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PERPETRATOR PENALTIFS
FELONY

STATE

~fiSDBiEANOR

~ ~ t-~~KR.t\1 ~

CASE

OP NO
PENALTY

NOTED

South Dakota

SD. CODIFIED LAWS §§
22--46-2, 22-46-3
(Michie 1988 & Supp.
1997)

abuse or negl=t which
does not c:cnstitutc
aggravated assauJPC:Ws 6
Felony

misdeme:mor

1EX. HUM. REs. COns §

a. felony of lst degree if
conduct is committed

48.038 (TEX. PENAL§

intentionally or knowingly.

22.04) and TEx. HUM.
RES. CODE § 48.002 {I'£X.
PaW. § 21.08) (West
1990 & Supp. 1998)

Utah
UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-111 (Michie
1995 & Supp. 1997)

sc:xu3l

.rt·

B

misdem~nor

b. if tonduct engaged in
recklessly, it sb31J be a
felony of the second
degree.
a. any person \\"ho cuses

elderly 2.dult to suffer
serious physical injwy
likely to produce dcatb, iC
done intentionally or
knowing})-=- 2nd degree
felony, iC done
rcd:lessly=3rd degree
felony.
b. any pason v.ilo exploits
d~led or elder e.dult. iC
done intentionally and
profit exceeds SSOOO,
second degree felony, iC
done intentionally and
profit less th:m $5000, Jrd
degtee felony.

•

c:xploit:ltion=s=anlni[s(sd1eemme:e:3mncr

willful nbuse. neg!Cd, or
cxptoit:Uion C13SS A

Tennessee
TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 71-6-103, 71-6.117
(Michie 1995 & Supp.
1997)
Texas

theft by

a. Any pctson who cuscs
elderly dull to suff'er $Crlous
physta.l injwy likely 10 produce
dC3th. if done w/ aimtnat
negtigc:ncc•CJass A

misdeme3nor.
b. Ally person v.ilo autts
elderly r.dult to sufTc:t ~
physt=!lnjwy, it do=
inttntioWJy or knowingly•
Class A misdemc:mor, lf' dcmc

recklessJy•Cbss B
misdcme:mor, if dOllc w/
aim inn! negligence C3.SS C
misdeme3nor.
c. Any pason v.ilo exploits
dis:1bled or elder t.dult. 1C done
rceklessly, Oass A mlsdemc:nor,
if done with aimiM1 negUgmt:e
cbss B mlsdcmc::mor•

184

[Vol. 31:77

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

Appendix D
PERPETRATOR PENALTIES
STATE

·~ -4"A~£J

FELONY

CASE

OF NO

PENALTY
NOTED

Vennont

any person who engages in

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33,
§ 6913 (1991 & Supp.

abuse, exploitatio~ or
failure to provide
subsistence or other
medical care of an elderly
or disabled. fmed not more
than $10,000 or be
imprisoned not more than
18 months, or both.

1997)

Virginia

X

Washington
West Virginia
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-29
(Michie 1997)

any care giver who
intentionally abuses, or
neglects an incapacitated
adult is guilty of a
felony, and upon
conviction shall be
confined to the
penitentiary for not less
than two nor more than
ten years or be confmed
in the county jail for not
more than twelve
months and fmed not
more than S1,500.

any care giver who negleas
an incapacitated adult is
guilty of a misdemeanor, and
upon conviction shall be
fmed not less than $500 nor
more than $1500, or
imprisoned in the county jail
for not Jess than ninety days
nor more than one year, or
both fined and imprisoned.

Wisconsin
Wyoming

a. abuse, neglect, or

WYO. STAT. § 35-20-

exploitation=misdcmcanor, tine
not more than S1000 or
imprisoned not more than 1 yr.
or both-upon a second or
subsequent conviction=imprisonment in state pen. for
not more than 5 yrs.

109 (Michie 1997)
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Appendix E
PERSONS AND INS...,..,.TI,.,.,.,fUTIONS REQUffiED TO REPORT;
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT
ST.

Anyone

Physician

Law
Enforcement
Personnel

Clergy

Social

Physical,

Worker

Oa:upallonnl

Therapist

AL

yes

AK

yes

yes

yes

AZ

yes

yes

yes

AR

yes

yes

yes

CA

yes

yes

yes

co

1

1

cr

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

GA

yes

yes

HI

yes

yes

ID

yes

yes

DE

yes

yes

yes
yes

yes
yes

yes

yes
1

yes

yes

yes

DC

FL

Psychologist
or ~!eolal He:llth
Professional

yes

n..

1

IN

yes

yes

yes

yes
yes

yes

yes
yes

yes

1. Reporting of abuse/neglect is encouraged but not mandatory.

yes
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PERSONS AND INSTITUTIONS REQUIRED TO REPORT;
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT
ST.

Nurse

Adult's
Caretaker

AL

yes

AK

yes

AZ

yes

AR

Residential
Facility,
Hospital

Penalties for Failure to Report

knowingly fail to ~port a misd~~anor and punhhed
by imprisonment for not.more than 6·mo. &. $500

yes

yes

failure or refusal to :report under§ 41.24.110aClass B
misdemeanor; (me
failure to report 212 Class 1 misdemeanor

yes

purposefully fail to repon .a Class B misdemeanor: abo
civU liability foe damages proximately ~u$ed by laUuro

yes

CA

yes

yes

co

1

l

CT

Adult
Daycare
Facility

yes

yes

misdemeanor punishable by not more than 6 mo. ln jaU
or by a fmc ofnot more than SUlOO, or fino and prison

failure to report .- rmc of not more than $500

yes

.

DE

none noted

DC

willful failure to report • misdemeanor. upon
conviction. subject to rmc not exceeding $300
.

FL

yes

yes

yes

failure to report. or preventing another from doing so •
2nd degree misdemeanor
·

.

GA

yes

HI

yes

yes

ID

yes

yes

knowingly and willfully falling to nuke report
misdemeanor

yes

1:1

failure to report. or wWtully preventing another to make
report a petty misdemeanor
failure to report 1:1 misdemeanor

IL

knowingly transmits a false report a disorderly conduce

IN

failure to report 1:1 Class A infraction
.

1. Reporting of abuse/neglect is encouraged but not mandatoey.
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Appendix E
PERSONS AND INS'.....rl'frw'tYfUTIONS REQUffiED TO REPORT;
PENALTY FOR FAll..URE TO REPORT
ST.

Anyone

Physician

Law
Enforcement
Personnel

IA

yes

yes

KS

yes

yes
yes

KY

yes

yes

LA

yes

yes

Clergy

Social

PhysiCll

Worker

Occupadonnl
Therapist

yes

Psychologist or
ltfental He:!llh
Professional

yes
yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

ME

yes

yes

MD

yes

yes

hnrmn
senices
\l"'rku

MA

yes

yes

yes

MI

yes

yes

yes

MN

yes

yes

yes

yes

MT

yes

yes

yes

NE

yes

yes

yes

NV

yes

yes

yes

yes

MS

yes

MO

yes

NH

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes
yes

yes

yes

yes

1. Reporting of abuse/neglect is encouraged but not mandatory.

yes

yes

yes
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Appendix E
PERSONS AND INSTI'-1'U'l10NS REQUIRED TO REPORT;
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT
Nurse

ST.

Adult's
Caretaker

Residential

Adult

Facility,

Daycare

Hospital

Facility

Penalties for Failure to Report

~

IA

yes

yes

Simple misdemeanor and subject to civU liab11lty for
damages proximately caused by the faUurc

KS

yes

yes:

knowingly failing to make report

KY

yes

yes_

knowingly and willfully violating section
misdemeanor

=- Class D misdemeanor
e2

Class D

faUurc to report =- rme or not more than S$00. or
imprisonment or ·not more than 6 mo•• or bolh

LA

yes

ME

knowingly violates statute commits a c1vU vlolat1on
of not more than $500
'

MD

a

fhte

'

none noted

MA

failure .to report if required= nne of not more than $1000

yes
-

MI

yes

MN

yes

failure to report = civil liability for damages pro:dmatcly
caused by failure & fme of no.t more than $500

yes

failure to report = misdemeanor & incurs liabUity for
damages caused by failure

"

faUun: to report a misdemeanor; fmc or not mora than
$500, imprisonment for nor more than 6 mo•• or boih

MS
MO

failure to repon w/in required drnc, or violating
confidentiality or reports = Class A misdemeanor

yes

MT

yes

failure to report= mbdemeanor;' fmc not to exceed $500.
imprisonment not to exceed 6 mo•• or both
~

NE

· yes
'

NV
NH

yes

yes

yes

willful failure to repon. or knowing release of confidcndal
infonnation = Class mmisdemeanor

yes

yes

failure to report = misdemeanor

-

knowing .failure to report

1. Reporting of abuse/neglect is encouraged but not mandatory.

a

misdemeanor
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Appendix E

PERSONS AND INSTITUTIONS REQUIRED TO REPORT;
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT
ST.

Anyone

NJ

1

NM

yes

NY

1

NC

yes

ND

1

yes

OH
OK

Social
\Yorker

Physical,

Law
Enforcement
Personnel

Clergy

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

)'CS

yes

O.:cuPJ!ionm
Thempist

Psychologist or
l'tfcntal Heallh
Professional

yes

yes

OR
PA

Physician

yes
1
•

RI

yes

sc

.with

yes

yes

yes

actual
knowledge•

SD

1

TN

yes

TX

yes

UT

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

1. Reporting of abuse/negleet is encouraged b'Jt not mandatosy.
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Appendix E
PERSONS AND INS~TI'n"'YfU'l'IONS REQUIRED TO REPORT;
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT
;::::::

ST.

"''I

Nurse

Adult's

Caretaker

Residential
Facility,
Hospital

Adult

Penalties for Failure to Report

Daycare
Facility
not noted

NJ

-

NM

failure or refusal to .report a misdemeanor

NY

not noted

NC

not noted

ND

willful false report • Class B misdemeanor: falso rcpt
to law enforcement ofr~Cer • Class A misdemeanor

OH

yes

yes

yes

OK

not noted
willf'ul failure to prompdy repon

misdemeanor
•

.

-

OR

a

yes

yes

punishable by fmc

PA

not noted

RI

fUlC of not n10rc than $1000, or Imprisonment for not
more than 1 yr•• or both

sc

yes

yes

yes

. guilty of mi.sdemeanor, fmc not less than $100 or
prison for not less than 6 mo.

not noted

SD
-

TN

yes

yes

yes

knowing failure to report

Class A misdemeanor

knowing failure to report a CJass B misdemeanor

TX
-

UT

a

yes

yes

yes

not noted

1. Reporting of abuse/neglect is encouraged but not mandatory.
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PERSONS AND INSI'Y'WTTI......,fU'ITONS REQUffiED TO REPORT;
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT
.

ST.

Anyone

Physician

Law

Clergy

Enforcement

Social

\Votker

Personnel

VT

yes

VA

yes

WA

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

WI

1

WY

yes

yes

yes

Psychologbt or
Menial Health
Plo(CS1ion:ll.

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

.

wv

Physiccl.
Occup3lional
Therapist

.

yes

yes

Jl

1. Reporting of abuse/neglect is encouraged but not mandatory.

•
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Appendix E
PERSONS AND INSTI'-TUTIONS REQUIRED TO REPORT;
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT
=
ST.

Nurse

VT

yes.

VA

yes

WA

yes

Adutt•s
Caretaker

yes, if paid
.regularly

Residential

Adult

Penalties for Pailure to Report

Facility,

Daycare

Hospital

Facility

yes

yes

failure to report a rme of not more than $500 or 1 yr.
imprisonment. or both

yes

yes

fmc of not more thaat $500 for 1st failure: not less than
$100 nor more than $1000 for subse.que.nt faUures

not noted

yes

wv

failure to Jcport Q misdemeanor: rme not moro lhan
$100 or imprisonment NMT 10 dayJ. or both
'

WI

not noced

WY

·not noted

=
1. Reponing of abuse/neglect is encouraged but not mandatocy.
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Appendix F
TYPE & TIMING OF INFORMATION BY REPORTER
II

STATE

=

Report in

Manner of

Any

Reporting

Reasonable

Not

Repon,
Followed

Manner

Specified

by Written

Oral

When
Vlrittcn

'Either Oral

ReponDue

Report

1

not specified

AZ

1

2

AR

1

2

CA

1

wfm2

AL
AK

or\Vriucn

wrm24hrs

wking days

co

1

2

w/inS days

CT

no specified
••
time

DE

DC

1

FL

1

2

no specified

GA

•

t1me

1

HI
ID

1

niL
.'

'

UIN

no specified
•
ttme
1

KEY TO TYPES OF REPORTS
1. report immediately
2. written report due within 48 hours of oral report

ASAP
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Appendix F
,........ G OF INFORMATION BY REPOR1'ER

TYPE&

===
Manner of
Reporting
Not

Report in

STATE

Any

Reasonable
Manner
.

.

Specified

.

When
Written
Report Due

Oral
Report,
Followed
by Written

Bither Oral
or Written
Report

no specified

lA

•

tune
w/in 6 hrs

KS

KY

1

LA

,.

ME

1

optional

1

2

,.

ASAP

MD
MA

1

2

Ml

1

optional
oral only

MN
in long-term

MS

care, oral
w/in 24 ·hrs

in long•tenn
•
care, ·wntten
w/in ·72 hrs

II MO

MT

no specified
time
no specified
•
tune
written only

',

•

if requested

no ttme
specified

NE
II

NV

)l NH

1

==

KEY TO TYPES OF REPORTS
1. report immediately
2. written report due within 48 hours of oral report

1

=

if requested
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Appendix F
G OF INFORMATION BY REPORTER
=;

STATE

Report in

Any
Reasonable
Manner

Aianner of
Reporting
Not
Specified

Oral

When

Report,

Written

Followed
by Written

Report Due

Either Oral
or Vlritten
Repon

no specified
•
time

NJ

II

no specified

NM

time
NY

NC

no specified
•

lime

ASAP

ND

OH

1

OK

no specified
•

. time

oral only

OR

no specified

PA

•

time

RI

1

.

sc

wfm24hrs

SD
TN

1

TX

no specified
•

tJme

.

UT

=

1

KEY TO TYPES OF REPORTS
1. report immediately
2. written .report due within 48 hours o.f oral report

196
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Appendix F

TYPE & 1'IMING OF INFORMATION BY REPORTER
====;::==:

STATE

Report in

Any
Reasonable
Manner

Manner of
Reporting
Not
Specified

Oral
Report,
Followed
by Written

VT

-

.

When
Written
Report Due

Either Oral
or \Vritten
Report
.

w/in 1 wk

VA
WA

=

w/in48 hrs

1
I,

W'l
WI

no specified
•
ttme

WY

no specified

1

w/in 10 days

1

2

•
ttme

KEY TO TYPES OF REPORTS

1. report immediately
2. written report due within 48 hours of oral report

•
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Appendix G

AGENCY DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE REPORT; AGENCY RESPONSE
ST.

Welfare,
Social

Services,
Human

Adult
Protective
Services

Law
Enforcement/
Peace Officer

Aging
Agency

Agency
Response

Central
Regisuy

Tune

Resources
AL

yes

yes

wfm48 hrs

AK

yes

if immediate
need

3
,,

yes

AZ

yes

2, but
•

•

yes

mvesUg3tc
emerg. immed.

yes, if'long-

AR

yes

2

term facUlty
yes

CA

yes, if long·
term facility

3

1

3

co

yes

CT

yes

3

DE

yes

3

yes

~-

DC

yes

2, but
•

•

yes

mvesugatc
emerg. •unmed.
2, but

FL

•
mvcsugace
•

yes

emerg. :inuned.
yes:

GA

m

yes

lD

yes

yes. if protec.
svcs. unava.il.

3

yes

2

yes

2, but

.

-mvesugatc
·
emerg. inuned.

yes

~

IN

yes

yes_

yes

3

yes

reponwfm.

yes

s days

===

KEY:
1.. on weekends and after working hours

2. no time for investigation given
3. investigate_immediately
4. or to any appropriate agency or organization

[Vol. 31:77

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

198

Appendix G

AGENCY DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE REPORT; AGENCY RESPONSE
ST.

Welfare,
Social
Services,
Human
Resources

lA

yes

KS

yes

KY

yes

Adult
Protective
Services

Aging
Agency

Central
Registry

1

2, but
•
•
mvesttgate
emerg. immed.

yes

1

2, but

yes

•
•
tnvestJgate
emerg .. immed.

ASAP
yes

LA

Agency
Response
Time

Law
Enforcement/
Peace Officer

yes

yes

3

ME

yes

3

MD

yes

2. but
•

•

mvesttgate
emerg. immed.
yes

MA
MI

yes

MN

yes

MS

yes

w/in 48 hrs.

yes

MO

yes

3

yes

MT

yes

2

NE

yes

NV

yes

NH

w/in 24 hrs.
yes

yes

3

yes

2

yes

w/in 72 hrs.

1

KEY:

1.
2.
3.
4.

2

on weekends and after working hours
no time for investigation given
investigate immediately
or to any appropriate agency or organintion

yes

w/in 72 hrs.

yes

yes
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Appendix G

AGENCY DESIGNA'I'ED TO RECEIVE REPORT; AGENCY RESPONSE
ST.

Welfare,
Social

Services,
Human
Resources

Protective
Services

Law
Enforcement/
Peace Officer

Agency

Agency
Response
Time

Cenual

Regisuy

2

NM

yes

NY

"may

•may

•may

make"-4

make•-4

make•-4

NC

yes

ND

yes

OH

yes

wfm2472 hrs.

OK

yes

3

OR

yes

PA

3

yes

3

yes

3

yes

yes

sc

yes

wfm72
hrs

RI

•

Aging

yes

NJ

II

Adult

yes

•

3
wfm72
brs

SD
TN

TX

yes

ASAP

yes

wfm24
hrs

UT

yes

yes

KEY:

1.
2.
3.
4.

on weekends and after working hours
no rime for investigation given
investigate immediately
or to any appropriate agency or organization

ASAP

yes
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AGENCY DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE REPORT; AGENCY RESPONSE
ST.

Welfare,
Social
Services,
Human
Resources

Adult
Protective

Law
Enforcement/
Peace Officer

Services

VT

Agency

Agency
Response
Time

Central
Registry

yes

w/in 72 hrs

yes

Aging

~-

VA

yes

WA

yes

wv

. yes, for sex
abuse

yes

WY

yes

(

yes

2

:.

.

yes

WI

3

2, but
mvestigate
emerg. bnnted.

yes

KEY:

1. on weekends .and after working hours
2. no time for investigation given
3. investigate immediately
4. or to any appropriate agency or organization

~ -

w/in 24 hrs

yes

2

yes
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Appendix H
PROTECTION FOR REPORTER

'

STATE

Good

Reporter

Protection Against

Faith

Confidential

Retaliation

Immunity
AL

yes

AK

yes

yes

1, 2

AZ

yes

yes

1

AR

yes

yes

1

CA

yes

yes

l, 2

co

yes

yes

1, 2

CT

yes

yes
•

DE

yes

yes

2

DC

yes

yes

1, 2

FL

yes

yes

1
'

yes

yes

11m

yes

yes

ID

yes

yes

2

IL

yes

yes

2

IN

yes

yes

l, 2

GA

1. Client in Community

2. Client-in InstitUtion

2
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Appendix H
PROTECTION FOR REPORTER
11

STATE

Good
Faith

Protection Against
Retaliation

Reporter
Confidential

Immunity

II

yes

yes

1

KA

yes

yes·

1,2

KY

yes

yes

2

LA

yes

ME

yes

yes

MD

yes

yes

lA
.

2

2
.

MA

yes

yes

1,2

MI

yes

yes

2

MN

yes

yes

1
.

.·

MS

yes

yes

2

MO

yes

yes

2

MT

yes

yes

NE

yes

yes
.

NV

yes

yes·

2

NH

yes

yes

2

=
1. Client in Community
2. Client in Institution
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Appendix H

PROTECTION FOR REPORTER
STATE

Good
Faith

Reporter
Confidential

Protection Against
Retaliation

Immunity

1, 2

NJ

NM

yes

yes

NY

yes

2

NC

yes

2

ND

yes

yes

1, 2

OH

yes

yes

1, 2

OK

yes

yes

2

OR

yes

yes

2

PA

yes

yes

1

RI

yes

yes

2

sc

yes

1

SD

yes

2

TN

yes

yes

1

TX

yes

yes

2

UT

yes

yes

2

2

•

==
1. Client in Community
2. Client in Institution
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Appendix H
PROTECTION FOR REPORTER
:;=
I.

STATE

Good
Faith

Reporter
Confidential

Protection Against
Retaliation

1, 2

Immunity
VT

yes

yes

VA

yes

yes

WA

yes

yes

2

wv

yes

yes

2

WI

yes

yes

1

WY

yes

yes

2

1. Client in Community
2. Client in Institution
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